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ABSTRACT 
“To the Seventh Generation”  
Italians and the Creation of an American Political Identity, 1921-1948 
Jessica Harriet Lee 
 
The increase in Italian American political power from the 1920s through the 1940s 
coincided with the rise of Fascism in Italy and Americanism in the United States—two opposing 
ideologies that greatly influenced how Italians practiced political citizenship. Benito Mussolini’s 
Fascist ideology demanded Italians’ permanent subservience to the Italian corporate state, even 
to the seventh generation abroad. At the same time, American xenophobes pushed Americanism; 
an anti-immigrant ideology that demanded foreigners’ total loyalty to America, its Constitution, 
and its Anglo-Saxon culture. Scholars have separately noted Italian Americans’ overwhelming 
support of Fascism and dramatic rise in electoral participation during the Great Depression, but 
few have investigated the overlap between those two developments. None have placed Italian 
Americans’ growing ethnic awareness within the context of American nationalism. This 
dissertation uncovers the causal relationship between Italian Americans’ Fascism and growing 
political capital, and demonstrates how ethnic elites worked with the Italian and American states 
to develop a new transnationalistic citizenship. Their new concept of citizenship did not deny the 
inherent nationalism of Americanism or Fascism, but rather recognized migrants as a special 
category of citizens with specific and unique rights and obligations to each of their nations. 
Beginning in 1930, Italian American elites made shrewd choices about how Fascism 
would spread and function in the United States to avoid government investigations. Italian 
immigrants first organized pro-Fascist clubs to find a collective purpose as transnationalistic 
citizens. Hoping to prove their value to Italy, immigrant elites first used their clubs to mobilize 
their growing communities in support of favorable terms of repayment for Italy’s World War I 
debt to the United States. The war debt campaign taught the Italian government and pro-Fascist 
immigrants that Italian Americans had the potential for great political power, but only if they 
naturalized and organized. To pursue naturalization and ethnic politics simultaneously they first 
needed to overcome their ideological conflicts with the Americanist values of total assimilation.  
Italian American elites resolved the tensions of choosing between Americanism and 
Fascism by bringing their communities together around an ethno-cultural nationalism, called 
Italianità, that pursued the ascension of Italian Americans in the United States and the 
supremacy of Italy in Europe. Italianità helped immigrants win support for their 
transnationalistic citizenship by using culture as a screen for advancing their political causes 
without drawing criticism. Seemingly apolitical events organized by Mussolini’s supporters 
brought Italian Americans masses to the attention of American politicians, like on Columbus 
Day. The more active Italian Americans became in support of themselves and their homeland, 
the more aggressively American politicians courted their votes.  
By 1941, Italians had far surpassed Germans and Japanese in continual demonstrations of 
pro-Fascist nationalism through Italianità. Because they also eclipsed their co-ethnics in 
American voting power, the government largely ignored Italians in its extensive investigations of 
un-American activities before and after Pearl Harbor. This dissertation is the first to recognize 
the political roots of the government’s investigations into Germans and Italians and the resulting 
arrests during the war. The strategies employed by immigrant elites in the 1920s and 1930s 
enabled Italian ethnics to escape the mass internment and arrests of the 1940s. Rather than shrink 
from their ethnic identity, Italian Americans employed the full weight of their political capital to 
serve their community through the end of World War II. 
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Introduction 
 
The mass exodus of 33 million Europeans to the United States in the century preceding 
World War II created an international crisis of citizenship.1 Supposedly, citizens were a legally 
recognized class of people with inviolable rights and obligations to one nation-state, yet the 
increasing naturalizations of European citizens abroad called into question the exclusiveness of 
those obligations. The problem of overlapping citizenships was so troubling to Europe and the 
U.S. that when the League of Nations called its first conference for the codification of 
international law in 1930, it began with the question of nationality—who rightfully claimed the 
citizenship of emigrants and for how long?2 Initiating the dialogue on conflicting citizenship, the 
League’s Hague Convention resolved, “it is the general interest of the international community 
to secure that all members should recognise that every person should have a nationality and 
should have one nationality only.”3  
With this guiding principle, the League subscribed to a conception of nationalistic 
citizenship that drew authority from the exclusivity of the relationship between an individual and 
the state. Nationalistic citizenship functioned by individuals promising obligations to one state 
only, while nations gave certain rights to its citizens exclusively. The League recognized that in 
such a system both individuals and states could be deprived of their citizenship rights, the former 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jose C. Moya and Adam McKeown, “World Migration in the Long Twentieth Century,” in Essays on 
Twentieth-Century History, ed. Michael Adas (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2010), 16. 
 
2 Hunter Miller, “The Hague Codification Conference,” American Journal of International Law 24, no. 4 
(October 1930): 674–693. 
 
3 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Refworld | Convention on Certain Questions 
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law,” Refworld, accessed March 6, 2016, 
http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3ae6b3b00. 
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through statelessness and the latter through dual citizenship.4 
In the aftermath of World War II the United Nations was faced with a different type of 
citizenship problem. The sea of refugees the Axis left in its wake magnified the catastrophe of 
statelessness for individuals, while Hitler’s expulsion and atrocious abuse of his own citizens 
weakened support for nations’ absolute claims over citizens.5 Article 15 of the U.N.’s 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was a reaction to both the plight of the refugees and the 
aggressiveness of nationalistic citizenship as it stated, “(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor deprived the right to change his 
nationality.”6 The state’s right to obligate no longer matched the individual’s right to belong; 
indeed the state no longer had a right to citizenship at all.  
The global emphasis on statelessness heavily influenced historical scholarship on 
citizenship as well as international law. Soon after the U.N. established its Declaration of Human 
Rights, historian Oscar Handlin related the epic history of America’s immigrants in his 1951 
work The Uprooted. In it, he told a story of alienated people ripped from the barren soil of their 
homelands and carelessly dropped into American society. As if the economic migrants of the 
1890s were as stateless as World War II refugees, Handlin explained that after five years, “the 
newcomer was expected to become a citizen. Docile, he did what was expected of him. One day 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2006). 
 
5 H Lauterpacht, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” British Year Book of International Law 
25 (1948): 354–381; Kathleen Cronin-Furman, “60 Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
Towards an Individual Responsibility to Protect,” American University International Law Review 25, no. 
1 (2010): 175–198. 
 
6 UN General Assembly, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” December 10, 1948. 
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he took an oath, received a certificate, was naturalized.”7 In the sixty-five years since Handlin’s 
writing, the social and cultural image of the American immigrant has changed dramatically. John 
Bodnar’s 1985 work The Transplanted inspired historians to investigate the myriad ways 
migrants brought their old world values, networks, religions, cultures, and even labor 
organizations with them to the new world.8 Historians have eagerly answered Bodnar’s call with 
one notable exception—the implications of migrants carrying their political citizenship with 
them across borders.9 Just as migrants changed American and European food and language 
through their transnationalism, they also changed international conceptions of citizenship. 
Handlin’s simple story of passive naturalization does not match the complicated history of 
competing nationalisms, ideologies, and allegiances.  
This dissertation explains how one group of migrants broke through the confinements of 
nationalistic citizenship to reinterpret immigrants’ multiple state obligations as a privilege 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations That Made the American People, 
(Atlantic-Little, Brown Books, 1951). 
 
8 Among historians of Italian immigration, examples include: Donna R. Gabaccia, Italy’s Many 
Diasporas (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000); Donna R. Gabaccia and Franca Iacovetta, 
eds., Women, Gender, and Transnational Lives: Italian Women Around the World (University of Toronto 
Press, 2002); Robert A. Orsi, The Madonna of 115th Street (Yale University Press, 2002); Jennifer 
Guglielmo, Living the Revolution: Italian Women’s Resistance and Radicalism in New York City, 1880-
1945 (The University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Gary R. Mormino and George E. Pozzetta, 
“Immigrant Women in Tampa: The Italian Experience, 1890-1930,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 61, 
no. 3 (1983): 296–312. 
 
9 By immigrants’ political citizenship I mean the standing migrants brought with them as political citizens 
of their home nations as well as the potential they had as white Europeans to become active political 
citizens in America. I am relying on T.H. Marshall’s description of “the political rights of citizenship” as 
the state-recognized right to engage in political acts, like voting as well as Judith Shklar’s distinction 
between the standing of citizens as holders of political rights and “active participation or ‘good’ 
citizenship.’” This dissertation traces how Italians earned standing in Italy and America as they actively 
participated as political citizens. T.H. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class,” in The Citizenship 
Debates: A Reader, ed. Gershon Shafir (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 93–111; 
Judith N. Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University 
Press, 1998). 
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instead of a problem. They achieved this feat without the global terror of World War II, but with 
the persistent political mobilization of an otherwise apathetic, apolitical, and unorganized group 
of migrants. In doing so, this project demonstrates how politically engaged migrants pushed the 
Italian and American states from adhering to strictly nationalistic citizenship towards accepting 
the immigrants’ vision of what I call transnationalistic citizenship.  
Definining Citizenship for Italian Americans 
In nationalistic citizenship, a nation recognizes the standing of a class of individuals only 
when they make exclusive promises of obligation to that nation.10 In transnationalistic 
citizenship, two nations recognize a group of migrants as having special standing in both places. 
Italian Americans wanted recognition of the specific civil, political, and social rights they held at 
home and abroad, and in return accepted a set of unique obligations to each state. 
Transnationalistic migrants were not free to relinquish all obligations to their home state upon 
emigration, but in return, neither nation could ask migrants for service beyond what was 
appropriate. 
 Defining the limits of appropriate service required decades of negotiations between Italy, 
America, and the migrants. In the 1920s, for example, Italian emigrants rejected Mussolini’s 
claims on their military obligations to Italy due to their service in the United States. In the 1930s, 
they rejected Roosevelt’s calls for a moral embargo against Italy because they felt obligated to 
support their homeland financially. Neither rejection was an effort to denationalize citizenship. 
Italian migrants did not want to relinquish the states’ claims to them. Rather, they wanted to 
secure their privileged position in both nations. As such, it was not enough for migrants to reject 
their military obligations to Italy on an individual basis. They needed Mussolini to acknowledge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership, 5–9. 
 
	   5 
their special exemption as a class of emigrants, which he ultimately did. Nor were they satisfied 
to donate immense amounts of copper, gold, and cotton during the Ethiopian War despite 
Roosevelt’s request to economically sanction their homeland. They expected Roosevelt to 
kowtow to their political power in America by abandoning his own neutrality bill against Italy, 
something he eventually did. The dialogue Italy, America, and their migrants had over the 
appropriate limits to migrants’ citizenship obligations at home and abroad shows how Italian 
Americans won acceptance of transnationalistic citizenship by employing their political capital.11 
In uncovering the discourse between immigrants and their home and host nations regarding the 
boundaries and viability of transnationalistic citizenship, this dissertation makes several 
contributions to the study of transnationalism, nationalism, and political citizenship. Most 
importantly, it brings politics and the state into the discussion of transnationalism and 
transnational citizenship, which tends to be understood as a cultural practice.  
  Modern scholarship on transnationalism traces its roots to Randolph Bourne’s 1916 
essay “Trans-National America,” in which Bourne defended immigrants’ cosmopolitanism in the 
face of Americanism. Bourne imagined dual citizenship as a model for internationalism that 
could liberate America from its self-defeating project of nationalistic citizenship. Describing 
forced assimilation as unrealistic and chauvinistic, Bourne wrote: 
“We have assumed unquestioningly that mere participation in the political life of the 
United States must cut the new citizen off from all sympathy with his old allegiance. 
Anything but a bodily transfer of devotion from one sovereignty to another has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Another option would be to follow Eiichiro Azuma’s model of the “inter-National” migrant. Azuma 
uses inter-National to explain Japanese immigrants’ experiences navigating between being citizen-
subjects of one state and aliens ineligible for citizenship in another. Like the Italians, Issei refused to 
choose one political identity over the other, leading to a conception of belonging that was “situational, 
elastic, and even inconsistent at times, but always dualistic to the core.” Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two 
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viewed as a sort of moral treason against the Republic. We have insisted that the 
immigrant whom we welcomed escaping from the very exclusive nationalism of his 
European home shall forthwith adopt a nationalism just as exclusive, just as narrow, and 
even less legitimate because it is founded on no warm traditions of his own.”12 
 
Long before Handlin portrayed America’s immigrants as uprooted refugees with no prior 
political allegiances, Bourne saw migrants’ Old World citizenship as a fundamental part of their 
cultural heritage. He argued furthermore that dual citizenship—that word “which meets with so 
much articulate horror among us,”—could solve America’s jingoism. Dual citizenship would 
replace nationalism with trans-nationalism and eventually “international citizenship,” a utopian 
term reserved for the day Americans would become true “citizen[s] of the world.13”  
The primary problem with using dual citizenship as a term today is its ubiquity. The label 
generally applies to any person with multiple citizenships, even if that individual has never left 
her country of birth or enjoyed civil, political, or social rights in a second nation. Spain, for 
example, recently passed a law allowing diasporic Jews to easily claim citizenship more than 500 
years after the Inquisition expelled their ancestors from the land. Jews of Spanish origin may 
seek their rightful citizenship not because they feel a sense of obligation or belonging to the 
Spanish state, but because a Spanish passport allows them to work and study anywhere in the 
European Union.14 Dual citizenship is not entirely meaningless, but is no longer as contentious as 
it once was or may be in the future. 
Dual citizenship also poses a problem by implying parity between the two nations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Randolph Silliman Bourne, “Trans-National America,” in History of a Literary Radical And Other 
Essays, Third Edition. (New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1969), 292–293. 
 
13 Ibid., 292, 297. 
 
14 Michael D. Moritz, “Value of Your Ancestors: Gaining Back-Door Access to the European Union 
through Birthright Citizenship,” Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 26, no. 1 (2015): 
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granting citizenship when in practice it is more like secondary or auxiliary citizenship. When 
dual citizens believe there is no chance for conflict in their national obligations they can imagine 
themselves as citizens of both places equally, but that fantasy only lasts as long as they never 
have to choose. One may be a dual citizen without ever having to act like one. In 2014 Spain 
dropped the provision from its citizenship bill requiring the forfeiture of foreign citizenship, and 
when the bill passed in 2015 the country expected to receive 200,000 applicants. Would Spain 
see quite so many new citizens if it still denied dual citizenship, retained its compulsory military 
service, or did not so comfortably enjoy the friendship of America and other European nations? 
These were not hypothetical questions for Italian Americans of the twentieth century, and they 
were not easily answered.  
Though Bourne wrote his defense of dual citizenship during World War I, he avoided 
addressing the obvious nationalistic challenges to multiple citizenships. In refuting Americans’ 
fears of hyphenated identities, Bourne wrote, “it is not the Bohemian who supports the Bohemian 
schools in Chicago whose influence is sinister, but the Bohemian who has made money and has 
got into ward politics.”15 For Bourne, immigrants asserted their ethnicities best through cultural 
institutions and lost their distinct standing by becoming American capitalists and voters. Though 
Italians would later demonstrate how making money, getting into ward politics, and reinforcing 
culture through ethnic institutions were essential components of the same naturalization process, 
Bourne defined citizenship as a cultural and sentimental attachment to a homeland, not the 
privileged access to civil, political, and social rights immigrants enjoyed in their home and host 
nations.16 
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In the late 1990s migration scholars rediscovered Bourne’s transnationalism, proliferating 
a host of new terms to describe the predominantly cultural aspects of citizenship. “Diasporic 
citizenship” accounted for the movement of Haitian identity across borders, “cultural citizenship” 
described Latinos’ racial, cultural, and linguistic space in white America, and “flexible 
citizenship” explained the choices ethnic Chinese made to accumulate social capital within a 
global capitalistic society.17 Scholars of Italian migration history similarly attempted to break 
free from what Gerard Noiriel termed “the tyranny of the national” and explore Italian 
transnationalism “as a way of life that connects family, work, and consciousness in more than 
one national territory.”18 Significantly, their definition of transnationalism did not include 
nationalism or state-sponsored citizenship. Just as Bourne privileged the immigrants’ cultural 
heritage over their political allegiances, “Italians of the World” replaced the state and its political 
borders with the migrant’s family, social networks, and labor organizations.19  
Italians’ tendency to travel as sojourners rather than immigrants offered a wealth of 
opportunities for historians to study transnationalism’s causes and effects in a global diaspora. 
Italian migration scholarship primarily focused on transnationalism’s influence on labor 
militancy and family strategies; a choice that yielded significant contributions to studies of labor 
and gender but elided the undeniable nationalism Italian migrants developed in response to 
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Mussolini’s Fascism. In confronting the problem of Italian diasporic nationalism in the 1920s 
and 1930s Donna Gabaccia reflected, “Our goal then was not to sidestep the tyranny of the 
national but to problematize it.”20 However, at its core transnationalism is a project that seeks to 
“deterritorialize” the nation and “denationalize” the citizen, and historians’ attempts to 
problematize nationalism led to their flawed conclusions that migrant pro-Fascism was primarily 
the result of an exported strategy rather than an exchange of ideas between Mussolini and his 
emigrants abroad.21 
Fascism, Americanism, and Italianità 
The rise of Italian American Fascism in the 1930s reveals how limiting a denationalizing 
approach to migration history can be. As with all nationalisms, the global Italian Fascist 
community was an imagined one—even more so because the Fascist State post-dated the mass 
migration of Italians.22 In Italy, Fascism was first a domestic system of government that replaced 
individualism with the disciplined cooperation of all citizens. Second, it was a foreign policy 
agenda that sought the country’s redemption from the Treaty of Versailles. Third, it was a 
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prophecy of Italy’s return to the glory of the Roman Empire through its racial supremacy.23 In 
the diaspora, Fascism called for Italians’ permanent subservience to the Italian corporate state, 
imperialist agenda, and racial pride even “to the seventh generation abroad,” as Benito Mussolini 
famously stated.24  
The Fascism that Mussolini intended to export ran into direct conflict with the American 
nationalist project of Americanism; a jingoistic ideology that demanded foreigners’ total loyalty 
to America, its Constitution, and its Anglo-Saxon culture. In a 1921 article on teaching 
Americanism, one educator explained the term succinctly: “Americanism is nationalism. Those 
who are un-American subscribe to the idealism of some other nation than America, to the tenets 
of inter-nationalism or to nothing. Those who stand for Americanism stand for a strong national 
existence.”25 Italian Americans and Fascist diplomats used Americanism to describe both the 
cultural suppression of an Italian identity for an American one as well as the denial of Italian 
nationalistic citizenship through naturalization as American citizens.  
Italian Americans found both sets of nationalisms appealing for their strong sense of 
community while also limiting for their exclusion of other “isms.” Rather than choose, migrants 
wanted to be both Italian nationalists and Americanists—to be for the expansion of Italy’s 
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borders and a strong America; for the racial ascendance of Italians in Europe and the acceptance 
of Italy’s emigrants as Americans. Immigrant elites resolved the tensions of choosing between 
Americanism and Fascism by bringing their communities together around an ethno-cultural 
nationalism of Italianità that pursued the ascension of Italian Americans in the United States and 
the supremacy of Italy in Europe. Italianità began as a domestic project of unification for the 
nascent Italian state of the 1860s and later expanded to signify pride in Italy’s historic, scientific, 
and artistic contributions to world civilization.26 In the 1920s the Fascist state accepted it as a 
proto-nationalism for emigrants. They employed the term first in making Italian nationalism 
synonymous with Fascism. By the 1930s, Italy, America, and the Italian migrants each adapted 
Italianità to support their visions of the good immigrant citizen.27 The question of how the 
competing nationalisms of Americanisms and Fascism were resolved through Italianità is central 
to this study, and serves to balance scholarly literature that overemphasizes the cultural and 
social aspects of transnationalism and nationalism.28  
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Understanding the context of Italian American migration in the interwar period is crucial 
to grasping the significance of the migrants’ rising nationalism and political capital. Italian 
Americans’ growing nationalism during the 1930s coincided with their entry into American 
politics and their visibility as active citizens of Italy and the United States. Though scholars have 
separately noted Italian Americans’ overwhelming support of Fascism and the dramatic rise in 
their electoral participation during the Great Depression, few have investigated the overlap 
between those two developments. None have placed that process in context with the American 
nationalistic project of Americanism. This dissertation uncovers the causal relationship between 
Italian Americans’ Fascism and their newfound political capital in America. 
The Rise of Italian American Political Capital 
 In 1920, Italians were the second largest immigrant group in America but made up only 
seven percent of the nation’s naturalized citizens.29 Unmotivated and disorganized, few Italians 
engaged politically at the time, allowing politicians to virtually ignore the community. Without 
political capital, Italian immigrants watched helplessly as their homeland suffered neglect at the 
hands of the Great Powers in the Treaty of Versailles and their fellow immigrants suffered 
prejudice and discrimination from the United States through its national quota laws. The 1921 
and 1924 immigration quotas that restricted aliens’ right to enter America’s golden doors 
encouraged Italian Americans to naturalize at unprecedented rates. In the three decades 
following the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, the population of American citizens born in Italy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
political identity, see Gary Gerstle, Working-Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City, 
1914-1960 (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002).  
 
29 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States 1920, Volume II: Population, 
Chapter 9, Table 1 (Washington, D.C., 1922), NARA. 
 
	   13 
increased by almost 170 percent, opening the way for enormous electoral power, at least 
potentially.30 By 1940 Italians edged out Germans to become America’s largest group of 
immigrants and naturalized citizens, and by 1950 no other nation came close to the Italian 
population in America. During that time Italian Americans had also organized themselves as a 
crucial voting bloc in several key states, and were able to influence the foreign policies of both 
Benito Mussolini and Franklin D. Roosevelt.31 
The growth of Italian electoral participation and political capital in the first half of the 
twentieth century was not a necessary or automatic effect of their increased naturalizations. In 
September of 1936, Columbia professor Giuseppe Prezzolini, director of his university’s Casa 
Italiana, spoke on the Italian shortwave station Radio Roma about a potential political resource 
for Fascism in America. “Seven years of residency in New York City has convinced me that 
Italy has a treasure there that it does not recognize or appreciate enough,” he told his audience. 
He described the treasure as “a magnificent diamond, if perhaps a little rough that only needs to 
be cleaned and cut to shine with all its light.” “By that I mean the heart of the American citizens 
of Italian origin” he clarified. Their enduring affections for the homeland had produced brief 
moments of political unity, but their sentimental attachments to Italy had not yet produced 
lasting political power. The problem was that no one had properly organized them. The 
immigrants, he explained, “left Italy miserable and illiterate by fault of the past government, that 
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never cared about them. And they found an American government just as indifferent to their 
fates.” The immigrants themselves had made some progress, but he believed they suffered from a 
lack of education, leadership, and unity that prevented them from achieving their full potential. 
Who would step in and help carve the jewel of Italian American political power? Speaking from 
a Fascist-built radio station as head of a Fascist-sponsored organization in America, the answer 
was clear: Mussolini’s Italian state.32  
By 1936 Prezzolini already saw changes within the community that gave him hope for 
the future. Just that year he noted the Italians of New York had overcome their disorganization to 
institute Italian language classes in the public high schools, raise massive sums of money to help 
fund Italy’s Ethiopian War, and assert their political pressure to ensure America’s neutrality laws 
remained favorable to Italy. Their fundraisers, rallies, and letter-writing campaigns had piqued 
the interest of American politicians. “In sum,” Prezzolini explained, “the Italians are a force in 
the United States, and the great mass of people are becoming aware of the political power that 
they hold united.”33 
While traditional scholarship on American ethnic politics focuses on the ways Americans 
cultivated an ethnic vote by assimilating voters to American politics, this dissertation 
demonstrates how Italian Americans worked with their homeland’s national representatives to 
turn a famously apathetic community into the strongest ethnic political bloc of the mid-twentieth 
century.34 The coordinated work of migrants and homeland representatives to politically 
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mobilize ethnics is unusual in American history. Unlike the Irish, Chinese, and Jewish 
communities who came together politically in the pursuit of homeland revolutions and 
independence, the Italian Americans’ political strength rose with their homeland’s state power.35 
And while some nations, like Germany and Japan, similarly tried capitalizing on their emigrant 
citizens in America, they found their success stymied by the apathy of assimilated ethnics or the 
racial laws that barred migrants’ full political citizenship in America.36 Studying Italian 
Americans’ unique history of political development provides new insights into American politics 
and immigration by showing the lasting success a state can have working with its emigrants to 
politically organize around their issues. 
By studying ethnic politics from an exclusively American vantage point, historians miss 
comparisons between nation-states and their nationalistic projects abroad, as well as the role of 
immigrants in determining the style of their political participation. Scholars of the 1960s to the 
1980s who discovered ethnic voters by examining American politics at the smallest level of 
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urban wards argued that Americans introduced ethnic voters to politics when it suited them. In 
Chicago John Allswang found corrupt machines at work, in Boston Gerald Gamm credited 
Democratic Party operatives with registering new voters, in New York City Ronald Bayor 
identified the influence of labor unions on voting patterns, and in San Francisco Frederick Wirt 
noticed opportunism among individual American politicians.37 Even where they acknowledged 
pushback from immigrant groups who demanded more recognition or material gains for their 
votes, scholars still claimed ethnic mobilization originated with the Americans.  
In the early 2000s, historians began paying more attention to ethnic groups and 
acknowledged the extent to which immigrants organized themselves by using their cultural 
institutions as bases for political power.38 Lizabeth Cohen’s study of working-class mobilization 
in the 1920s, Making a New Deal, was particularly successful at demonstrating the ways mass 
consumer culture helped immigrant groups work across ethnic boundaries to politically mobilize 
for a working-class notion of “moral capitalism.”39 This dissertation follows the trend towards a 
cultural analysis of ethnic politics by determining how Italian American radio stations, 
newspapers, and fraternal associations shaped the character and content of their communities’ 
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political participation.40 It adds further to the scholarship by bringing the Italian state into the 
history of ethnic politics; demonstrating the extent to which the Italian state contributed to the 
creation, growth, and endurance of migrants’ cultural institutions.  
The role of the Italian state in supporting an Italian American voting bloc through ethno-
cultural nationalism reveals a second shortcoming in the scholarship on American political 
history in that the literature continues to privilege race and class over migrants’ other identities. 
Since 1991 scholars have been responding to David Roediger’s question of why America’s white 
workers continuously vote based on racial, rather than working class issues. Roediger’s 
conclusion that race matters more to workers than class as a socially constructed identity initiated 
a new genre of whiteness studies in American immigration history.41 By examining immigrants’ 
political identities in a strictly American setting, historians present a binary choice between racial 
and class identities that denies immigrants’ nationalisms. Italian Americans may have realized 
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the privileged access to naturalization and the franchise that their whiteness brought them, but it 
was not the basis of their political identity nor was it the motivating factor in their mobilization.42 
Rather than speak of their whiteness, when Italian Americans organized their fellow immigrants 
they evoked the group’s ethno-cultural nationalism, or Italianità.  
Italians not only ignored whiteness as a political identity by choosing Italianità, they also 
abandoned their global solidarity with workers when it conflicted with their Italian nationalism. 
This decision is seen most clearly in 1935 when the International Ladies Garment Workers’ 
Union banned the collection of funds for Italy’s Ethiopian campaign on factory floors. Workers 
immediately rebelled against the prohibition and contributed almost a third of the money sent to 
Italy in the first month of war.43 They further demonstrated the primacy of their nationalism 
when their support for President Roosevelt’s third and fourth presidential campaigns dropped 
significantly in response to his unwillingness to help Italy. Though Italians benefited greatly 
from the New Deal and many still voted for Roosevelt, they were more receptive than other 
ethnic groups to Republican appeals to their ethnic nationalism.44 Italian Americans’ skill 
spreading pro-Fascist nationalism even in the heart of anti-Fascist labor unions requires a 
reevaluation of the former dichotomy between race and class as the origins of political identity. 
The introduction of ethno-cultural nationalism into the history of immigrant political history is a 
step in that direction. 
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Finally, whiteness also falls short as a framework by prioritizing identity over action in 
the formation and accumulation of ethnic political capital. As highlighted by the twentieth-
century histories of Japanese and German Americans, European immigrants’ whiteness unlocked 
political opportunities denied to America’s other ethnic groups, but it was up to the immigrants 
to open the door and cross the threshold. For German Americans, acceptance of American 
nationalism and near-total relinquishment of an ethnic identity after World War I left the 
community devoid of political capital when their citizenship and allegiance came into question 
during World War II. For Japanese Americans, coordinated efforts in the early twentieth century 
to attain political capital and avoid the fate of Chinese exclusion could not defeat the power of 
American racism either in 1924 or in 1942. 
German Americans reacted to their World War I experience by running from their 
German ethnicities and rapidly assimilating. The papers of the German Ambassador to America 
during the 1930s reveal a frustrated diplomat envious of Italy’s success at spreading ethno-
cultural nationalism and exasperated by his government’s futile efforts at curbing the public 
relations liability of the German American Bund. Despite ethnic Germans’ minimal interest in 
German nationalism and the drastic decline of German ethnic institutions after World War I, 
American politicians and filmmakers promulgated an imagined Nazi fifth column in America 
during the mid-1930s.45 Without a unified voice to defend themselves, the assimilation of five 
million German Americans was negated by the grossly exaggerated claims of Bundist Fritz Kuhn 
that his group counted 230,000 German American Nazis.46 Though historians now estimate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Sander A. Diamond, The Nazi Movement in the United States, 1924-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1974); Arnie Bernstein, Swastika Nation: Fritz Kuhn and the Rise and Fall of the German-
American Bund (New York: Picador, 2014); Holian, The German-Americans and World War II, An 
Ethnic Experience; Kazal, Becoming Old Stock. 
 
 
	   20 
number was closer to 6,500, Congressman Samuel Dickstein further inflated Kuhn’s claims 
when he used his position in the House Un-American Activities Committee to generate a fear of 
450,000 Bundists in America.47 The public and the government responded accordingly, with the 
FBI arresting five times more Germans than Italians after Pearl Harbor, based largely on citizens’ 
tips.48 
Conversely, the Japanese in America responded warmly to nationalistic propaganda from 
their home nation. Like the Italians, Japanese in America worked alongside their consuls to 
spread sympathy among Americans for the homeland’s cause. They stimulated patriotism across 
generations through newspapers, motion pictures, and cultural events, and raised money to 
support military campaigns.49 The immigrant patriotism of the Issei naturally prompted their 
concern over the Nisei’s assimilation, and just as Italian Americans organized pro-Fascist 
schools for their children, Japanese schools in California flourished in the 1930s. Issei imagined 
new connections between their migratory experience and American history to diminish their 
“otherness” and make space for themselves in American society and culture, just as the Italians 
did with icons such as Christopher Columbus and Francesco Vigo. Unlike the Italians, Japanese 
immigrants were ineligible for citizenship and could never hope to access the political capital 
they needed to establish their vision of Japanese American citizenship.50 
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America’s recognition of Italians’ whiteness and eligibility for citizenship gave Italians 
access to countless privileges denied Japanese, all of which would contribute to their different 
treatment during the war.51 Even second generation Nisei could not rely on their American 
citizenship to protect them from the intensified racism of early 1942, leading to the internment of 
112,000 Japanese Americans. But the experience of German Americans proves that a claim to 
whiteness was not enough to guarantee acceptance. Immigrants had to use their privileged access 
to American citizenship first to build their political capital and then win recognition of their 
transnationalistic citizenship. 
In exposing the extensive ideological and political work required to build ethnic political 
capital, this project raises questions about the mechanics of mobilizing millions of uneducated 
and unorganized migrants, the willingness of American politicians to let Fascists run their 
political campaigns, and the ability of Italians to emerge out of World War II largely unscathed. 
How, exactly, did the Italian state get 100,000 women to donate their gold wedding bands to the 
Italian Consulate in New York and why would impoverished immigrants donate their only gold 
objects to fund a foreign politician’s imperial war during the Great Depression? Why did so 
many politicians attend pro-Fascist events, hire pro-Fascist organizers, and campaign on a pro-
Fascist platform, and how did the House un-American Activities Committee miss so much pro-
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Fascist organizing? What stopped Germany from spreading even a fraction of the nationalistic 
fervor that swept Little Italy, and if the Italians were so much more overtly pro-Fascist before the 
war why did the FBI arrest five times more German Americans than Italian Americans after 
Pearl Harbor?  
Sources and Structure 
To uncover this silenced past I have relied on three sets of sources. First, I use the records 
of the Italian government in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Popular Culture, and 
its subordinate agencies including the Dante Alighieri Society. What remains of the Italian 
Fascist papers reveal a clear mission to organize Italian immigrants indirectly, rather than overtly 
through Fascist organizations after 1929. To do so, diplomats relied on the Italian American elite, 
or prominenti and the newspapers, radio stations, and organizations they controlled. Working 
together, diplomats and prominenti organized Italian Americans in schools, churches, clubs, and 
cultural institutions specifically targeted towards children, mothers, artists, workers, businessmen, 
and veterans, among others. They held parades and rallies, sponsored movies and sporting events, 
gave out medals of honor and free trips to the Motherland.  
The papers of the prominenti, scattered in archives throughout America, make up the 
second major archival source. Most of the record of their involvement with the Italian 
government did not survive the panic of World War II, but several revealing newspapers, 
souvenir booklets, and speeches remain. From the San Francisco Public Library, the University 
of Minnesota’s Immigration History Research Center, the Historical Society of Pennsylvania’s 
Balch Institute, and the New York Public Library, the voices of successful Italian American 
businessmen, politicians, journalists and educators tell a story of Italian American Fascism that 
spoke to the prominenti’s hunger for recognition.  
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The papers of American politicians and government agencies comprise the third major 
source informing this dissertation. The papers of American politicians show their obtuse denial 
or complicit acceptance of the role Fascism played in organizing their Italian American voters. 
From Franklin D. Roosevelt to anti-Fascists Vito Marcantonio and Fiorello LaGuardia, 
politicians learned in the 1930s that they could not win a substantial portion of the voting 
population if they entirely rejected Italian Fascism. Finally, the papers of agencies tasked with 
investigating un-American activities give voice to anti-Fascist witnesses who could not 
understand why the U.S. government allowed Fascism to spread through Little Italies unimpeded. 
In interviews with Office of Strategic Service agents or before Congress in the House un-
American Activities Committee, the testimonies of anti-Fascist witnesses reveal their too-slow 
realization that they could not win American political support in defeating Italian American 
Fascism as long as the pro-Fascists controlled the Italian vote.  
To tell the history of Italian American political identity and transnationalistic citizenship I 
begin with the birth of Fascism in Italy and the United States. Chapter one, “To the Seventh 
Generation: Fascism, Americanism, and Transnationalistic Citizenship, 1921-1929” explores the 
problem of nationalistic citizenship for Italian immigrants. Exacerbating the dualism between 
Fascism and Americanism was the emergence of Italian state-sanctioned Fascist clubs in 
America. The clubs suffered from political infighting, undisciplined members, and apathy from 
the general Italian American population in addition to provoking Americans’ anger over their 
supposed anti-Americanism. In 1929, Mussolini was forced to disband his Fascist League of 
North America, never again to directly organize Italian American political clubs. This chapter 
argues that Italian Americans’ apathy was due to the unrealistic vision Mussolini had copying an 
anti-democratic nationalist ideology for emigrants living in a republic. Italian Americans who 
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did engage with early Fascism did so because they thought the ideology could bring meaning and 
purpose to the chaos of their transnational lives, not so they could pretend Mussolini truly 
controlled them from afar.    
The next two chapters consider the evolving relationship between the Italian government 
and its emigrants as the former ceded more ground to the transnationalistic citizenship of the 
latter. Chapter two, “From a Political Virginity: The Development of Italian American Fascism, 
1930-1940” addresses the change in Italian American Fascism after the Fascist League of North 
America. It examines the ideological and practical differences between the Italian government’s 
vision of Fascist propaganda, and the version of Fascism the prominenti spread. It argues the 
prominenti used Italianità to build their cultural hegemony over Italian Americans by 
forestalling the immigrants’ cultural assimilation. Their version of Italianità became a widely 
popular ethno-cultural nationalism that embraced the Italian Americans’ transnationalism. 
Though the prominenti’s goals ran counter to those of both Fascists and Americanists, eventually 
both groups would accept Italianità as the best approach to reaching Italian American voters. 
Chapter three, “Marrying the Fascist Cause: Italian Americans Embrace Italianità, 1935-
1936” explores how the Italian American elite and Italian consuls turned propaganda into 
political action. They started campaigning for the “Italianization” of the Italian American second 
generation by instituting Italian classes in American public schools. The pinnacle of pro-Fascist 
political action came in the winter of 1936 when Italian Americans blocked Roosevelt from 
applying aggressive sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian War. In 1927 Mussolini’s 
ambassador to the United States had complained about his many difficulties converting Italian 
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Americans from a “political virginity” to “marrying the Fascist cause.”52 During the Ethiopian 
War the Italian Consulate General in New York married 100,000 Italian American women to the 
Fascist cause through public fundraising rituals in which women exchanged their gold wedding 
bands for steel. 
The final two chapters address Americans’ responses to the migrants’ claims of 
transnationalistic citizenship. Chapter four, “The Italian American Vote” studies the presidential 
campaigns of 1936 and 1940 to understand how and why Italian Americans influenced national 
politicians. Italian Americans were famously apolitical and unorganized, but by the 1930s, 
politicians in Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Massachusetts 
considered Italian Americans to be the swing vote in their states. Politicians reacted to the rise of 
Italian American political participation by learning the language of Italianità, which included a 
key adjustment to traditional Americanism: the idea that being a good American meant being a 
good Italian. In both 1936 and 1940 American politicians not only accepted immigrants’ right to 
vote as an ethnic bloc, they actively encouraged it by campaigning to pro-Fascist issues.  
Finally, chapter five, “Good Americans, Good Italians,” follows Italian American 
Fascism and political power through the end of World War II. It finds that Italian Americans 
received less scrutiny than Germans and Japanese because of their political capital, 
overwhelming size, and success at convincing Americans to accept their version of 
transnationalistic citizenship. Though 600,000 Italian “enemy aliens” lived in the United States, 
the government only arrested a few hundred of the most staunch supporters. In defending their 
community, Italian Americans reminded politicians of the number of American GIs with Italian 
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last names, the votes they would cast in midterm elections, and even the country’s reliance on 
Italian laborers. Roosevelt removed the label of enemy alien for Italians on October 12, 1942, 
Columbus Day. The political expediency of choosing that date was lost on no one. The chapter 
concludes with the successful “letters to Italy” campaign of 1948 in which Italian Americans 
exerted their transnationalistic citizenship by flooding their homeland with letters of support for 
the Christian Democratic Party. Letters to Italy was the last great act of Italian American 
transnationalistic citizenship. The ideology required the state’s active cultivation of its migrant 
citizens as political actors, and as Italy stopped asking its American emigrants for service, they 
stopped feeling obligated to give.  
When Randolph Bourne wrote about the benefits of trans-nationalism he argued that by 
retaining their native culture the foreign-born was “likely to be a better citizen of the American 
community.”53 A decade later Secretary of Labor James Davis made a similar comment to a 
convention room full of Italian Americans. He told the Order of the Sons of Italy, an 
organization that had already pledged its full loyalty to Mussolini, that “the American citizen of 
Italian birth who loves his Italy best is the one who loves America best; the top-notch 
representative of his native land is the real true-blue American.”54 His words inspired the Italian 
American audience to increase their political engagement in America. They also inspired the 
Italian Ambassador in attendance to give credence to the idea that Italian immigrants were 
something different—and far more useful—than failed nationalistic citizens of Italy. This 
dissertation is an exploration of that idea in practice. 
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Chapter One:  
To the Seventh Generation:  
Fascism, Americanism, and Transnationalistic Citizenship, 1921-1929 
 
On September 19, 1927, twenty-three Italian aliens stood in a Baltimore federal court 
ready to take the last step in becoming United States citizens. They had waited years for 
eligibility, taken out first citizenship papers, studied English, paid fees, and passed an American 
civics exam to earn the privileges and responsibilities of American citizenship. Before they could 
pledge their oaths of allegiance, however, Baltimore’s District Director in charge of 
naturalization interrupted the proceedings to interrogate the applicants one last time. “Do any of 
you contemplate joining the Fascisti?” District Director Jesse M. Thomas asked.1 All shook their 
heads in the negative. Satisfied with their response, he allowed the immigrants to take their oaths. 
Thomas’s interruption caught the attention of the local press, the national media, and 
politicians in Washington, D.C. as it drew a full summer of public intrigue in Italian immigration 
to a close. The executions of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti in August of 1927 as well as 
the corresponding protests encouraged journalists to investigate Italians more closely throughout 
America. That July, the New York Telegram ran a four-part series of articles by Ray Tucker on 
the Fascist League of North America (FLNA), which included an accusation that the FLNA’s 
loyalty oath was anti-American. Fifty newspapers reprinted Tucker’s series, and though Thomas 
did not mention the article by name, it was likely the instigator of his impromptu interrogation. 
Commenting on his behavior, Thomas explained to The Baltimore Sun that he had recently read 
in a newspaper that the Fascisti required members to swear loyalty to Fascism above the United 
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States. Thomas believed an Italian who joined the FLNA “could not be a good citizen of this 
country.” When asked about members who had already become citizens Thomas noted, “I 
believe that under the law every member would be liable to have his papers canceled if the oath 
is of the nature reported.”2 
No one asked Thomas about the citizenship status of native-born Americans who also 
approved of Fascism. After the March on Rome that brought Fascism to power in October of 
1922, Mussolini’s suppression of Bolshevism and other domestic achievements earned him the 
open support of American writers, financiers, and politicians. A few weeks before Thomas’s 
unusual interruption, New York’s Mayor Jimmy Walker proudly stated in Venice “I am 
something of a Fascist myself.” Envious of the Venetian Podestà’s dictatorial power over his city, 
the Mayor—who had been awarded a medal of honor from Mussolini two months earlier—noted, 
“Italy has a government which understands a few things.”3 Even the Yale College class of 1927 
voted Mussolini the world’s greatest figure.4 At a time when so many native-stock and 
prominent Americans supported Mussolini’s government financially, politically, and rhetorically, 
Thomas’s problem with a naturalized American joining the FLNA was not that the group 
supported a dictator and espoused an anti-liberal, anti-democratic ideology, but that it 
acknowledged and organized an ethnic group around a transnational political identity.  
Fortunately for Mayor Walker—who boarded a ship bound for New York two days 
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later—the Department of Labor responded to Thomas by unequivocally stating that Fascists 
would not be barred from entry or naturalization since no laws warranted such exclusion. The 
Baltimore Sun further cast doubt on Thomas’s suggestion that current laws permitted the 
denaturalization of FLNA members. The Citizens’ Expatriation Act of 1907 provided for 
denaturalization of citizens who took oaths of allegiance to a foreign state, but support for a 
foreign political party did not clearly fit the law’s purview.5 Congressman Albert Johnson of 
Washington, House chairman of the Immigration and Naturalization Committee, hoped to 
remedy that. Johnson had heard Tucker’s article read aloud on the House Floor and announced 
his plans for a bill “by which naturalized citizens, who, after swearing allegiance to the United 
States, wear black shirts and swear undying allegiance to Mussolini or any other dictator, or who 
support any other government, shall be deprived of their naturalization.”6  
Anti-Fascists in America heartily endorsed Johnson’s proposal, while Fascists defended 
their group’s compatibility with American citizenship. The head of Baltimore’s FLNA, Vincent 
Fiaccomio, told a Baltimore Sun reporter, “The very first principle of Fascism among the 
members here is love of this country and a respect and loyalty to her flag and Constitution. One 
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could not be a good Fascist unless he was a good American.”7 Days later, in a letter to the editor 
of the same paper, prominent anti-Fascist Charles Fama wrote of the Fascists, “They are 
emissaries of Mussolini, their leader, who is in Italy, and they have come here with an absolute 
anti-American program.” Directly contradicting Fiaccomio’s claims, Fama believed all those 
who joined the FLNA should have their citizenship revoked, stating “they cannot serve 
Mussolini and Uncle Sam at the same time.”8  
Writing to Benito Mussolini at length about Johnson’s proposed bill in 1927, Italy’s 
Ambassador to the United States Giacomo de Martino attempted to explain “the strange social 
structure and politics of this country.”9 He concluded that Americans’ impulse to label Fascism 
un-American went to the core of their ambivalence about being a multicultural society with 
naturalized citizens. “They tacitly admit and recognize the influence and activities of the many 
races that compose [the nation],” he wrote, “but on one absolute condition: loyalty to America 
and to its Constitution and the radical exclusion of any apparent influence from abroad.” The 
question the Italians needed to answer for the American public was whether immigrants could 
accept Americanism—loyalty to America, its Constitution, and its Anglo-Saxon culture—while 
still supporting Fascism—subservience to the Italian corporate state and belief in the racial 
supremacy of its people. “This is precisely the point that makes the work of an Ambassador so 
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delicate,” he told Mussolini.10 
As Thomas, Johnson, Fiaccomio, Fama, and de Martino publicly debated the 
compatibility of Americanism and Fascism, they sought to define the boundaries of nationalistic 
citizenship for people caught between two nations. Mass migration at the turn of the century 
produced millions of migrants with dual citizenship, and World War I made their questionable 
status a cause for great international concern. Both Italy and the United States saw citizenship in 
nationalistic terms, as a status that entitled individuals to certain rights and privileges only when 
those individuals promised their service and obedience to that nation over any other. Mussolini 
asserted his claims to citizens’ loyalty by demanding their compliance with Italian law even to 
the seventh generation abroad, while the United States revoked citizenship for those with 
questionable allegiance, like women who married foreigners or naturalized immigrants who 
returned to their homelands for more than two years. Dual citizenship ran counter to nationalistic 
citizenship, and in 1928 Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg urged the House of Representatives 
to support the treaties he pursued eliminating that conflict. The League of Nations similarly 
rejected dual nationality, convening the Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the 
Conflict of Nationality Laws, also known as The Hague Conference of 1930, under the 
conviction that “every person should have a nationality and should have one nationality only.”11  
While statesmen debated the legal limits of nationalistic citizenship from The Hague to 
Baltimore, Italian immigrants in America were responding to the same world events and 
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ideological conflicts by developing a theory of transnationalistic citizenship that addressed their 
specific experiences and needs. Since the beginning of mass migration from Italy in the late 
nineteenth century, Italians’ regular repatriation and enduring familial and economic ties to the 
homeland distinguished their group as especially transnational. With a repatriation rate of 50 
percent until World War I, migrants felt neither wholly Italian nor American when they faced 
increasing pressure to make exclusive and competing oaths of national allegiance in the 1920s —
either through membership in the Fascist League of North America or naturalization as a United 
States citizen. Straddling two worlds was not easy, and Italian emigrants yearned for recognition, 
clarity, and a sense of purpose to their transnational lives. They developed transnationalistic 
citizenship in the belief that their unique migration patterns required a unique theory of 
citizenship. 
In their imagination, transnationalistic citizenship provided Italian migrants with a 
recognized status in both Italy and the United States with clear rights and obligations exclusive 
to them. Transnationalistic citizens maintained deep attachments to both their home and host 
countries and believed they could be better citizens by politically organizing as intermediaries 
and advocates for themselves and their communities. The Italian Americans of the 1920s who 
joined the Fascist League of North America sought a sense of purpose and recognition for the 
unique contributions they could give to Italy as political agents abroad. Though they first thought 
they could avoid questions about their dual allegiances, over time Italian Americans realized they 
could not pretend Mussolini perfectly controlled them or that they were fully assimilated 
Americans. Even if they could conform to the nationalistic visions of either country, such 
concessions undermined their own agenda of recognition and political power. Instead they 
learned to demand the respect of the Italian and American governments by organizing 
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themselves politically as transnationalistic citizens. Through politics, they could win esteem and 
power and force both nations to accept their transnationalism. Ironically, though Italians joined 
the Fascist movement to elevate their status in Italy and the United States, ultimately they could 
only realize that goal by exchanging Fascist membership cards for American citizenship papers. 
The Origins of Fascism in America, 1921  
Even before Benito Mussolini took control of his own country, Italians in America began 
spreading his movement abroad. On May 1, 1921, nearly eighteen months prior to the March on 
Rome that made Mussolini Prime Minister of Italy, a group of Italians in New York cabled 
Mussolini to announce the first fascio, or Fascist club, outside of Italy. The group’s leader, 
Agostino de Biasi, owned and edited a popular Italian review magazine in New York City, Il 
Carroccio. That week he devoted nearly his entire magazine to explaining the fascio to his 
readers. To Mussolini, he used just a few lines in a telegram: 
“The first Fascio Italiano di Combattimento in the United States, meeting in assembly 
today, salutes all the Fasci of Italy. We assert the right of all emigrants to participate in 
the national recovery and reconstruction and to voice their desire to participate in [Italian] 
elections. Because the fascist idea exalts Italian national power and inspires respect and 
dignity for our brothers abroad who work for the well-being of their families and for the 
honor of Italy, we count on the efforts of our kinsmen and friends of the entire peninsula 
to bring about the triumph of the Fascist electoral list.”12 
 
 The fascio’s first telegram reveals the immigrants’ conflicted psychology about their 
transnationalism. The telegram clearly asserted immigrants’ pride in their unique situation and 
the rights and abilities they had to affect change in Italy, but also spoke to their deep feelings of 
impotency concerning their tenuous position in America and Italy. By focusing on statements 
such as “the fascist idea…inspires respect and dignity for our brothers abroad,” historians have 
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emphasized the former, arguing that immigrants used Fascism to improve their humble situation 
in America. Since 1972 scholars have generally accepted the diagnosis John P. Diggins gave to 
Italian Americans in his book, Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America. Diggins 
attributed Italian Americans’ support of Fascism to the “inferiority complex” they developed 
after years of formal and informal discrimination. He argued America had psychologically 
primed Italians to accept Fascist nationalism by making Italians feel unwelcome, writing, 
“Fascist propaganda provided the fertilizer, but American society had planted the seed.”13  
 Agostino de Biasi did not quite fit the profile of the unwelcome outsider in America. The 
son of a successful Italian lawyer, de Biasi worked as a journalist in Italy before migrating to the 
United States in 1900 where he immediately became managing editor of Il Progresso Italo-
Americano, the largest Italian-language paper in the country. Italian newspapers floundered in 
America for lack of literate journalists, providing an experienced writer and newspaperman like 
de Biasi ample career opportunities. In 1906, while simultaneously editing the newspaper Il 
Telegrafo, he founded the successful Philadelphia paper L’Opinione, which was later purchased 
by Il Progresso. By 1913 his four brothers followed him to America, with two finding jobs in the 
small world of Italian American journalism, one opening an advertising agency, and the fourth 
becoming a physician.14 In 1915 Agostino launched his second publication, Il Carroccio, in New 
York City. Ambassador Giacomo de Martino read Il Carroccio regularly in the 1920s and 
described it as “undoubtedly the best Italian magazine printed abroad.” Though de Biasi had 
strained relations with the Italian government by the late 1920s, de Martino nevertheless wrote of 
him, “he is not an irrelevant element: he is an incredibly intelligent, able writer, well ‘placed,’ a 
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fervent patriot, and a convinced fascist.”15 In 1918 de Biasi used his well-placed connections to 
participate in the founding of the Italy-America Society, with the goal of supporting friendship 
between the two nations based on their mutual admiration and contributions to the fields of art, 
science, and literature. Joining him in founding the society were Hamilton Holt, owner of The 
Independent; Robert Underwood Johnson, the American ambassador to Italy; Thomas Lamont of 
the House of Morgan; and Charles Evans Hughes, the future secretary of state.16 
Despite de Biasi’s personal success and connections, the traditional analysis of Fascism’s 
origins among Italian Americans is not without basis. In announcing his fascio, de Biasi noted 
how his fellow immigrants suffered on a daily basis “humility, degradation, and lost opportunity 
imposed by a foreigner…always with injustice and superiority.”17 Beyond de Biasi’s personal 
observations, national events in the early 1920s reinforced Italian Americans’ sense of 
victimhood. The same month that de Biasi founded his fascio, President Warren G. Harding 
signed the Emergency Quota Law limiting Italian migration, and the town of Dedham, 
Massachusetts, began its biased trial of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti. Both actions 
would serve to formalize what de Biasi and his fellow immigrants long knew—Americans 
considered Italians racially undesirable and dangerous, and Italian Americans lacked the political, 
social, and economic power to change their status.  
 But de Biasi and the Italians in his first fascio were not looking for Mussolini to solve 
their problems in America. They did not think Fascism could increase Italy’s immigration quotas 
in America or stay Sacco and Vanzetti’s execution, though Mussolini would eventually attempt 
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both.18 Instead, de Biasi hoped that Fascism could strengthen the immigrants’ position towards 
their homeland. The New York fascio’s first telegram to Mussolini divulged a clear preference 
for its members to raise their profile within the Fascist Party, thereby raising their status 
everywhere. In Il Carroccio, de Biasi explained Fascism as a movement for Italy and for its nine 
million emigrants abroad, claiming Fascism pursued “an Italy that works, that prospers, that 
inspires in its sons abroad—through foreign esteem, respect, and awe—the pride of being a vital 
part of the nation.”19 To de Biasi, who called his fellow emigrants “exiles,” Italians abroad were 
an integral part of the homeland who only lacked recognition from the Italian state. According to 
de Biasi, the emigrants’ “ancient dream,” which compelled millions of Italians to suffer abroad, 
was to sustain the state they left behind through hard work and political power. 
 The fascio could achieve its dreams of supporting Italy and earn the recognition its 
members deserved by supporting Fascism both ideologically and practically, wrote de Biasi. 
First, the existence of an American fascio would prove Mussolini’s assertions that Fascism was 
not a political party but an ideological movement to suppress individual ambition for the 
collective interest of the nation. By bringing Fascism across the Atlantic, de Biasi explained the 
New York fascio did not “confine itself to the just and unjust borders of the nation” nor limit 
itself to “electoral bickering.” Far removed from Italy’s messy politics, the fascio highlighted 
Fascism’s much greater mission of Italian pride through “civilization, order, culture, and work” 
and its “supreme intention of giving meaning to Italy’s [World War] victory.” By separating the 
movement from the electoral battles on the peninsula, de Biasi hoped his fascio could emphasize 
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the movement’s beliefs without getting mired in the everyday politics of Italy.20 
 Fascism’s—and de Biasi’s—emphasis on Italy’s borders and war victory gave the fascio 
its second value to Italy: practical influence in foreign policy. De Biasi blamed the diplomatic 
corps for blundering Italy’s foreign policy in the United States and disparaging the Italian 
American masses, arguing Italians abroad had every right to affect foreign policy with or without 
the ambassador’s assistance. He called for an Italian agenda in the United States that was “more 
virile, more robust, more honest and powerful” than what the liberal regime pursued. Such a 
change, he argued, “could not be created by the ambassador, but must instead be generated and 
imposed…by Parliament and the People.”21 The fascio would make Italy and America “true 
friends” by teaching Americans about Italy, speaking up for their homeland, and showing their 
support for Italy’s lost colonies in Europe and war debt in Washington. De Biasi predicted that 
this work would not only improve Italy’s relations with the United States but would also mend 
the strained relationship between the Italians in America and their ambassador.  
 Mussolini’s reaction to the founding of the New York fascio was positive, to de Biasi’s 
delight. Days after receiving the fascio’s telegram, Mussolini printed it on the front page of his 
Popolo d'Italia with praise. He cited the expansion of fasci across the Atlantic as an aspect of 
Fascism’s program. “We have one, we have a program!” he declared, explaining further: 
“To grow, conserve, exalt Italianità among the millions of our countrymen dispersed 
throughout the world; to bring them to live even more intimately into the life of the 
Metropol, to bind and intensify the relationships—of every type—between colonies and 
the motherland; to establish real and true ‘Fascist consulates’ for the legal and extra-legal 
protection of all Italians, especially those that are employed by foreign businesses; to 
always and everywhere hold high the name of the faraway Patria: this is the formidable 
meaning of the constitution of the Fasci abroad, this is our program.”22 
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Mussolini’s program matched the fascio’s desires to formalize the deep connection they felt for 
the homeland. Through Fascism, Mussolini claimed, the Italian people abroad would be able to 
do more for Italy, and in exchange Italy would do more for them. Agreement between the two 
sides ended there, however, for while both the immigrants and the Fascist Party believed the 
Italian consulates in America should do more to protect immigrants, de Biasi wanted consulates 
to work with the immigrants to improve Italy’s economic situation, while Mussolini thought their 
work should be limited to improving the economic conditions of Italians in the United States. 
Throughout the life of the fasci, the relationship between Italy, its diplomats, and its emigrants 
rarely satisfied each party, resulting in an enduring and often damaging power struggle between 
each. The root cause of their disagreement was their difference in opinion regarding the sensitive 
issue of organizing a political bloc of Italian immigrants in the United States. Whether members 
of the fasci advocated for the economic improvement of the immigrant—as Mussolini wanted—
or the Italian state—as de Biasi wanted—they would need to enter into American politics as a 
group, something each side suspected would be problematic and neither side knew how to 
address.  
Problems and Solutions for Italian American Citizenship 
 From the beginning, de Biasi hoped to navigate the dangerous terrain of ethnic political 
organization by acknowledging the immigrants’ obligation to the United States in his 
membership oath’s six pledges. “While accepting the principles of the Fasci of Italy, the Fascio 
of New York must adapt itself to the specific conditions of the land in which it resides,” de Biasi 
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conceded in his fascio’s first announcement.23 To accommodate America’s specific conditions, 
the fascio’s first pledge was “to adhere to the principles of the Constitution of this Nation and 
respect its laws.” In 1927 the head of Baltimore’s FLNA could defend his group from Jesse 
Thomas’s allegations by pointing to a similar oath in his organization as proof that “One could 
not be a good Fascist unless he was a good American.”24 Though de Biasi envisioned the fascio 
as a means of asserting immigrants’ rights and value to Italy, of the remaining five pledges four 
concerned the members’ obligations to their immigrant community. The pledges called for the 
“moral, economic, intellectual, and political elevation of the Italian emigrant masses” as well as 
the emigrants’ protection, prosperity, and unity. Only one pledge regarded Italy: “to undertake—
in all possible and permitted forms—intense propaganda to make Italy’s war victory known.”25  
 Pledging to only spread permitted propaganda and to politically organize exclusively 
through legal means was an easy promise to make. In 1921 no laws forbade immigrants from 
engaging in foreign political and propaganda activity—something Congressman Johnson would 
try to fix in 1927. Still, de Biasi felt a need to convince Italians and Americans of his group’s 
respect for the law, especially as the fasci faced growing criticism. In a 1926 issue of Il 
Carroccio dedicated to the state of Fascism in America, de Biasi wrote, “It is not forbidden for 
us foreigners, Italians of birth, arriving here as Italians and protected by the Italian flag, to meet, 
speak, write, and print. The endowment of laws that protects citizens of this place also protects 
us.” Speaking on behalf of nearly 500 Fascists who had met that spring in New York City, de 
Biasi stated, “Fascism is not a crime, it is not a violation of the laws, and it does not fall short of 
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our obligations towards [American] hospitality. Suspect and intrigue can not touch us.”26 
As an immigrant organization supporting a foreign political party in an increasingly 
xenophobic country, suspect and intrigue did follow the fasci. Though de Biasi had enough 
knowledge of American culture to pledge his organization’s obedience towards the Constitution, 
he erred by basing Italian Americans’ right to organize on their foreignness. De Biasi, who only 
became a citizen in 1945 at the age of 70, spoke of his organization as unambiguously comprised 
of foreigners protected by the Italian flag. He firmly believed the Italians had a right to support 
their homeland as guests in America, ignoring the growing population of American citizens in 
his ranks. In keeping with his goal of avoiding suspicion in America as his group worked to 
improve conditions in Italy, he forbade members from participating in American internal politics, 
thereby reinforcing his members’ alienage. De Biasi left open the question of whether 
naturalized Americans enjoyed the same rights aliens had to support a foreign government, a 
problem that grew as the fasci soon counted more American citizens than aliens.  
The changes to de Biasi’s fasci reflected changes to Italian American communities 
nationwide. Italian immigrants who had not already become citizens during the Great War 
started taking out citizenship papers in response to the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act. The law 
drastically cut the number of Italian immigrants permitted in the country with the exception that 
naturalized citizens could bring their families to the United States outside of the quota limits, 
causing Italians to naturalize in record numbers. As a result, while the Italian immigrant 
population in the United States only increased by 10 percent from 1920 to 1930, the population 
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of American citizens born in Italy increased by 113 percent during the same period.27 Meanwhile, 
as immigrants settled permanently in the United States and started families, the share of the 
Italian community comprised of native-born Americans grew as well—from 50 percent in 1920 
to 60 percent in 1930. The second generation was also older, with more young adults graduating 
high school and college as future voters, business leaders, and society members caught between 
their parents’ foreignness and their friends’ Americanness. 
Italian American organizations addressed the changing demographics with trepidation. 
The Order of the Sons of Italy in America, the largest Italian organization in the country, never 
considered its members to be exiles as de Biasi did, but nevertheless had a complicated 
relationship with assimilation, naturalization, and politics. Founded in New York in 1905, OSIA 
had a national membership of 300,000 by 1922 when its Supreme Venerable, Giovanni di 
Silvestro, pledged the group’s loyalty to Mussolini and Fascism, causing a major schism. 
Although OSIA regularly referred to itself as “apolitical,” Ambassador Giacomo de Martino 
cited the primary goal of the Order as “the political education of the Italian emigrants in 
America.”28 De Martino believed OSIA’s greatest challenge was achieving its goal of political 
education while overcoming “the decisive and bitter program of Americanization in the United 
States.” The ambassador used the term Americanization to mean the legal act of naturalization as 
well as the cultural process of assimilation, as most Italians did. Though he found the question of 
Americanization pervasive and critical for OSIA’s members, de Martino also acknowledged how 
difficult a topic it was for the organization to address. “If the Order assumes an open character of 
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resistance to Americanization, it would immediately be swept up in violent fights instigated by 
American patriotic associations,” he noted. However, to prevent Americans’ animosity by 
dropping OSIA’s ethnic character entirely would be similarly self-defeating, as he explained: “If 
its attachment to Italy is reduced to some vague formula or to some vague demonstrations, it 
would have no reason to exist.”29 
OSIA’s eventual approach to the Americanization problem was to offset any outside 
criticism by offering tepid encouragement of immigrants’ assimilation through English and 
citizenship classes. It coupled its mild pursuit of Americanizing the first generation with an 
aggressive program of Italianizing the second generation through the ardent cultivation of an 
Italian ethno-cultural identity. Over time, the second generation became a major focal point for 
the organization as it protected its future by fostering Italian pride among the members’ children 
through Italian classes, clubs, and even free summer trips to Italy. 
 OSIA’s approach did not work for de Biasi, who tried to ignore the question of 
Americanization despite his organization’s changing demographics. Relying on his edict against 
American political involvement to justify his disinterest in the all-important issue, de Biasi stated, 
“We are not afraid of hampering the process of Americanization. Americanization is a subject 
that does not come up in the Fascio, because of its basic rules; to not participate in the internal 
politics of the country.”30 As he continued, he exposed a much deeper reason for his neutrality 
than respect for American politics: the ideological incompatibility between Fascism and 
American citizenship. “We Fascists are not obligated to obstruct [Americanization] nor to force 
it” de Biasi wrote. Even if they could obstruct Americanization—which he doubted—it would 
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violate their rule against internal politics as he already explained. But unlike OSIA, he felt no 
obligation to force Americanization either, as he explained, “to force Americanization would be 
to disavow the Homeland for whose greatness we work and we suffer.”31 
 De Biasi’s rationale that Americanization ran counter to his vows to the homeland 
reflected Mussolini’s growing control over the fascio abroad and de Biasi’s corresponding 
alignment with Italy’s nationalistic citizenship. Although he originally asserted that Fascism in 
America differed by necessity from Fascism in Italy, by 1926 he espoused a strict adherence to 
Fascism’s ideology, if not its bureaucracy. Fascism abroad, he wrote, “is what Fascism is, and 
wants to be, in Italy: the emergence of national influence; the sublimation of patriotic spirit; the 
esteem of the moral and material elements of the race.”32 If Fascism abroad meant the supremacy 
of Italy and the Italian race, as de Biasi now understood it, then by definition Fascism was 
incompatible with Americanization—a process that replaced immigrants’ identity with their 
homeland’s culture, identity, and political allegiance with that of America’s.  
 Because de Biasi considered the members of his fascio as exiles and Italians—not the 
American citizens that most of them actually were—he underestimated the magnitude of the 
conflict between Americanization and Fascism. Though he acknowledged America’s interest in 
assimilating its immigrants he justified his anti-Americanization policy by emphasizing the 
Fascists’ permanent alienage. In one such justification in Il Carroccio de Biasi wrote, “No honest 
American and no law can deny to the Italian the right to be Italian—just as no Italian and no law 
of ours denies to the American that resides in Italy the right to remain American.”33 
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  In truth, both countries’ nationalistic interpretations of citizenship meant Americans 
often questioned their immigrants’ rights to stay permanently alien, and Italian laws regularly 
denied American citizens the right to be American. Italy’s claims on American citizens were not 
new to Fascism or even unique to Italy. The early Italian nation passed an 1865 Civil Code 
automatically revoking the citizenship of Italians who naturalized abroad, but nationalists within 
Italy soon demanded reforms to the citizenship laws. In 1912 the government changed course to 
match most European nations in extending citizenship through jus sanguinus, which directly 
contradicted America’s citizenship of jus soli.34 As a result, children born in America of Italian 
parentage automatically held dual citizenship, with all the obligations of both nations. Although 
the United States did not recognize dual citizenship, many European nations did and often made 
it difficult for Americans to renounce their obligations to the homeland upon naturalization. 
Some, like Poland, even reserved the right to reject an emigrant’s renunciation.35 
 In the 1920s Italy lacked a naturalization treaty with the United States, making it one of 
more than a dozen nations that held citizens responsible for military service even after 
naturalization.36 At age 20 all Italian citizens owed two years of military service, after which 
they would remain in the reserves until the age of 45. An Italian immigrant who came to the 
United States as a child could not naturalize until the age of 21 so for at least a year he was a 
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deserter. If he returned to Italy after age 20 he could be arrested. This predicament was not 
limited to immigrants; even American-born boys could be Italian fugitives at the age of 20.37 
Italy was one of a handful of countries that extended citizenship obligations to the children of its 
emigrants, but the size of its emigrant population in the United States made the military problem 
a special concern for America. In the 1920s the Department of State handled between three and 
four thousand cases of American citizens forced to serve in foreign militaries despite their 
naturalization or birth in the United States. Over half of the cases came from Italy.38 
 Under Fascism, Italy enforced its laws of renunciation and citizenship sporadically. For 
the first five years of his government, Mussolini maintained the liberal regime’s migration laws, 
guided by a traditional view of emigration as an unstoppable and necessary outlet for the 
country’s overpopulation. He only diverged from precedent by calling for greater state regulation 
of emigration, which he unevenly implemented for political friends and foes. As an example of 
his inconsistency, Mussolini had warm relations with several naturalized American Fascists, 
including OSIA Grand Venerable Giovanni di Silvestro. But when the “vaguely anti-Fascist” 
Hollywood star Rudolph Valentino announced his plans to naturalize in 1925, Italians denounced 
him as a national traitor and Mussolini banned his films.39 That same year Il Duce started taking 
a stronger stand on emigration, announcing “My order is that an Italian citizen must remain an 
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Italian citizen, no matter in what land he lives, even to the seventh generation.”40 
By 1927, Mussolini had changed his position on Italy’s overpopulation in general, 
affecting his views on emigration. Claiming Italy had the resources to support an even larger 
population if its citizens would leave overcrowded cities for the countryside, he began 
encouraging population growth through various legal measures. Most famously, his government 
hoped to encourage marriage and childbirth by instituting a progressive tax on bachelors aged 26 
to 65. That same year the state formally opposed its citizens’ permanent emigration. In 1927, 
Dino Grandi, Italy’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, signaled the change by proudly announcing that 
in the state’s lexicon, “The title ‘emigrant’ has now been replaced by ‘citizen.’”41 
 Though Grandi’s proclamation simply reflected what Mussolini and de Biasi had 
maintained for years, the zealous enforcement of Italy’s citizenship claims in the late 1920s 
surprised many. Italians returning to the homeland feared arrest for desertion from the Italian 
military, as did the American-born sons of Italian emigrants. Anti-Fascists noted the government 
enforced military service in a manner that exclusively targeted their ranks, leaving Fascist 
migrants free to enter and leave Italy unhindered. Without a treaty, the United States was 
powerless to help its new citizens when such cases arose. Nor could the United States do 
anything about the bachelor tax levied against second-generation men. Those who chose not to 
pay the substantial tax discovered the state simply assessed their extended families in Italy. 
 Mussolini’s quixotic attempt to reduce bachelorhood through taxation drew fascination 
and praise from the United States, but his claims on American soldiers were less popular, 
especially among his emigrants. The government slightly loosened its grip on emigrants in 1926 
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by allowing Italian migrants to offer proof of service in the American army to exempt 
themselves from their Italian military obligations. By acknowledging migrants as a unique group 
of citizens with different obligations to their two nations, the change in law was a step closer 
towards Italy’s acceptance of transnationalistic citizenship. However, in practice the government 
first placed migrants in prison for desertion and then let them prove their innocence from jail, 
forcing them to wait months for release. The fear of imprisonment for desertion caused enough 
panic among Italians in the United States that steamship companies aggressively advertised a 
1928 law exempting Italians born abroad from the draft, and releasing emigrants from military 
obligations during times of peace. Italians were so fearful of returning to the homeland that when 
the Order of the Sons of Italy in America planned summer pilgrimages in the late 1920s to Italy 
it negotiated with the Italian government for “full assurances that no one will be bothered for 
unfulfilled military service.”42 In newspaper announcements, the Order explained to potential 
pilgrims that with a special card signed by OSIA’s Supreme Venerable Giovanni di Silvestro 
they could visit Italy “with full freedom to return to America at the end of the trip.”43 Without 
the card they risked imprisonment.  
 The changes to military law in Italy were a significant step away from Mussolini’s 
strictly nationalistic citizenship towards the immigrants’ transnationalistic citizenship, as the 
laws acknowledged immigrants’ different obligations to their two states. But special cards signed 
by di Silvestro on an as-needed basis would not long appease Italian Americans who wanted 
permanent answers to their unique situations. As de Biasi’s first fascio tried doing, in the late 
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1920s migrants began asking the Italian government to clarify and formalize their special 
relationship with the state. When Ambassador de Martino first arrived to his post in 1925 he was 
able to sidestep the issue of Americanization for a few months by busying himself with questions 
of Italy’s war debt and the crisis of the Lira. Over time, however, he realized that he was 
addressing Italian audiences increasingly consisting of naturalized Americans who wanted to 
hear Italy’s plans for them. By 1926 he wrote Mussolini, “it will no longer be possible for me to 
avoid speaking even generically about the situation of the Italian Americans towards Italy and 
the United States.”44 The increasing naturalization of Italian Americans in the 1920s had forced 
the Fascist League of North America, the Order of the Sons of Italy in America, and the Italian 
military to consider the matter of Americanization, but none had come up with a solution that 
addressed with satisfaction the competing realities of the Italian American masses and the 
demands Italy and the United States placed on their citizens.  
 In formulating his own solutions to the citizenship question, de Martino relied on his 
experiences with OSIA and the FLNA. As both organizations had discovered, preventing 
naturalization was futile and ultimately damaging for the organizations and for Italy. “Before 
everything else,” de Martino wrote to Mussolini, “we must recognize this fact: that there is no 
way of impeding the naturalization of the Italians.” De Martino reasoned that Italy would only 
engender hostility from the immigrant by trying to block naturalization. As for Italy’s claims to 
emigrants’ dual citizenship, which he had long favored for sentimental reasons, he wrote, “my 
experiences in America have persuaded me that double citizenship would be a great political 
error in this country.”45 Dual citizenship would weaken the political position of Italians in 
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America and raise Americans’ suspicions of them, encouraging their xenophobic hostility.  
 The best proof de Martino had for his position was the recent ratification of Italy’s war 
debt to the United States. When Italy’s minister of finance came to the United States in 
November of 1925 to negotiate Italy’s debt, Italian American organizations and politicians 
sprang to action. Italian-language newspapers encouraged letter-writing campaigns among 
readers. The Federation of Italian World War Veterans wrote to Congress in the name of 27,000 
members and the Order of the Sons of Italy sent one letter to every senator on behalf of its 
300,000 lodge members. A third group, the Italy-America Society, lobbied Secretary of 
Commerce Herbert Hoover pretending to speak for a voting bloc of hundreds of thousands of 
Italian Republicans. Though the society actually represented a select group of mostly Anglo-
Americans backed by the House of Morgan who were financially and personally interested in 
Mussolini’s success, Hoover nonetheless listened.  
 Years later, when Ambassador de Martino met with President Hoover, he noted “Mr. 
Hoover observed that every time a campaign is launched against Italy, the Italians of America 
react and try to put things right: the Italians of America, he affirmed, are very loyal to their 
country of origin.”46 De Martino feared that Hoover’s last remark revealed “a certain worry, ever 
present among American nationalists, of foreigners’ resistance to Americanization.”47 The 
ambassador believed he quelled the president’s apprehensions by avowing Italian Americans’ 
loyalty to the United States, but the interaction bore witness to warnings de Biasi made about 
Americanization, comparing it to the rattling of a serpent’s tail. De Biasi had argued that even if 
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Italian Americans could help Italy through American politics, such activity exposed “the venom 
of the so-called ‘Italian electoral force,’ not tolerated by the strong and possessive spirit of pure 
Americans.” He predicted, “in the not so distant future, [the Italian electoral force] will be a 
source of grave apprehensions in America, even thornier than what is now harbored for 
Fascism.”48  
 De Martino had a more optimistic assessment of the Italian electoral force, believing 
Italian Americans were useful to Italy in a way unnaturalized “exiles” like de Biasi were not. In a 
report on Italian migrant citizenship to Foreign Affairs Minister Dino Grandi, he credited the 
Italian American masses with Italy’s success in the debt negotiations, explaining, “Italy exercises 
effective pressure on internal politics here…in direct proportion to the electoral force of the 
Italian masses.” Grandi’s office underlined the corollary to de Martino’s lesson in pencil: “no 
notable influence was exercised by the Italian that is not an American citizen….the Italian 
citizens of Italy add no weight to our influence here.” 49 If Italy could get the rest of American 
society to recognize, but not fear, Italian Americans’ electoral force, de Martino believed they 
could hold great power.  
 To navigate the delicate question of Americanization, de Martino offered two approaches. 
First, though he argued Italy could not prevent its emigrants’ naturalization, he thought they 
could make reacquisition of Italian citizenship easier for “those Italians who desire to abandon 
the American experiment and re-enter the national community.”50 Rather than undermining 
American citizenship through arrest and taxation, or risk angering the United States through 
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proscriptions against naturalization, Italy could simply make its citizenship an easier and more 
attractive option. The suggestion was based on a theory of nationalistic citizenship that made 
little sense to Italy’s transnational emigrants and, not surprisingly, few renounced their American 
citizenship to return to Italy permanently. 
 De Martino found his second approach to citizenship after attending the 1926 annual 
convention of the Order of the Sons of Italy, where American Secretary of Labor James Davis 
delivered the meeting’s opening address. Davis had some reconciliation work to do with the 
Italian political community, prompting his appearance at the convention. Since becoming 
Secretary of Labor, he had compared new immigrants to rats; expressed clear preference for the 
“anglo and teutonic races” in immigration quotas; aggressively called for alien registration to 
control the “alien agitator who wants to retain his foreign citizenship;” and launched an 
education program for immigrants “to Americanize the alien before he alienizes America.”51 His 
Republican party, meanwhile, had implemented the immigration quotas that closed America’s 
golden doors to Italians. 
 In this context, when he declared in his 1926 OSIA convention speech that “no better 
group of citizens exists than the Italian-American” it comes across as empty political pandering. 
Nevertheless, de Martino seized upon one of Davis’s statements in the speech as the key to his 
problem of political organizing in America: “the American citizen of Italian birth who loves his 
Italy best is the one who loves America best; the top-notch representative of his native land is the 
real true-blue American.”52 Davis likely intended his statement at the OSIA convention to serve 
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as a call for Italians to show their love of Italy by demonstrating their individual honor, and to 
become better Americans by acting as moral exemplars of the Italian race.53 De Martino 
interpreted Davis’s meaning differently. The ambassador translated Secretary Davis’s speech 
into Italian as “one can not be a good American if they entirely forget their country of origin,” a 
sentiment he interpreted politically rather than racially.54 The idea that an American politician 
believed fidelity to Italy was not only compatible with loyalty to America but actually an asset to 
American citizenship seemed to de Martino to be the key to Italian American political 
organization. While Italy was conceding its sovereignty over emigrants by exempting them from 
the military obligations owed by citizens to the seventh generation abroad, de Martino was happy 
to discover American politicians were also yielding ground to transationalistic citizenship by 
allowing migrants to retain their ethnic political ties indefinitely.  
 Writing to Grandi after the convention, de Martino explained that for Italian American 
action in the United States, “loyalty to America is a requirement, but of the most sincere 
devotion to Italy.” After observing French, Swiss, and German political organizations in 
America, de Martino came to understand that all ethnic associations in the United States 
followed a similar formula: assert loyalty to America as a precondition for work done on behalf 
of the homeland. Showing an uncharacteristically sympathetic view of the fasci, de Martino 
explained that asserting American loyalty “is what the Fasci here have done, which has made 
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possible the most fervid exhortations to the cult of the Homeland.”55  
Fascism Abroad: In Action and Out of Control 
 While the fasci did pledge their obedience to America’s constitution early and often, the 
formula was more complex in practice than de Martino suggested, especially as the fasci 
expanded. From de Biasi’s first fascio in 1921, the fasci grew moderately in size and inordinately 
in visibility within a few years, peaking at 12,000 members in 1929. As more members marched 
in black shirts in Memorial Day parades, attended rallies for visiting Fascist dignitaries, and 
battled anti-Fascists in the press and the streets, the fasci exhibited less control of their members 
just when American politicians and journalists were noticing them more. When Ambassador 
Caetani wrote to Mussolini about the lack of discipline and disorder of the fasci in 1923, he 
placed some blame on de Biasi, who he described as “a shady figure, suspected and despised by 
the majority of the colony” and some on the general membership, “the least worthy elements of 
our colonies.”56 But Caetani worried the real problems of the fasci emanated from Rome, 
specifically from Giuseppe Bastianni, the Fascist party official who headed all fasci abroad in 
1923.  
 After Mussolini’s rise to power, de Biasi closed his New York fascio for reorganization, 
eventually allowing Mussolini to replace it with the Fascist Central Council in 1923. The Fascist 
Central Council intended to control the fasci by centralizing power with Bastianni in Rome. 
OSIA’s Supreme Venerable Giovanni di Silvestro served as president and Agostino de Biasi 
acted as secretary of the fasci in the United States. Writing to Mussolini about Bastianni, Caetani 
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warned, “One of the biggest dangers, in my opinion, are the provisions, authorizations, or rash 
orders issued by Fascist ‘direction’ in Italy or by some eminent persons unaware of how delicate 
the situation is here and ignorant of American psychology, deeply hostile to any foreign 
interference.” Though Caetani loathed de Biasi, he recognized that de Biasi at least lived in the 
United States, making him far more qualified to comment on the immigrant experience than 
Bastianni. Moreover, de Biasi had a clear vision, which Bastianni lacked. “I don’t know if, or in 
what form and what measure the Royal Government intends to promote a Fascist movement 
among the Italians abroad,” Caetani wrote in 1923, revealing his exasperation over the lack of 
direction. “I beg Your Excellency to give me precise directives,” he concluded.57 
 The next month Bastianni attempted to provide the American fasci with a precise 
program, producing a set of vague proscriptions against the fasci mixing themselves in American 
politics and a commandment for fasci to “avoid all that can disturb the relationship between Italy 
and the states that host them.” Months later, in an attempt to further clarify his vision, he brought 
to light some of the contradictions that infuriated Caetani. “The Fasci abroad are not and will 
never be considered part of the Party’s section,” Bastianni stated unequivocally, though he, a 
party operative, headed the fasci abroad. He explained fasci as grassroots clubs, organized and 
directed by migrants abroad with a goal of correcting false propaganda about Fascism in Italy. 
“The Fasci abroad therefore have no party role to undertake nor are they official organs of the 
Fascist Government,” he stressed.58 
 The Grand Council followed Bastianni’s directions by approving seven commandments 
for the fasci that mostly contradicted his statements. The seven commandments were also a 
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major step away from de Biasi’s six oaths from 1921 that emphasized members’ primary 
obligations to their unique transnational community of immigrants. Despite ordering the fasci to 
“obediently follow the laws and customs of the Nation which hosts them and keep themselves 
absolutely separate from local politics,” as de Biasi had, the Grand Council simultaneously 
demanded the fasci’s obligation toward Italy’s “national discipline,” their subordination to the 
Italian diplomatic corps in America, and their duty “to facilitate the [Italian Government’s] work 
with discipline.” By demanding the fasci’s total obedience to the Italian state while denying any 
party involvement in their direction, the Grand Council fostered more uncertainty than clarity 
among the fasci abroad.59 
 In distancing itself from the fasci, the Fascist Party created a void in the organization’s 
hierarchy that became more problematic as the fasci grew, aggravating tensions between Italy, 
the diplomats, and the local fasci. Throughout the country, fasci bickered with leaders of 
established clubs, clashed violently with anti-Fascists and drew suspicion from Americans. 
Writing to Mussolini in 1923, Ambassador Caetani acknowledged the potential advantages of 
immigrants spreading propaganda about Fascism in America. However, he did not believe the 
fasci came close to achieving those goals, and warned Mussolini, “at the current moment, the 
formation of the fasci in the United States is a delicate, if not to say dangerous thing.” He 
explained that while a rogue Fascist section could be stopped in Italy “if necessary with coercive 
and even violent means,” in America he lacked such power, and the fasci were out of control. He 
feared it was already too late to disband the fasci or even stop their expansion, but he asked for 
advice on whether to “constrain or guide the Fascist movement.”60 
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 Leopold Zunini, the consul general of Chicago, felt the lack of control Caetani described 
acutely when a fascio formed in his city. At the time, the balance of power in Chicago’s Italian 
community delicately teetered between the leadership of the city’s Sicilian Union, the Order of 
the Sons of Italy, and the Italian War Veterans. Zunini wrote that before the arrival of the fascio, 
“this Italian American community was tranquil, united, and firmly behind the Government’s 
Representative.” The arrival of Fascism, however, “was the beginning of discord and fights 
without end.” As in other cities, Zunini complained the fascio’s leadership was at odds with the 
local elites, and worse, “rebellious towards the consular authority.” Writing to his superiors, he 
explained that in Chicago, Fascism “has meant that we have lost the sense of respect, of 
deference, and of obedience to the powers that be, given the impunity enjoyed by others. It has 
also produced an irreparable split in the Colony, since for me to oppose and resist the continuous 
and daily attacks by these people I have been forced to rely on the support of certain associations 
[over others].”61 
 In Boston, an Italian diplomat felt lucky his community avoided Chicago’s problems by 
simply showing no interest in the fasci. He believed his apolitical community felt an ardent love 
of the homeland “above any political conceptions.” As a political organization, he explained, 
“the constitution of the fascio therefore aroused general suspicion.” As had happened in Chicago, 
he predicted the fascio “without a doubt could have become motive and fodder for terrible 
discord and the casting of a dark shadow on this colony and on all Italians, if not for the good 
sense of our people…to quickly leave [the fascio] and show less and less interest in it.” By 1923, 
he claimed the fascio was so isolated, and supported by so few members, that it was simply “an 
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amusing topic for idle conversation in cafés.”62 
 Within three years things became far less amusing for Boston’s Vice Consul Mario 
Vattani when he responded to accusations that he was undermining the work of the now 
formidable fascio. Defending himself to Dino Grandi, he attested to the delicacy of the diplomats’ 
work controlling the fasci without taking any responsibility for them. When an Italian military 
hero planned to visit Boston, the city’s Italians invited Vattani to join the welcoming committee. 
The committee, comprised of Fascists, anti-Fascists, Catholics, and masons, had predictable 
trouble coalescing, and as he was a new face in Boston Vattani wrote, “I made an all too easy 
target for all the inevitable, disgruntled, disillusioned adversaries.” Immediately, he was asked to 
weigh in on whether the fasci should be allowed to dress in their black shirts for the general’s 
public tribute. “The exclusion of the blackshirts would have transformed the demonstration into 
an anti-Fascist one, and that could never be my intention. The Fasci must always be represented, 
at least through the lodges of the Order of the Sons of Italy,” he wrote to Grandi. But he knew he 
could not give that answer to the committee, instead telling them “I can not make a ruling on the 
behavior of [the fasci] that are completely independent of myself, my office, and my 
authority.”63 Though the general’s visit was a success, tensions within the community only 
worsened, erupting in a bloody riot in 1928 when anti-Fascists attacked blackshirt-wearing 
Fascists in a parade celebrating Italy’s World War I victory. Four men were hospitalized and 
seven arrested that day. Though the melee was a blight on the reputation of the Fascist 
movement in America and Italian immigrants broadly, Italy succeeded in keeping its government 
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unconnected.  
  By 1925, seventy branches of fasci under Italy’s control counted only seven thousand 
members in the United States. The ineffectiveness of the Fascist Central Council at resolving 
disunity and rebellion led Mussolini to disband it that year, replacing it with the Fascist League 
of North America. Hoping to reign in the undisciplined fasci, avoid the internal political 
squabbles of the Italian American elites, and clarify the hierarchy of the organization, Mussolini 
hand picked a wealthy and well-connected Italian immigrant, Count Ignazio Thaon di Revel, as 
the FLNA’s only leader. Even with Count Thaon di Revel’s central leadership in the United 
States, the fasci continued to succeed more in sowing discontent within Italian American 
communities than uniting immigrants for Italy; they created more bad publicity through violent 
clashes with opponents than good propaganda for Fascism; and regardless of who controlled the 
fasci they continued to face the same central dilemma—uncertainty about how politically active 
America’s immigrants could be regarding their homeland. 
Like Agostino de Biasi’s fascio of 1921 and the Fascist Central Council in 1923, 
membership in the FLNA after 1925 required swearing a membership oath. As a set of six 
pledges, the FLNA’s oath reflected Italy’s intention to impose discipline, service, and respect for 
hierarchy among the fasci; three qualities the fasci fundamentally lacked. Five pledges included 
demands for obedience to higher authorities, culminating in a final commandment “to be 
disciplined to the hierarchies of the Fascist League of North America.”64 The first two 
commandments—which Jesse M. Thomas had found so inimical to American citizenship in 
Baltimore—ordered members “to serve with loyalty and discipline the Fascisti idea of society 
based upon religion, nation and family” and then “to love, serve, obey and exalt the United 
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States of America and teach obedience to and respect for the Constitution and laws.” Though 
Thaon di Revel and other Fascists pointed to the second commandment as proof of their loyalty 
to America, they underestimated how the American public would react to making obedience to 
the Constitution secondary to loyalty towards Fascism. 
 The third and fourth pledges spoke to the FLNA’s program in America: “to keep alive the 
veneration for Italy as our country or origin and the eternal light of civilization and greatness,” 
and “to fight with all my strength the theories and ideas aiming to subvert, corrupt, or disgrace 
religion, love of country, and family.”65 None of the iterations of the fasci had been very 
successful at keeping alive the cult of Italy through propaganda, recruiting new members, or 
accepting Italy’s imposed hierarchy. With four and a half million Italian Americans in the 
country, the fasci only had 12,000 members at its peak in 1929. The FLNA did not do much 
better than the Fascist Central Council in this regard, especially because Count Thaon di Revel 
focused his energies on the fourth vow; combatting subversives. Rather than mend relations 
between the existing fasci and local elites and restore the good name of Fascism abroad, Thaon 
di Revel succeeded in augmenting both community discord and bad publicity by fighting his 
fellow immigrants, violently when necessary.  
 Three years after the FLNA’s creation, Piero Parini, director of the Fasci Abroad, wrote 
to Ambassador de Martino “to clarify and define the relationship between the Fascist League of 
North America and the General Secretary of Fasci Abroad,” asking him to relay his message to 
Count Thaon di Revel.66 The nine points Parini outlined in the 1928 dispatch proved that the 
problems Caetani noted as far back as 1923 persisted. Rome had still not resolved its 
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contradictory edicts about the purpose and function of the fasci, it had not improved upon ill-
defined organizational hierarchies, and a lack of cohesion between the fasci, the Italian American 
masses, and the consuls continued. 
  First, Parini stated that Thaon di Revel and all members of the FLNA “are considered 
subordinate to the Authority of Rome, following with discipline the instructions of the Secretary 
General.” His second point was a direct contradiction: “The League must conserve its character 
of autonomous association in the face of the authority of American public opinion and the 
masses of Italian Americans, but remain set that its leadership complies in its acts and initiatives 
with the Secretary of Fasci Abroad.” The third order complicated, rather than clarified, earlier 
commandments against politics and Americanization, stating “the League must be a powerful 
instrument of Italian politics and of the Fascist revolution and therefore must bring together the 
greatest number possible of good Italian citizens residing in America and of Italians that have 
become Americans.” The fourth order, acknowledging the inevitability of polemics between the 
consuls and the FLNA asked for disputes to be solved internally rather than through the 
newspapers, or worse, on the streets. The next five orders specified the necessary procedures for 
bringing the FLNA under control, including “purging” the league of “unworthy” members and 
suppressing political debate and elections while avoiding “minute” control of the League’s 
activities.67 
Parini’s drastic measures were a direct response to the total lack of control Italy and 
Thaon de Revel had over league members from the FLNA’s beginning. Immediately after the 
FLNA was formed, league members announced their arrival onto the Italian American political 
scene by clashing violently with anti-Fascists on the 118th birthday of Giuseppe Garibaldi in 
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Staten Island on July 4, 1925. The Italian unification hero had resided for a time in the 1850s in 
Rosebank, Staten Island, at the home of Antonio Meucci, inventor of the telephone before 
Alexander Graham Bell. OSIA maintained Meucci’s home on the island as a pilgrimage site for 
the Italians of New York and hosted a July 4th celebration there for Garibaldi’s birthday. That 
day, while Americans celebrated their country’s independence from England, a strong police 
force in Staten Island tried stopping 350 Fascists and 1,000 anti-Fascists from fighting for their 
rights to the space in two separate brawls involving broken bottles, stones, and wooden clubs.68  
 The next month, the police were less prepared to stop a bloody confrontation in Newark, 
New Jersey. On August 16, 250 anti-Fascists attended a rally to hear Vincenzo Vacirca, former 
Deputy of the Italian parliament, speak. Before he began, forty Fascists led by Thaon di Revel 
stormed the meeting hall, demanding the stage so they could “convince the Socialists that 
Mussolini had been the savior of Italy.”69 Despite their violent encounter with the anti-Fascists 
just one month earlier, the Fascists claimed the anti-Fascists invited them to the meeting and said 
they showed up “believing that it was for a courteous discussion, animated by a sincere spirit of 
Italianità, between political adversaries that respect one another despite their battles.”70  
 The anti-Fascists’ version of events that night differed quite a bit. The anti-Fascists 
accused FLNA members of kidnapping ex-Deputy Vacirca that evening as he rode the train from 
New York City to Newark, threatening him with death if he delivered his intended address. 
Vacirca escaped his aggressors in Harrison, arriving at the hall an hour after the meeting’s start. 
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By then, Count Thaon di Revel amassed reinforcements in Newark to prevent the meeting from 
taking place. Whether Thaon di Revel and his men naively walked into an ambush that night or 
followed Vacirca to Newark, ready for battle, the results were discouraging for the intruders: a 
bloody confrontation that sent six Fascists to the hospital with gunshots, knife wounds, and head 
injuries after policemen broke up the riot. 
 Though Mussolini had chosen Thaon di Revel to head the FLNA so he could bring 
stability and cohesion to the Italian community and avoid bad publicity for Italy, his group’s 
continued violence worked against both goals. Headlines after the Newark meeting, such as “27 
Hurt as N.Y. Fascisti Invade Socialist Hall: Pistols, Knives, Razors Used in Battle Royal in 
Newark when Count di Revel Leads Men into Meeting” helped to grow the anti-Fascist 
movement and draw negative attention to Fascists by Americans. De Biasi, who had resigned 
from the fasci in 1924 because he preferred speaking his mind to following orders, wrote: “one 
of the most pernicious threats to the development of the Fasci in America is the shadow of the 
billy-club projected onto them.”71⁠ De Biasi’s continued refusal to follow directions from Italy 
caused Mussolini to formally expel him from the Fascist Party in 1928 and cut advertisements to 
Il Carroccio, further evidence of Italy’s lack of control over its migrants abroad.   
 Over the next several years the violence continued, earning the FLNA column inches 
whenever Italian Americans shed blood over Italy’s politics. In 1926, the same day that 
Mussolini was the object of an assassination attempt in Italy, anarchist Carlo Tresca witnessed a 
bomb prematurely explode outside his anti-Fascist meeting in Harlem, killing two Fascists. The 
next year, when Tresca planned to speak at an anti-Fascist meeting in Port Chester, New York, 
Fascists stormed the meeting hall with bombs and other weapons, causing injury to ten Italians 
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and ten policemen. The Port Chester event was one of more than a dozen violent incidents 
between Fascists and anti-Fascists in just the first five months of 1927, though the violence was 
not limited to New York or the reign of the FLNA. In 1933, years after Mussolini disbanded the 
FLNA, Giovanni di Silvestro’s home was bombed in Philadelphia, killing his wife and injuring 
three of his children. A decade later, two gunmen murdered Carlo Tresca while he walked down 
Fifth Avenue.72 
End of the Fasci, Beginning of Fascism in America 
 Agostino de Biasi established his fascio in 1921 with a primary goal of giving Italian 
Americans status as transnationalistic citizens, but his group’s peculiar relationships with Italy 
and America hindered the fasci from being productive. Because the fasci eschewed 
naturalization and maintained close ties with the Italian government, they proved to be the least 
effective Italian association in the United States. During the debt negotiations the fasci lacked a 
voice in Congress while the Order of the Sons of Italy, the Italian War Veterans and even the 
Italy-America Society spoke freely on behalf of American voters and Italy. By serving two 
masters—the American public and the Fascist state—the fasci’s actions were so constrained as to 
make them politically impotent. Their main avenue for activism became physical and verbal 
fights against immigrant subversives, other ethnic organizations, and the Italian consuls, causing 
Foreign Minister Dino Grandi to admit in 1929 that the fasci “did Italy more harm than good.”73 
 The violence, coupled with protests from anti-Fascists, caught the attention of the 
American press, causing some journalists to dig further into the activities of the FLNA and the 
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Italian consuls in America. Eventually, one article brought about the ultimate demise of the 
FLNA in 1929. That autumn, Harper’s Magazine published an exposé on the FLNA by Marcus 
Duffield titled “Mussolini’s American Empire: The Fascist Invasion of the United States.” 
Duffield’s article added little new information to what Ray Tucker had written in the 1927 New 
York Telegram piece that excited Jesse Thomas and Albert Johnson, but Duffield was far more 
successful at rousing Americans’ deepest fears of unassimilated immigrants. Shaking Americans’ 
belief in the powers of the melting pot, he quoted Mussolini’s order that Italians must remain 
citizens to the seventh generation, placing it in a military context. “He sees no reason why 
perhaps a half million potential soldiers of Fascism should slip from his grasp by becoming 
Americanized.”74 
 Duffield’s article became a condemnation of de Biasi’s belief that “no honest American 
and no law can deny the Italian the right to be Italian.”75 Connecting Italy’s military prospects 
with American sovereignty over its citizens and the battle over allegiances for future generations, 
Duffield summarized the dangers of the FLNA, stating, “the Fascist campaign here not only 
involves frequent violations of American citizenship rights, but also is in ceaseless conflict with 
our attempt to assimilate the Italian element.”76 Americans reading Duffield’s article were 
outraged to learn the American government had allowed Thaon di Revel to turn the FLNA “into 
a powerful nucleus for Mussolini’s American empire” over the course of four years.77  
 Duffield stated the twin purposes of the fasci as the “Italianization of the Italo-American 
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and the crushing of anti-Fascists.”78  He believed the second mission had protected the group 
from serious investigation because they had successfully framed their mission as an attack 
against Bolshevism and radicalism. When Thaon di Revel spoke to Ray Tucker for the 1927 
article “Fascism in America,” for example, he described the Italian American community as 
inundated with dangerous “Bolshevists, Communists, and radicals of all kinds.” Thaon di Revel 
claimed “it was to oppose and crush these elements that the Fascisti League of North America 
was organized,” adding that if the subversives stopped their work he would disband his league.79  
Confusion about the relative dangers of the Fascism and anti-Fascism permeated the 
American government, forestalling a direct response to the fascisti. Even when Jesse Thomas 
interrupted the naturalization proceedings in September of 1927 to prevent any Fascists from 
becoming citizens, he admitted, “I don’t know exactly what this Fascisti is. But I think it should 
be investigated and that is what we are going to do.”80 The Department of Justice had no better 
intelligence at the time either, as one official explained in response to the incident: “The Fascisti 
hold that the anti-Fascists are a menace to the country and should be driven out. The anti-Fascisti 
tell harrowing tales about the Fascisti and assert that they all should be deported. It is difficult to 
know which side to believe or whether either knows what it is talking about.”81 Two more years 
of familiarity with the Fascists and their growing violence would settle the question. By 1929 
Marcus Duffield could point to an increasing number of Americans, including Senator William E. 
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Borah, who believed “the Fascist activities here are more disturbing than the Communists’.”82 
 By 1929 Duffield could point to the first purpose of the FLNA—the Italianization of the 
Italian Americans—to provoke an American response. All of de Biasi’s care in avoiding public 
scrutiny by keeping his members from American politics backfired when Duffield explained the 
policies as anti-American and anti-assimilation. Rather than applaud de Biasi’s careful 
distinction between foreign citizens who had the right to organize on behalf of their homeland 
and naturalized immigrants who should not belong to a foreign political organization, Duffield 
claimed “the League ipso facto penalizes any of its members who become naturalized American 
citizens by taking away their rights and privileges as members of the Fascist organization in 
Italy.”83 Though no evidence supports Duffield’s charge, and Thaon di Revel boasted that 
seventy percent of his members were American citizens, the accusation that the FLNA actively 
worked against naturalization and Americanization marred the fasci. 
  In October, Alabama Senator Thomas Heflin introduced a resolution asking Secretary of 
State Henry Stimson to investigate the FLNA. On the Senate floor, Heflin described the FLNA 
as “a foreign organization antagonistic to American ideals and institutions which disrespectfully, 
insolently, boldly, and brazenly demands of duly naturalized American citizens…that they 
pledge their allegiance to and give whole-hearted support to Mussolini and his Roman Fascist 
regime.”84 Heflin had long opposed Mussolini, and often read articles on the Senate floor about 
the Fascist presence in America, including Tucker’s. His earlier denunciations of Fascism had 
been undermined by his staunch anti-Catholicism, however, which made his attacks seem more 
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like religious bigotry and underhanded hits at presidential candidate Al Smith than credible 
warnings of foreign political activity. In 1929, with Smith’s campaign concluded, Heflin 
presented the problem again as an immediate threat to American sovereignty by winning the 
support of Senator William E. Borah, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.  
 Italy took the threat of a formal investigation seriously. In December, before Stimson’s 
report went public, Thaon di Revel spoke to the American press, refuting several of the claims 
Duffield had made and praising his group’s efforts “to contribute to the enlightenment of the 
American public pertaining to the ideals of fascism and the marvelous work of national 
reconstruction accomplished by the Fascisti Government in Italy.”85 Nevertheless, he announced, 
“recognizing that our struggle is ended and that the accomplishes of Fascist Italy have gained 
American sympathy this special meeting of the Fascisti League of North America has 
unanimously agreed to dissolve its organization and cease its activities.” On December 31, 1929, 
ninety-three fasci with twelve thousand members ceased to exist.86 
 Disbanding the FLNA only brought about the end of an organization, not the beliefs or 
activities of its members, a truism the American public would disregard for at least another 
decade. Reporting on the end of the FLNA, The New York Times and Herald-Tribune both 
quoted anti-Fascist leader Dr. Charles Fama warning Americans not to believe the war against 
Fascism over. “We must not think that the Fascisti have given up, merely because they have 
formally disbanded,” he stated, adding “this by no means wipes out the Fascist Propaganda in the 
United States.”87 He rightly predicted the Fascists would increase their work spreading 
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propaganda through indirect means and go unnoticed by the American public.  
After eight years of conflict, disorganization, and ineffectiveness in the fasci, Italy 
abandoned its insistence on hierarchy and left the work of propaganda to unaffiliated local elites 
who took up the Fascist cause with self-serving zeal. Their work grew the political activity of 
Italians in the United States from ninety-three fasci to hundreds of thousands of individuals 
successfully organized in support of Italy and Mussolini. The end of the FLNA and the 
beginning of a new indirect form of political organization clarified the limits of Americans’ 
tolerance for immigrant political identities.  
Throughout the 1920s, American politicians, immigrants of varied political leanings, and 
Italian diplomats essentially agreed on an immigrant’s right to an ethnic identity, even if that 
right came with unclear restrictions. The fallout to Duffield’s article revealed those limits: 
Americans would not allow their immigrants to swear political allegiance to any foreign body or 
join a foreign political organization, but would permit them to maintain a personal interest in the 
politics of their homeland and hold sympathy for its government.  
By disbanding the FLNA, Mussolini removed the source of competition between the 
American and Fascist states over conflicting nationalistic citizenships. Like his concessions over 
emigrant military obligations, the end of the FLNA was a step closer to immigrant 
transnationalistic citizenship as a unique status that recognized migrants’ different 
responsibilities towards their two nations. Over the course of the 1930s the United States 
similarly made concessions about immigrants’ transnationalism by allowing their ethnic political 
identity. Over time, the emphasis on formal service evident in Dr. Charles Fama’s 1927 assertion 
that Italians “cannot serve Mussolini and Uncle Sam at the same time” would give way. In its 
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place arose a new idea that suppressed nationalistic citizenship for the transnationalistic 
citizenship immigrants had wanted. Building on Secretary Davis’s speech at the OSIA 
convention in 1926, Italian Americans would win support for the idea that Italians could not be 
good American citizens if they forgot their homeland politically nor good Italians if they ignored 
their obligations towards America.88
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Chapter Two: 
From a Political Virginity: The Development of Italian American Fascism, 1930-1940 
 
Less than two years into his tenure as Italy’s ambassador to the United States, Giacamo 
de Martino wrote to his superiors in Rome outlining his difficulties working with the Italian 
leaders in America. He found few of them “well suited to complete the work of Fascist 
transformation” which he considered especially crucial at that moment “when most of the Italian 
Colony is asked nothing less than to transform their political virginity for marrying the Fascist 
cause.”1 De Martino found little hope for his mission in 1927. The bitter personal rivalries that 
emerged between editors and the fascisti over control of the community left him exasperated. 
“The situation is incurable,” he wrote, “my efforts…have been useless.” He worried the 
prominenti—the Italian American elite—had loose allegiances to Fascism and believed many of 
them hid their outright love of the old liberal regime beneath generic “Mussolinism”—lauding 
Mussolini and Italy without understanding the actual Fascist political system.2 Perhaps the worst 
offender was Generoso Pope, owner of Il Progresso Italo-Americano, the largest Italian-
language paper in the United States. De Martino claimed the paper still clung to the “traditional 
colonial style of the old Italy,” and suffered from a condition he coined as “monumentomania, 
banquetomania, parchmentomania, etc.”3 
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De Martino’s complaints hardly differed from those of his predecessors and colleagues. 
Well before Mussolini’s March on Rome, Italians undertaking cultural and political organizing 
work in America wrote to their superiors back home attempting to explain why success evaded 
them. Giovanni Caggiano, president of New York’s Dante Alighieri Society, liberally placed 
blame on others for his inability to grow the Rome-based educational organization abroad. First, 
he had to contend with the immigrants’ “lack of culture” and “the rivalry that still divides Italians 
from Italians until it provokes painful phenomenon of campanilismo”—or fierce attachment to 
their hometowns. Conditions in America did not help, as he found the “fervid life of the country 
offers no respite to the exhausting work of the day laborer—so that what little time is dedicated 
to non-financial institutions is found with sacrifice.” Moreover, he faced “hostility, both seen and 
unseen, sincere and in bad faith from the native element” and the unfortunate “delay of the 
Italians in Rome comprehending these truths.” But above all, what made his work “truly difficult, 
delicate, and slow,” was the “apathy that possesses our emigrants.” This apathy, he explained, 
resulted from repeated patriotic schemes such as statues, banquets, and parades, “attempted and 
failed due to the limited ability and sometimes dishonesty of their promoters and sustainers.” He 
believed these “unscrupulous business ventures” created an effective mask for what was really a 
“continuous financial and moral drain suffered by the people in the name of patriotism.”4 
 Fascism’s obstacles in the Italian American community, as described by de Martino and 
Caggiano, seemed intractable. Indeed the problems of campanalismo; overworked and underpaid 
workers; hostile Americans; an Italian bureaucracy that failed to understand local American 
conditions; widespread political apathy; and prominenti who sought financial gain and personal 
importance “in the name of patriotism” had existed from the beginning of Italian mass migration 
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in the 1870s. Since Mussolini’s rise to power, the state’s criticisms of the prominenti grew to 
include indiscipline and disunity; loose interpretations of Fascist ideology; and an over-reliance 
on showmanship exemplified in a full calendar of celebrations, banquets, rallies, and awards.5  
Caggiano and de Martino both resented the prominenti as obstacles to the effective 
spread of Fascism in the United States, but after the public backlash against the FLNA and its 
closure in 1929, they had little choice but to partner with Italian American elites to carry out their 
political agenda. What they did not foresee at the time was that only after the Italian government 
relinquished hierarchy and doctrine, embraced the immigrants’ organizational diversity, pushed a 
cultural and racial definition of Fascism, and promoted the prominenti’s monumentomania, 
banquetomania, and parchmentomania, that Fascism would succeed as an organizing principle 
among Italian Americans.  
The public backlash against the political work of the Fascist League of North America 
had the immediate consequence of forcing Mussolini to disband the FLNA in December of 1929, 
and the more gradual effect of changing how both the Italian government and the ideology of 
Fascism operated in the United States. Over the next decade, the Italian government 
experimented with more opaque methods of cementing Italian Americans’ loyalty to the 
homeland through the growing work of the Ministry of Press and Propaganda—later renamed the 
Ministry of Popular Culture. From 1930 until the rupture of diplomatic relations in 1941, the 
Ministry pursued two tactics for increasing Italian American support for Fascism: indirectly 
spreading propaganda in the United States, and politically organizing Italian Americans in 
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nominally apolitical organizations. The Ministry and its sixteen subsidiaries, including the 
Educative Cinematic Union (LUCE), the National Office for the Tourism Industry (ENIT) and 
the Office for Italian Radio Listening (EIAR), provided the Italian consuls with institutional 
support as well as propaganda materials they could distribute indirectly through their connections 
with organizations, media, and community leaders.  
 Tasked with spreading cultural propaganda everywhere—rather than among the fiercely 
Fascist minority as the FLNA did—Italian consuls throughout the United States looked to 
develop deeper partnerships with the prominenti who ran the communities’ newspapers, owned 
its businesses, and organized its members into associations. By relying on prominenti and their 
institutions to spread Fascism, the consuls adjusted the methods of spreading Fascism in America 
and permitted a substantial change in the meaning of Fascism among Italian Americans. Just as 
Fascist immigrants in America forced Italy to concede its nationalistic citizenship for 
transnationalistic citizenship, pro-Fascist prominenti would change the meaning of Fascism 
abroad. Because they controlled the distribution of Fascist propaganda, the prominenti could turn 
the Italian political ideology into a set of beliefs that fit their personal agendas. For newspaper 
editors whose papers served as instruments of power over their communities, Fascism meant 
greater prestige of Italian Americans and therefore greater prominence for themselves as leaders. 
For business owners who sponsored radio broadcasts, Fascism meant Italian American pride in 
their immigrant heritage, which would translate to dollars spent on imported Italian products. 
And for the heads of immigrant institutions such as mutual aid associations, churches, and clubs, 
Fascism meant Italian unity demonstrated by joining and becoming active members of ethnic 
institutions. 
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 None of this is what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had in mind before the FLNA’s end, 
and Italy’s agents in America were slow to accept the prominenti’s versions of Fascism. Over 
time, however, it became clear that the Italian consuls did not control Fascism among their 
emigrants in the United States. They supported and encouraged pro-Fascist organizations, they 
supplied community leaders with propaganda materials, and they helped stamp out the anti-
Fascist opposition, but the prominenti made Fascism their own. 
Quantifying Fascism 
 Without the hierarchy and structure of the FLNA, the fascisti who had long battled with 
prominenti over control of the Italian community lost their standing within the Italian 
government. Once a symbol of Italian emigrants’ enduring devotion to the homeland, the fascisti 
had become public relations liabilities through their public violence. In their place, Italian 
consuls relied on newspaper editors, radio programmers, businessmen, and organization heads 
who could reach the Italian American public, spread propaganda to them, and organize them by 
using the community institutions and networks they had controlled since the 1880s. As American 
citizens, the prominenti could do all this outside the official purview of the Italian government, 
avoiding scrutiny. Though many contemporaries and historians tried to quantify and evaluate the 
existence of Fascism in the United States, their focus on “true” Fascists ignored how the post-
FLNA strategy purposefully avoided such a distinction. After 1930, that Italian strategy 
produced two levels of Fascist supporters in America, neither of which fit the model of the 
staunch Fascist: pro-Fascist prominenti and their sympathetic followers.  
 At the height of the Ministry of Popular Culture’s efforts, Harvard professor and Italian 
exile Gaetano Salvemini estimated “out-and-out Italian American Fascists constitute no more 
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than 5% of the Italian population.”6 While he must have included some of the workers, veterans, 
and die-hard Fascists that once held membership cards to the FLNA, the professor explained the 
group was made up of mostly “successful businessmen and professionals.” Though Salvemini 
wrote that these “Fascist agents” were “strongly organized, active, and as noisy as Italians can 
be,” by 1930 the only official Fascist agents in America were the Italian consuls and the small 
staff they employed. The prominenti who worked with the consuls to organize their communities 
on behalf of the Fascist cause did not do so because they wanted to occupy a bottom rung on the 
Italian government’s hierarchical ladder. They believed Fascism could serve them as much as 
they could serve it. While they remained wholly sympathetic to the Fascist cause and great 
admirers of Mussolini until the 1940s, the drama of the FLNA had scared the smartest and most 
ambitious prominenti away from any official connection with the Italian government. The other 
term Salvemini used when referring to this group, “pro-Fascist,” more aptly described their deep 
commitment to the Fascist cause yet unofficial, tenuous commitment to the Italian government. 
In describing why the prominenti flocked to support Fascism, one OSS explained: 
“hunger for Italian prestige [was] omnipresent.”7 Rather than embrace Fascism as a rejection of 
the American society that had marginalized them, many prominenti approached it as a system 
that could recognize their past successes and support their future ambitions in American society. 
Professor Salvemini explained, “For one who was himself or whose father before him was a day 
laborer only twenty-years ago, it is the consummation of felicity to be knighted by 
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Mussolini…To pave the way for such triumphs, they contribute generously to all kinds of Fascist 
activities.”8  
 Salvemini may have had Generoso Pope in mind when describing the pro-Fascist 
prominenti. By far the most influential and well-known of the American prominenti, Pope came 
to the United States in 1906 at the age of fifteen with $10 in his pocket. Twenty years later he 
received his first of three medals of honor from Mussolini, presented to him by New York’s 
Mayor Jimmy Walker. After his first job in the United States hauling water to laborers as a 
teenager, Pope moved up the ranks of the Colonial Sand and Gravel Company from shoveler to 
foreman, superintendent, and eventually owner in 1920.9 Within a few years, Pope was 
considered the wealthiest Italian in New York City and the first Italian American millionaire.  
 Around the core group of pro-Fascist organizers, Salvemini described “a halo of people 
with a mentality which has not yet clearly become Fascist and antidemocratic but which might 
crystallize at the first emergency.”10 This 35 percent of the Italian American population had even 
weaker commitments to the Fascist government, yet regularly spoke of Fascist Italy with 
sympathy, and readily joined associations and events organized by the Italian consuls and the 
pro-Fascists. Salvemini labeled another 50 percent of Italian Americans as apathetic and 
completely uninterested in Italy’s politics, though it is not so easy to separate the genuinely 
apathetic from the merely uncommitted.11 Very often, those who described themselves as 
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indifferent to Italian politics joined pro-Fascist events and organizations during the Ethiopian 
War in the mid-1930s or other moments of high Italian patriotism. 
 Observers noted that the political battle in America’s Little Italies existed mostly between 
small groups of politically active pro- and anti-Fascists who fought for two decades over the 
sympathies of the rest of the community. Both sides recognized that pro-Fascists had the upper 
hand in the fight. In 1942, Giuseppe Lupis, editor of the socialist newspaper Il Mondo believed 
90 percent of Italian Americans were “either indifferent to Italian anti Fascism or hostile to it.”12 
Salvemini similarly put anti-Fascism at 10 percent, though he wrote, “the majority are not 
organized and remain inactive.”13 A year later, no longer trusting his co-nationals were merely 
apathetic, Lupis declared “No matter what anyone tells you…ninety-five per cent or more of the 
Italians here are still Fascists.”14 As proof, he suggested to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
that “anyone who goes into the Italian section of New York can hear open statements against the 
United States, the President, and other expressions of the pure Fascist line.”15 
 In 1944, Bryn Mawr College classics professor and OSS informant Lily Ross Taylor did 
just that. As she had done in other cities, Taylor wandered through Baltimore’s Little Italy one 
day in April, asking strangers about Mussolini and the war. As a non-Italian outsider, she 
received many answers of “I am a good American. I have been here thirty-seven years and I 
don’t know what’s going on in Italy and don’t care.” But of the eight people who would speak to 
her, six told her Mussolini was a good man who had done a great deal for Italy. One woman 
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“explained that he had made mistakes, but that one ought to remember that all human beings 
make mistakes and we ought to consider how much good he had done for Italy.” This she said to 
an unknown American woman three years after Italy declared war against the United States.16 
 In one fruit store Taylor wandered into, she met the proprietor “who was unwilling to 
commit himself on Mussolini,” and a customer who was the only anti-Fascist she met that day. 
That she met more people willing to defend Mussolini than describe themselves as anti-Fascist, 
even in 1944, is not surprising. Whereas the Ministry of Popular Culture ensured Fascism had a 
place wherever Italian Americans interacted with their community—media, clubs, schools, 
churches, concerts, picnics—anti-Fascism’s failures lay in its leaders’ inability to spread their 
cause beyond the labor union and their political associations. When Lupis estimated that 90 
percent of Italian Americans were indifferent or hostile to anti-Fascism he also explained that 
“the immense majority of them had never heard of the Mazzini Society;” the largest anti-Fascist 
organization in America.17  
 The felicitousness of the forced disbanding of the FLNA and Italy’s turn towards indirect, 
cultural propaganda is highlighted by the anti-Fascists’ failures. Inside New York, the Mazzini 
Society suffered from constant political turmoil stemming from battles between “anarchists of at 
least two denominations, revolutionary syndicalists, left wing socialists, right-wing socialists,” as 
well as communists, Italian exiles, and American citizens—much like the fascisti had once 
fought with the prominenti. Observing the problems of the “politically active minority,” 
Salvemini wrote, “these groups are at loggerheads with one another, make as much noise as 
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possible, and do not accomplish very much. Italians cannot do anything without noise and they 
often make noise without doing anything.”18  
 Many of the Mazzini Society’s critics—and even more of its supporters—agreed with 
Salvemini. Though the Mazzini began organizing nationally in 1938, the society’s influence 
outside New York was negligible. Of the quarter million Italian Americans in Chicago, 45 
belonged to the society. San Francisco and Boston each had 70 members, and in Los Angeles 
there were 100, ninety of whom belonged to labor unions.19 In Milwaukee, Madison, and 
Minneapolis a few people subscribed to the Mazzini’s newspaper without any intention of 
joining, knowing only that the prominent Italian statesman Count Carlo Sforza, then exiled from 
Italy and leading the Mazzini in America “was a name.”20 By May 1943, the decline of the 
Mazzini Society was apparent to all, especially because the organization could not find any new 
leaders from within its membership after Sforza’s return to Italy. “They do not wish,” an 
informant stated, “to serve as undertakers.”21 
Defining a New Italian American Fascism 
 Printing the Fascist ideology in propaganda material went against the post-FLNA strategy 
of indirect political activity, but when government representatives and Italian American 
sympathizers did articulate the ideology of Fascism they emphasized three key points: Fascism 
was a vision of “the Italian nation victorious” in redressing perceived wrongs from the Treaty of 
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Versailles; it was the realization of the corporate state which replaced communism and anarchy 
with “the effective cooperation of all citizens” through sacrifice, order and discipline; and lastly 
“the religion and passion of the Patria, pride in the Latin name, and the unshaken faith in the 
country's highest destiny—the coming of new Italian supremacy.”22 More simply articulated, as 
it was in Italian grammar books freely supplied to emigrants by the Italian government in the 
1920s, Fascism was “a way of life” that signified “pride in feeling Italian every hour of the day, 
discipline in work, respect for authority.”23 
 The question of whose authority immigrants were supposed to obey complicated 
Fascism’s success in America during the FLNA. The League’s membership oath, which began 
with a commandment “to serve with fidelity and discipline the Fascist idea of society” and then 
“to love, serve, obey and exalt the United States of America” articulated Fascism’s emphasis on 
discipline and respect for authority as well as their naïveté about how the American public would 
react to an organization placing obedience to the Constitution secondary to service towards 
Fascism. The last commandment, “to submit to the discipline of the hierarchy of the Fascist 
League of North America,” confirmed the league’s commitment to order and discipline above all 
else.24 
 Tensions in the oath between serving a Fascist idea of society and obeying the 
Constitution of the United States reflected Italy’s lack of a coherent position on how Italian 
Americans could support an anti-democratic nationalist movement while living in a foreign 
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republic. De Martino acknowledged the emigrant experience made it impossible for Italian 
Americans to follow Fascist ideology to the letter, but he regarded with contempt the watered-
down version of Fascism that newspaper editors put forward. Though he originally condemned 
“Mussolinism” as a tenuous acceptance of Fascist political ideology hidden behind outspoken 
adoration of Mussolini and Italian cultural patriotism, within a short time the Italian government 
began embracing a similar strategy. 
 After the FLNA’s demise the Italian government continued distributing free textbooks to 
language schools abroad, though it significantly edited its list of Fascist virtues. In 1933, a level 
three textbook asked, “What are the guiding principles of the Fascists abroad?” The question 
itself revealed a newfound appreciation in Italy of Fascism’s inherent difference for emigrants 
outside the homeland, but the textbook’s response showed even greater changes. As a counter to 
critiques over the FLNA’s oath, the book quoted Mussolini stating fascisti abroad must obey the 
laws of their host countries. Then it listed the Fascist virtues: first, “be an example of public and 
private integrity,” next “respect Italian representatives abroad,” and then, “defend Italianità in 
the past and in the present.”25 Immigrants’ obligations to defend Italianità meant spreading 
recognition and appreciation for Italian cultural, scientific, and historic contributions to world 
civilization. In short time, the Italian government connected Italianità to the Fascist movement, 
making anti-Fascism synonymous with being anti-Italian, and covering up its political agenda 
with an ethno-cultural identity accessible to emigrants. 
The Fascist government did not coin the term Italianità. Decades before Mussolini, 
Italian intellectuals developed the idea of Italianità in service of the Risorgimento—a national 
movement aimed at overthrowing foreign monarchs and converting Italy into a united nation. 
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The Risorgimento’s supporters realized that before they could unite Italy, they had to create the 
idea of an Italian nation by building an “imagined community” out of Italian peasants, statesmen, 
and intellectuals.26 Towards this goal, Italianità became a crucial first step by imagining a single 
Italian community of economically and culturally diverse people, and by using racial language to 
imagine the Italian man as someone capable of throwing off his foreign monarchs and 
developing a new liberal state.  
 After achieving unification in 1861, the new state, in conjunction with its artists and 
writers, spread Italianità to overcome entrenched regionalism and create a positive national 
identity befitting the new regime. The act of unification and the existence of a liberal state 
produced a “southern question” in which the northern-based government considered the role of 
the backwards, barbaric, and racially inferior southerners in the country’s success. The state then 
looked to Italianità as a counter to northern antipathy towards southern Italy, which had been 
bolstered by the development of criminal phrenology and positivism in Italy in the 1870s.27 
 Unification also created an exodus of Italians out of the peninsula as thirteen million 
Italians left the country between 1880 and 1915.28 By the time Mussolini came to power in 1922, 
almost a quarter of the Italian nation lived abroad.29 Italy’s unprecedented population loss raised 
major questions internally about the failures of unification and the role of emigrants in the state. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Antonietta Di Pietro, “Italianità on Tour: From the Mediterranean to Southeast Florida, 1896-1939” 
(Ph.D. diss, Florida International University, 2013); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London and New York: Verso Books, 1983). 
 
27 Aliza S. Wong, Race and the Nation in Liberal Italy, 1861-1911: Meridionalism, Empire, and 
Diaspora (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
 
28 Mark I. Choate, Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad (Harvard University Press, 2008), 1. 
 
29 Madeline J. Goodman, “The Evolution of Ethnicity: Fascism and Anti-Fascism in the Italian-American 
Community, 1914-1945” (Carnegie Mellon University, 1993), 72. 
 
	   83 
To answer both questions, historian Mark Choate argues the government employed Italianità as 
“a subsidized and somewhat artificial Italianism” that would assuage some of the country’s 
shame over mass emigration. Migrants would be pioneers of a global Italy, and just as they 
served the state as informal ambassadors of Italy, Italianità would serve them “as a portable, 
enduring ethnic identity for transnational emigrants.”30 
 After decades of the liberal state trying to spread Italianità to its citizens abroad, 
Caggiano’s description of New York’s Italian American community in 1922 demonstrated what 
Mussolini’s blackshirts would proclaim marching on Rome a month later: the ineffective liberal 
regime could not achieve its goals. Campanilismo still divided Little Italies on regional lines, 
shame over Italy’s failures was pervasive, and connections to the home government barely 
existed. If Italians in the United States were familiar at all with Italianità, they encountered it 
only through the newspapers of their prominenti whose “monumentomania” impelled them to 
call regularly on their co-nationals to help them “fill New York with monuments.”31 When 
Ambassador de Martino coined the term monumentomania he disparagingly considered the 
prominenti’s efforts to be the traditional style of the old liberal regime, condescendingly writing 
about the monuments, “some are ‘cute,’ while others are grotesque.”32  
 The figures Italian editors chose for their monuments reflected the evolving nature of 
Italianità. By 1927, when de Martino wrote his critique, New York City’s Italians had erected 
public statues for Giuseppe Mazzini, Giuseppe Garibaldi, Christopher Columbus, Giuseppe 
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Verdi, Giovanni da Verrazano, and Dante Alighieri.33 The statues of cultural icons Dante and 
Verdi recalled the early uses of pre-Risorgimento Italianità as a discourse on the greatness of the 
Italian man. Unification heroes Mazzini and Garibaldi reflected the post-Risorgimento 
development of Italianità as a call for political unification. Showcasing a unique addition to 
Italianità by the American prominenti, the navigators Columbus and Verrazano made strong 
claims of Italian greatness and Italy’s connections to and responsibility for American history.  
Italian government representatives eventually followed the prominenti’s example by 
supporting monumentomania, banquetomania, and parchmentomania in honor of William Paca, 
Italian signer of the Declaration of Independence; Filippo Mazzei, advisor and friend to Thomas 
Jefferson; and Francesco Vigo, financier of the revolutionary army’s battles in Indiana. The 
evolution from memorializing purely Italian heroes to Italian Americans reflected the 
simultaneous change from strictly nationalistic citizenship to a broader acceptance of 
transnationalistic citizenship in theory. In practice, once the Italian government discovered the 
utility of transnationalistic citizenship, the monumentomania it once scorned as watered-down 
Fascism became part of the Italian American Fascist organizing strategy. De Martino’s successor, 
Augusto Rosso, for example, could hardly turn down the opportunity to speak alongside Franklin 
Roosevelt at the dedication of the General Clark and Francis Vigo memorial in June of 1936. 
While Italy waged a financial battle against England over its western expansion into Ethiopia, he 
could not waste an opportunity to tell the story of a man who financially supported America’s 
battle for western territory against England.  
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 An anti-Fascist labor leader once described the phenomenon of Italian American Fascism 
as “a kind of spiritual nationalism which served to compensate them for an inferiority complex 
arising from their humble status in the various Little Italies.”34 But the success of Italianità was 
not that it pushed pure Italian nationalism on humble Italians. Though the memorialization of 
great Italian men like Dante and Galileo helped prominenti spread racial pride and overcome an 
inferiority complex among the masses, it was only the first step in migrants’ political 
organization. By resurrecting the histories of Italian Americans like Vigo, Mazzei, and Paca, the 
prominenti progressed to the next step of providing historic precedent for Italian American 
political power through transnationalistic citizenship.  
The process of moving Italian Americans from a political virginity to political capital and 
transnationalistic citizenship depended entirely on the voluntary work of prominenti, of whom 
Generoso Pope was paradigmatic. Pope’s economic successes in the Colonial Sand and Gravel 
Company turned to political power when he formed New York’s first Italian American political 
clubs in 1925 and delivered the “Italian vote” to Walker’s mayoral campaign the next year. He 
eventually controlled one third of all ethnic political clubs in the city and served as the head of 
the Italian Division of the Democratic National Committee during Franklin Roosevelt’s 
presidential campaigns.35 Pope realized that his own power was tied to that of the Italian 
American masses, and saw Italianità as an opportunity to coalesce, inspire, and politicize his 
immigrant masses. To that end, Pope bought Il Progresso Italo-Americano, America’s second 
largest foreign language paper and the country’s largest Italian title in 1927. He later went on to 
purchase New York’s Il Corriere d’America and Bolletino della Sera, and Philadelphia’s 
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L’Opinione, with the help and encouragement of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.36 By the 
1930s, each of his papers additionally advertised his various Italian-language radio shows on the 
New York City airwaves. 
Just as Generoso Pope acted simultaneously as a business owner, newspaper editor, radio 
show sponsor, and political organization head, most prominenti took on several roles at once in 
their efforts to increase both their personal wealth and influence, embracing Fascism along the 
way. Though they shared leaders, each form of propaganda differed substantially. To illustrate 
the Fascist propaganda system in the post-FLNA era, this chapter analyzes the propaganda forms 
of printed media for newspaper editors, radio shows for business owners, and film for 
organization heads. Prominenti in all arenas worked with Italian consuls, who in turn reported to 
the Italian ambassador and the Ministry of Popular Culture about how best to bring Italian 
Americans from a political virginity to marrying the Fascist cause. While chapter three addresses 
how prominenti successfully organized Italian Americans politically in support of several Fascist 
causes, the rest of this chapter explains how they could exert such influence without criticism 
from the American public, why they would help the Italian government, and how they adapted 
Fascism and Italianità to serve their individual needs. 
Spreading Fascism 
The Written Word: Newspaper Editors go to Work for Fascism 
 In 1935, Italian Ambassador Augusto Rosso sent a memo to the Ministry of Popular 
Culture regarding the transfusion of fascist propaganda in the United States, rhetorically asking if 
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the government should encourage public opinion in its favor at all.37 As American opinion 
cooled to Italy over the conflict in Ethiopia, Rosso argued propaganda was only useful when 
done well—suggesting that Italy’s efforts up to then had been less than useful.  
Since the early 1920s, the Fascist regime had relied on its ability to spread good news 
about Fascism abroad through its control of foreign journalists stationed in Rome. In Italy, 
correspondents of “good moral and political standing” received free railway transit, theater 
tickets, reduced rent, housing in desirable neighborhoods, and other perks from the 
government.38 Foreign journalists additionally could avail themselves of 5,000 words of free 
cable transmission per month.39 With few exceptions, historian John P. Diggins found as a result 
of these benefits, “the American press treatment of Fascist Italy was marked by considerable 
obtuseness and even a shade of dishonor.”40 Outside of Italy, the government had a harder time 
influencing what journalists printed, and Rosso’s letter was in part an apology for failing to 
control the American media. Defending his poor results, Rosso explained that in America readers 
did not accept news without knowing its source, journalists rarely accepted bribes, and 
newspapers did not tolerate restrictions, censure, or limitations on their correspondents abroad.  
 Fortunately for him, most Italian American editors did not share Americans’ qualms 
about unsourced items, censure, and subsidies, and pro-Fascist editors continued to avail 
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themselves of the perks of being in Mussolini’s good graces long after American papers turned 
against Il Duce. Though anti-Fascists regularly accused newspapers like Il Progresso Italo-
Americano of receiving direct subsidies from Italy, the American government largely ignored 
their claims until Italy entered World War II. When the FBI finally investigated Generoso Pope 
in June, 1940, they found no evidence of Italy’s financial support of the paper besides the cable 
transmission, which had increased to 9,000 words a month during the Ethiopian crisis and 
reached as much as 18,000 words in a single month in 1941.41 The cable service did act as a de 
facto subsidy, as Il Progresso received nearly 180,000 free words in the year following Italy’s 
invasion of France in June 1940, which would have cost the paper over $14,000.42 Those savings 
allowed Il Progresso to fill its pages with fresh news from Italy, while its anti-Fascist 
competitors could not supply enough foreign news to interest mainstream readers.  
 The cable allowance did not cover ethnic papers’ financial needs entirely, and though the 
Italian government did not directly pay Italian American newspapers to support Fascism, many 
editors hoped it would. Several supportive papers asked their local consular representatives for 
help keeping their papers afloat through the Depression, with little success. In the mid-1920s 
Ambassador Giacomo de Martino helped the struggling Fascist paper Giovinezza with some 
private contributions that he pulled together from Italian friends in New York, but he 
subsequently wrote the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that not only was he unable to continue 
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supporting the paper that way, as requested by both the Ministry and Giovinezza’s editor, he 
considered it useless and impractical to maintain a publication in such an uncertain manner.43  
 By the 1930s, the Ministry agreed and started turning down similar requests from other 
publications. In 1937, Seattle’s consul Francesco Parenti wrote a detailed proposal for 
government help of his city’s La Gazzetta Italiana. Seattle supported a twelve-page German 
paper entirely subsidized by the Nazi government, and Parenti wondered if the Italian 
government could do something similar, warning how dangerous it would be for Italy to lose “a 
propaganda method…that nourishes national consciousness and pride among Italians here in a 
systematic way, just as a drop of water slowly hollows out a stone.”44 Among other suggestions, 
Parenti asked if the government’s dependent offices, such as the tourism bureau, the tobacco 
office, and Italian banks, could take out advertisements in the paper. He also asked for a $1,000 
yearly subsidy and for the Ministry to furnish the paper with free photographic and cartoon prints. 
Despite Ambassador Rosso’s support for many of Parenti’s suggestions, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs turned down each proposal for La Gazzetta’s direct support, “given the limited 
importance and circulation of the newspaper.”45 However, it did begin sending Italian consuls 
cartoons and photographs they could distribute to all of their local newspapers. Even without the 
government’s financial support, La Gazzetta Italiana managed to survive into the 1940s with a 
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circulation of just 1,000—mostly by copying articles from other pro-Fascist paper—and 
remained sympathetic to the Axis until 1942.46  
 Not all journalists were willing to stay loyal to the motherland without something in 
return. In the 1930s, James Donnaruma, editor of Boston’s leading pro-Fascist newspaper, La 
Gazzetta del Massachusetts, believed his support earned him recognition and financial benefits 
from Italy. The paper only had a circulation of 2,200 though the city had over 90,000 Italian 
Americans, so Boston’s consuls general felt comfortable ignoring a paper they considered “of 
little seriousness, notoriously blackmailing and libelist.”47 In 1933, Donnaruma got the attention 
of Boston’s Consul General Ermanno Armao when he prepared to publish a positive review of 
an anti-Fascist meeting, claiming “I’ve gotten nothing from loving Fascism, now I want to try 
anti-Fascism.”48 When Armao confronted Donnaruma, the editor offered to pull the review in 
exchange for a subsidy that would help turn his weekly paper into a daily. Armao turned down 
Donnaruma’s offer, considering it akin to blackmail, and subsequently adopted his predecessors’ 
strategy of ignoring Donnaruma and his paper, explaining to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “it 
is true that [La Gazzetta] usually defends Fascism and Il Duce, but I believe Fascism and Il Duce 
can do without defenders and allies from that paper.”49 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 INT-17IT-1133, Italian-Language Press in the U.S., April 18, 1944, OSS, FNB, NARA. 
 
47 Consul General Armao to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 4, 1933, Ambasciata d’Italia in Washington 
1925-1943 B. 58, ASMAE; INT-17IT-1133, Italian-Language Press in the U.S.; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930 Population. In the 1940s, the United States 
government cited the Gazzetta del Massachusetts circulation of 9,245. It is possible that circulation 
increased that much between the Ethiopian War and the start of World War II at the height of pro-Fascist 
feeling. 
 




	   91 
 The Italian government felt comfortable ignoring requests from small papers with a 
readership that was already solidly pro-Fascist since their influence was minimal and—except 
for Donnaruma—their loyalty secure. Anti-Fascist papers gave the regime more cause for 
concern, both for the damage they did in Little Italies and for the possible influence they could 
have on American public opinion. Though no circulation numbers exist for any of the most 
prominent anti-Fascist newspapers of the 1920s and 1930s, Diggins suggests the papers’ 
importance could be measured by the attention Italy paid to anti-Fascist papers such as Il Nuovo 
Mondo.50 Established in 1925 by union leader Frank Bellanca, within a year the Italian 
government wrote that although Il Nuovo Mondo’s circulation was “infinitely less than other 
Italian-language papers in America, its work among the lowest classes of our emigrants is not 
minimal.”51 The government should pay particular attention to the class which was “the most 
numerous, the most docile, the most hard-working, the poorest,” it wrote in a separate report, 
adding “all activities must be directed to neutralize [anti-Fascist newspapers’] deleterious action 
turning them into traitors of the Patria.”52 
 Italy’s diplomats investigated various methods for neutralizing socialist, anarchist, 
syndicalist, communist, and other anti-Fascist threats in Italian American communities. Their 
greatest success came in 1923, when the Italian embassy wrote to the state department about 
anarchist newspaper editor Carlo Tresca. Within a few weeks, the FBI arrested Tresca and 
charged him with spreading advertisements for birth control in his newspaper, Il Martello. He 
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was sentenced to a year in prison, but public opinion turned quickly in his favor when liberal 
American papers asked if their government was “acting as the agent of Mussolini’s 
dictatorship.”53 Four months later, President Coolidge commuted Tresca’s sentence.54  
 After Tresca’s release, Italy’s lawyers in America dissuaded their client from seeking any 
more assistance from the state department, and regularly counseled Italy against pursuing 
defamation cases which it had little hope of winning. The government turned to other strategies 
for undermining anti-Fascist publications. Although Italy’s ministries made it clear in their 
correspondence regarding Seattle’s La Gazzetta Italiana that their dependent bureaus would not 
waste money taking out advertisements in fledgling pro-Fascist papers, they did not ignore the 
power of advertising dollars entirely.  Rather than the carrot they could not afford, they often 
chose the stick. Consuls struck a blow to anti-Fascists by forcing Italian companies to pull 
advertisements from any paper that became critical of the regime, citing the support of such a 
newspaper “an act of hostility against Italy.”55  
 Besides financial incentives and pressure, the Italian government pursued more direct 
methods of influencing what Italian Americans read about the Fascist government. Anti-Fascist 
Girolamo Valenti, Il Nuovo Mondo’s editor in the 1930s, claimed the Italian government posted 
agents to newspapers who worked simultaneously as editors for the papers and “guardian[s] of 
Mussolini’s interests.”56 Valenti named Angelo Flavio Guidi and Vincenzo Comito, editors for 
Generoso Pope’s Il Progresso Italo-Americano and Corriere d’America, as agents. While 
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working for America’s two largest Italian language dailies, Valenti claimed they frequently 
visited Italy to take instructions from the Ministry of Popular Culture and maintained offices at 
the Italian Consul General in New York.57 The American government did not investigate 
Valenti’s accusations, but the papers of the Ministry of Popular Culture reveal Guidi did report to 
the Ministry while working for Il Progresso in the 1930s, and beginning in 1941 he worked for 
Mussolini on the shortwave propaganda station Radio Urbe. Similarly, the Italian government 
installed Comito, an American citizen, in leadership positions of various pro-Fascist bodies, 
including as head of an FLNA branch.58 
 Il Progresso Italo-Americano rarely printed bylines, but Guidi’s name appeared regularly 
below articles in the paper’s Sunday supplement. An analysis of Guidi’s contributions to the 
supplement offers insight into the ways pro-Fascists spread support for Italianità and Fascist 
causes. The supplement grew in size over time, but typically included an English page that 
summarized the week’s news, pages on American society, fashion, and gossip, and several about 
Italian culture or current events in Italy. Guidi’s 1932 articles in Il Progresso’s Sunday 
supplement are good examples of the type of indirect propaganda Ambassador Rosso instructed 
the Ministry of Popular Culture to pursue.  
Guidi and his colleagues avoided spreading Fascist ideology directly, as Rosso advised 
against, but still supported Fascist issues through Italianità. The most obvious propaganda Il 
Progresso’s staff wrote concerned Italy’s claims to land beyond the peninsula. Though Ethiopia 
would become the major topic in this genre midway through the decade, in 1932 Il Progresso’s 
writers focused on European lands Italy had been promised in the 1915 Treaty of London but had 
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lost in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. The subheading from a May 15 article by Marco Scrivanich 
exemplifies the way pro-Fascists spoke of lands such as Dalmatia and Rhodes. Below the 
headline “Nostalgia for Italian Dalmatia,” Scrivanich wrote: “The eternal mark of latinità and of 
the great republic of Venice lives forever in the land of Dalmatia. And nostalgia for not-so-
distant memories are especially tied to the Curzolari islands that Italy occupied in 1918 and was 
forced to then abandon.”59 
 Articles on African countries emphasized similar points as those on European territories: 
the spread of Italian power benefitted conquered lands as much as it benefitted Italy, Italy had 
historic rights to the lands it desired, and Fascist Italy would succeed in expanding Italy’s 
boundaries where the liberal regime failed. Guidi’s June 12 article, “The Fiftieth Anniversary of 
Eritrea: First African Colony of Italy” addressed this last point carefully, since unlike the losses 
of Dalmatia and Rhodes, the fiftieth anniversary of Italian Eritrea marked a success of the liberal 
regime. Not wanting to give liberals credit for doing anything right, Guidi skillfully wrote an 
article that both celebrated Italian spirit, ingenuity, and military power in Africa while also 
criticizing the old government’s motives for taking the colony in 1882. At a time when the 
country hemorrhaged citizens to the Americas at a rate of forty thousand per year, Guidi 
condemned the liberal regime for acquiring Eritrea “more for political and strategic reasons than 
for re-directing the surplus Italian population.” It was through acquisition of Libya—not 
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Eritrea—Guidi argued, that the “ethnographic problem” of mass emigration, “was confronted 
and resolved only in recent years by the will of Il Duce.”60 
 Il Progresso made similar comparisons between liberal and Fascist Italy on articles 
concerning everyday life. Almost weekly, the Sunday supplement highlighted a different part of 
Italy and described how life there had improved since the March on Rome. In June, an unsigned 
article titled “Naples, the Most Perfect Tourist Port,” opened with the first line, “From the day in 
which the will of the Fascist Government decided to bring about the resurrection of Naples, the 
Port of Naples…has begun a marvelous ascent.”61 Similarly, in a September 4 article about 
“New Calabria,” writer Vincenzo Lucco detailed the centuries of neglect Calabria endured 
before asserting, “Today, no. To the region, sacred to the heart of every Italian, Fascism has 
given a new appearance.”62 Guidi followed that model in his October 16 article titled “The 
Swordfish Fishing Industry in Sicily.” As an introduction, Guidi recounted the natural riches of 
the island that drew Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, and Arabs to it. Describing an Eden where 
date and pineapple trees grew, thousands of flowers bloomed and “where it seems that an eternal 
perfume hangs in the air,” Guidi wrote, “God gave Sicily the gift of a perfect climate… 
but…today the Fascist Government, thanks to Sicily and to the Sicilians that live and prosper 
marvelously in Libya, has secured for Italy supplies of the most exquisite and exotic fruits.”63 
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 In Italy, according to Guidi, Fascism competed only with God for the magnitude of its 
contributions to her prosperity. In the United States, the competition was stiffer. While 
journalists who wrote about Italy could copy directly from propaganda pieces sent from the 
Ministry of Popular Culture, writing about Italian achievements in the United States required 
more ingenuity. Guidi must have appreciated the challenge, as he wrote more on American 
subjects than on Italian ones in 1932. The subject matter allowed him to develop his creativity at 
spreading Fascist propaganda fully as he centered on two themes that spoke to a 
transnationalistic agenda: how great Italians contributed to America’s success, and how great 
Americans supported Italy and Fascism.  
 The first theme had long been a part of Italian newspaper culture in America, but Guidi 
and fellow pro-Fascists took the monumentomania that de Martino criticized in the early years of 
Fascism to a new height. Pro-Fascists did not limit their monumentomania to the most well-
known Italians, but cast a wide net in their hunt for Italian contributions to American history, 
science, philosophy, and culture. Over time, they revealed Italian success stories across the 
United States, made connections between American achievements and earlier Italian 
developments, and resurrected forgotten Italian heroes in American history.  
 Two early Italian heroes Guidi uncovered were Carlo Camillo de Rudio and Giovanni 
Martini. On March 13, Guidi wrote the article “Two Italian American Soldiers in the Last Battle 
Against the Redskins,” in which he described the men’s heroic actions in the “tragic massacre” 
of the Battle of Little Big Horn. Guidi singled out Martini as “the last being in the world to see 
General Custer alive,” and praised him for saving the general’s body from the fate of every other 
fallen soldier—scalping. The next month, Guidi wrote an article celebrating the centennial of the 
Morse telegraph in which he reminded his readers that Morse came up with his idea for the 
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invention on his ocean voyage home from a trip to Italy. Guidi positioned Morse as a middleman 
between the earlier Italian discoverers of electricity—Volta and Galvani—and the later Italian 
inventors of the wireless telegram and the telephone—Marconi and Meucci. “The land 
Columbus discovered,” he concluded, “sees…its sons strengthen, through their work, their 
indissoluble ties to the land that gave Columbus his birth.”64 On the first Sunday of July, Guidi 
wrote how Roman law influenced Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, and in August he 
wrote on the cultural contributions Italian Americans made in an article about Greenwich Village.  
 Naming Italians who brought historic, scientific, philosophical, and cultural achievements 
to the United States helped spread Italianità among Italian immigrants, but did not necessarily 
spread political support for Fascism through transnationalistic citizenship. It was by connecting 
American figures to Fascist ideals, as he did in a piece on the bicentennial of George 
Washington’s birth, that Guidi best helped Mussolini’s political agenda in America. His 
February 21 article first described the celebrations Italy planned that year to honor the father of 
America before exploring who George Washington was as a leader. Though some adjectives 
Guidi used to describe Washington fit Americans’ understanding of the reluctant president-
farmer, others could more aptly describe Mussolini. As a “gentleman, farmer, and soldier,” Guidi 
wrote “there was in him the courageous enthusiasm of the captain and the calm reflection of the 
man of business, wonderfully fused together.”65 “As a soldier, he was inflexible in his discipline; 
as a man of State, he was incorruptible” Guidi continued. As a Federalist, Washington, like 
Mussolini, believed in a strong central government, which brought him political enemies who 
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fought him openly and in secret. Following through on the comparison between Washington and 
Mussolini, Guidi asked “Was Washington a dictator?”: 
“No. But in effect he was. Because he understood that the State must be strong and that 
the executive head must have all the responsibility, but also all the powers. No one had 
more respect for Parliament and the popular will than him, but he understood that respect 
in the Roman way, which shaped his intentions, ‘Country first and Country above all.”66 
 
Finally, Guidi made Washington a hybrid of Italian and American ideals when he painted 
the president as an isolationist, a man incapable “of conceiving of the United States in an 
international accord.” Guidi’s emphasis on isolationism is noteworthy as distinctly un-Fascist yet 
perfectly fitting for transnationalistic citizens who might become politically active in America on 
behalf of Italy. As the ambitious Mussolini eyed new colonies in Africa and Europe, Italian 
Americans could use their political capital to push their adopted nation towards an isolationist 
stance—something they would do in the mid-1930s by blocking an aggressive American 
response to the Ethiopian War. Through Guidi’s interpretation, the American president who 
believed “Country first and Country above all” became a model for transnationalistic citizenship 
by supporting a political platform of isolationism that theoretically put both nations first.  
Guidi served as a model writer and government censor in his position at Il Progresso 
though Generoso Pope did not need surveillance to keep his papers in line with the Fascist 
agenda. Nor did he need the cable subsidy or economic pressure of advertisers to support 
Mussolini. As the publicity director of the Italian government abroad explained to the FBI about 
Pope’s pro-Fascism, “Pope’s motives were only based upon a desire to receive prestige and glory 
from the Italian Government and not upon any receipt of money.”67 Prestige and glory were 
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cheap gifts for the Italian government to bestow, which they did regularly through medals of 
honor and titles.  
 No complete list enumerates the medals Italy gave to supporters of the Fascist regime 
over its two decades of existence, but Italian consuls bestowed them frequently to Italian 
language teachers, sympathetic Americans, supportive priests, generous donors, and to editors of 
Italian-language newspapers. Medals of honor became so ubiquitous that in a single day in 1934 
Mussolini awarded ninety-nine medals of high honor to Americans who helped celebrate General 
Italo Balbo’s flight to the United States the previous year.68 
 Italy was not quite as generous with medals to Italian Americans. In fact, Generoso Pope 
may have paid a nightclub owner $23,000 in “expenses” to act as a broker facilitating the 
awarding of his first decoration, the title of Chevalier, in 1927.69 Over time, Italy increasingly 
recognized the influence of newspaper editors nationwide by granting them medals as well. 
Ettore Patrizi, editor of San Francisco’s La Voce del Popolo and L’Italia, received Fascist 
decorations in 1936, Domenica Trombetta, owner of Il Grido della Stirpe got his in 1940.70 After 
purchasing his four papers and taking control of one third of the ethnic political clubs in New 
York City, Pope never had to use a broker to get influence or recognition in the Italian 
government again. Unlike pro-Fascist editors James Donaruma in Boston and Domenica 
Trombetta in New York who collectively printed about 7,000 copies, Pope’s four papers reached 
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nearly a quarter of a million readers before Pearl Harbor.71 Printing out of New York and 
Philadelphia, his papers reached Italian Americans throughout the country, especially in 
locations that could not support their own Italian-language organs. Even before Pope purchased 
his New York papers, Il Progresso, Il Corriere d’America, and Il Bollettino della Sera, the 
Italian government acknowledged in regards to the ethnic press, “when one speaks of New York, 
one speaks of all of the United States.”72 So great was Pope’s hold on Italian American media in 
the 1930s that one satirical Italian-language newspaper had as its tagline “This is not a Generoso 
Pope Paper.”73 
 While the scale of Pope’s success and the size of his influence in both Italian and United 
States politics made the “Sand and Gravel King” stand out, Pope was one of many Italian editors 
during the interwar period who printed mainstream, commercial, and pro-Fascist Italian-
language newspapers for the nation’s four and a half million Italian Americans. Estimates vary 
about the number of Italian-language newspapers, their commitment to Fascism, and the size of 
their readership. Based on several lists created by both Italian and American agencies, Fortune 
magazine’s 1940 estimate that 80 out of the 129 Italian-language papers in the country were 
“more or less Fascist” is a reasonable estimate.74  
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About one third of Italian-language papers came from New York alone, and another third 
from urban centers in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and California—cities with the 
country’s largest Italian populations.75 The centers of Italian immigration were not the only ones 
able to support Italian-language papers in the United States, however. Birmingham, Alabama’s Il 
Gladiatore had 1,000 readers, Dallas’s La Tribuna Italiana had 10,000, and Portland, Oregon 
could support three newspapers of unknown circulation.76 Still other papers, like the Corriere del 
Wisconsin, “the only Italian publication in the state” did not make it onto any list. Scattered 
copies that individuals have saved and donated to archives are the only proof that they and 
countless other small-town papers ever existed.77 
 With at least 129 papers, Italian printing seemed second only to German, with 178 titles, 
and far above Polish with just 72 foreign-language papers.78 But while the Polish population in 
America was only two-thirds the size of the Italian group, Italian-language papers as a whole had 
only half as many readers as the Polish papers did.79 Il Progresso boasted a circulation of 82,000 
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before Pearl Harbor, but most papers had much less.80 Of the 86 papers the Italian government 
had circulation numbers for in the 1930s, only 13 had circulations over 5,000, and 31 titles 
printed 1,000 or fewer copies.81  
 For all the self-promotion on the part of editors, and medals the Fascist government 
awarded them, both groups acknowledged that the assimilation of the second generation and 
illiteracy of the first generation limited the influence newspapers could have in Little Italies. In 
1930, America’s immigrants had twice the illiteracy rate of native-born citizens, and while 10 
percent of the country’s foreign-born could not read or write, 25 percent of Italian immigrants 
were illiterate.82 Though the second generation matched native Americans in English literacy, 
and could communicate with their parents in Italian or dialect, they rarely had the ability or 
desire to read their parents’ newspapers. To reach greater numbers, and specifically target 
women, children, and the elderly, the Ministry of Popular Culture, pro-Fascist prominenti, and 
anti-Fascists in America all looked to other forms of political propaganda.  
In a 1941 study published in Public Opinion Quarterly, Harvard psychologists Jerome 
Bruner and Jeanette Sayre speculated that that Italian neighborhood of Boston’s North End 
“would be an excellent breeding ground for Fascism” because of its almost total isolation from 
American life and the persistence of strong sentimental links to Italy. But with 40 percent of 
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North End immigrants “totally unlettered” the pair asked where could the community turn for 
news? “One channel is open to them,” they wrote, “the Italian shortwave radio.”83 
The Spoken Word: Commerce engages with Italianità 
 Though Bruner and Sayre recognized the North End community as an obvious target for 
Fascist radio propaganda, the Italian government arrived late to the same realization. In 1930 the 
government erected a 15 kW shortwave station near Rome at Prato Smeraldo, but its weak signal 
strength meant even emigrants who did own shortwave receivers could only hear broadcasts 
during perfectly clear conditions. Beginning in 1934, the government increased the station’s 
power to 25 kW and initiated a weekly program that it publicized in American newspapers. 
When the Ethiopian War began the following year, Radio Roma augmented its production of 
newsflashes to six nights a week. Each broadcast opened and closed with the Italian Royal 
March and the Fascist hymn, Giovinezza, and then gave a fifteen-minute news report in Italian 
and English. Three times a week the station also broadcast an “American Hour” which included 
concerts, opera performances, discussions, and speakers.84 Prominenti visiting Rome and Italian 
statesmen recently returned from America often spoke from Prato Smeraldo, extolling the virtues 
of Fascism and the dedication of America’s Italians to Mussolini. Il Duce himself took to Radio 
Roma in October 1935 to announce Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia and again in May of 1936 after 
his army conquered Addis Ababa to declare “Ethiopia is Italian.”85  
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 Italian representatives in America considered the broadcasts an overall success. The 
Cincinnati consul general wrote that his community listened “with religious punctuality,” 
meeting up in the houses of those who owned a shortwave apparatus to hear the latest news.86 
When poor weather conditions blocked shortwave broadcasts the week after Italy entered World 
War II by invading France, Italian Americans visited his office anxious to know if the programs 
had been suspended. He noted that listening increased after Italy’s invasion of France, just as it 
had during the Ethiopian War, explaining, “our co-nationals are dependent on the newscasts 
coming from Rome for its precision of the news on our affairs, after reading with the disgust the 
usual lies of the local press.”87 Shortwave listening continued even after Pearl Harbor, much to 
the anti-Fascists’ vexation. Throughout the war, anti-Fascists struggled to combat Radio Roma’s 
success at spreading antipathy for the allies when the shortwave station broadcast the exact 
names of streets bombed, neighborhoods destroyed, and people killed and maimed by the 
Allies.88 
 Radio Roma’s audience increased during crisis moments of the Ethiopian War, the 
invasion of France, and the Allied bombing of Italy, when all Italians, regardless of their politics, 
tuned in to hear the latest news. During non-crisis moments however, Bruner and Sayre posited 
that the most common everyday listener was the “militant Italian.” Typically a man, he spoke 
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openly to interviewers about his disapproval of Roosevelt, the glory of Rome, his staunch 
isolationism, and anti-Semitism. They emphasized that he was not an “unacculturated peasant” 
who ate up foreign news without understanding its biases and motives. He knew Radio Roma 
was censored propaganda, and listened to it anyway. Supporting the theory of Italian American 
Fascism as a response to an inferiority complex, the researchers explained the militant listener 
had “tried to become an American and has been rebuffed; now he turns with passion to Italy as a 
source of gratification and comfort.”89  
 The militant male listener, however, made up only half of the shortwave audience and a 
much smaller percentage of the total Italian-language radio audience. At work most of the day, 
he may not have been home by six thirty to catch the nightly fifteen minutes of news from Prato 
Smeraldo. While he was gone, his home radio set was likely tuned to domestic stations that 
broadcast daily “Italian hours” to his wife and children. It was this daily Italian programming 
over domestic stations, rather than Radio Roma, that eventually made radio “the most effective 
of all forms of propaganda” according to Gaetano Salvemini.90 
 Bruner and Sayre also acknowledged the power of the domestic “Italian hours,” and 
would have agreed with Salvemini’s analysis of its effectiveness at “hammering Fascist mis-
information into the heads of housewives all day long” and reaching “those who do not know 
how to read.”91 In addition to the six hours of low quality shortwave radio coming from Prato 
Smeraldo every week, by the eve of World War II Boston’s Italians could hear ten individual 
programs on four of the city’s eight radio stations filling twenty hours of air time a week. Even 
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after Pearl Harbor, Italian-language broadcasts made up a quarter of all foreign-language radio 
hours in the country, as sixty-five domestic radio stations broadcast 54.6 hours a day of Italian 
programming.92 
 Even before Mussolini installed Radio Roma, prominenti began experimenting with 
broadcasting domestically. Considering the problems newspaper editors faced with 
comparatively small readerships, high competition from other papers, and a shrinking pool of 
literate Italians, it is not surprising that they took to the airwaves first. Luigi Barzini, owner of 
New York’s Corriere d’America, established the first successful commercial radio station for 
Italian Americans in 1928, the same year he sold his paper to Generoso Pope. Others followed 
soon after. San Francisco’s Ettore Patrizi, owner of the daily newspapers La Voce del Popolo and 
L’Italia, broadcast the program La Voce dell’Italia on KROW six nights a week. His was the 
only Italian news program on the station, and he used his exclusive platform to laud Mussolini 
for ruling Italy “with an injection of love.”93 Antonio Certo, editor of La Stella di Pittsburgh and 
OSIA Grand Venerable, served as the announcer for the “Italian Star Hour of Pittsburgh” on the 
city’s KQV in which he “mingle[d] propaganda with the advertising of an Italian pharmaceutical 
product, “Effervescente Brioschi.”94 And Domenica Trombetta, owner of Il Grido della Stirpe, 
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produced a thirty-minute program on station WHOM that became so anti-Semitic and anti-
democratic that the station canceled his show to prevent the FCC from revoking its license.95  
 Despite their early adaptation of the medium, newspaper editors did not manage to make 
radio an audio version of their printed newspapers. The differences in structure, audience, and 
sponsorship between radio and newspapers made that tactic unprofitable. After an early start by 
editors, it was a different group of prominenti who made the most use of the medium—Italian 
business owners. Whereas editors like Ettore Patrizi used their papers as vehicles for bolstering 
their own self-importance and the radio to sell themselves as community leaders, Italian import 
and export companies sponsored radio programs as a means for selling Italian products to an 
assimilating immigrant consumer base. As a result, while newspaper editors embraced Fascism 
as a way of earning prestige for themselves and for the communities they believed they 
controlled, businessmen embraced Fascism as a marketing strategy that helped them sell Italian 
products by selling Italy or Italianità. 
 The structural differences between newspapers and radio broadcasts dictated the unique 
direction radio would take from its printed predecessor as a propaganda source. Whereas Italian 
Americans began printing newspapers as soon as large communities of immigrants arrived on 
American shores, and reached nearly a hundred titles nationwide by the 1920s, radio 
broadcasting in America only began in 1920. During its initial years, local nonprofits, churches, 
and unions broadcast to ethnic workers who built radios from spare parts or kits. Within just a 
few years, radio transitioned from a hobby and a public service to an avenue for selling products 
on major commercial stations. The Radio Act of 1927 that created the Federal Radio 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Luconi, Stefano. American Jewish Archives Journal. Fascist Antisemitism and Jewish-Italian Relations 
in the United States, 165. 
 
	   108 
Commission required stations to apply for a limited number of licenses. Later replaced by the 
Federal Communications Commission, the FRC gave preferences for licenses to larger stations 
with higher programming quality, ensuring that by the end of the decade twenty-one of the 
twenty-four channels in the country affiliated with the national networks NBC or CBS.96  
 After 1927, local radio stations that had once been voices for community groups turned 
towards commercialization to survive. In a 1944 study of Italian radio audiences, a Columbia 
University researcher explained how, unlike immigrant churches, clubs, and newspapers, “the 
foreign language radio is not a cultural product of the immigrant community. The stations which 
put on these broadcasts are not owned by members of the community but by American business 
men.”97 In contrast to newspaper editors printing scores of cheap independent titles with low 
circulation numbers, financial restraints consolidated the Italian-language broadcasts to major 
stations, and the FCC’s licensing regulations restricted what the networks would allow on the air. 
 The respective audiences of each media made up a second major difference between 
newspapers and radio. Listeners of domestic Italian programs rarely included the “militant 
listener” of the shortwave broadcasts or the literate, first-generation newspaper reader. 
Commercial radio audiences overwhelmingly consisted of Italian American housewives, and to a 
lesser extent, their children. American-born women of Italian descent were twice as likely as 
their male counterparts to listen to Italian programs, and women born in Italy were twice as 
likely as their husbands not to listen to any English stations.98 Considering the extent to which 
Italian American women remained confined to their households, one study explained, “the 
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difficulty of reaching the woman in her home, hitherto almost insuperable, is largely overcome 
by radio.”99 Additionally, unlike the newspapers that could not attract second-generation readers, 
about one in four American-born Italians listened to radio programs in Italian. Some young 
Italian Americans explained that listening to the serials and music programs—their favorites—
gave them “a better understanding of their parents and a finer appreciation of their cultural 
heritage.”100 Those who understood English tended to prefer American stations for their news, 
but still tuned into Italian radio for classical music, serials, and even educational talks. 
 Sponsorships made up a third major difference between newspapers and radio. 
Newspapers counted on several different companies to buy advertisement space in their papers, 
whereas a single company typically sponsored each different radio program. The company then 
had more editorial discretion about what went into its program, but also more accountability if 
the program went against the company’s political views. Italian businesses willingly took on the 
responsibility of underwriting a broadcast because of radio’s unique audience. Since most Italian 
women shopped for their families, companies eagerly sponsored serials and music hours in the 
hopes of reaching housewives and getting their loyalty as consumers. In addition, brands that 
depended on an ethnic consumer base hoped to keep second-generation Italians eating and 
shopping like Italians. The result, according to Salvemini, was a form of media that “deluge[d] 
all Italian homes with commercial advertisements for tomato paste, wine, oil, cheese, macaroni, 
furniture, bread, medicines, etc., into which is interpolated more or less subtle Fascist 
information and comment.”101 
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 Like the newspapers, Italian import and export companies did not need supervision from 
government censors to ensure their programs supported Fascism.102 Though the consuls paid 
more attention to shortwave programming than the domestic stations, Salvemini found American 
programmers nonetheless “injected [Fascism] into musical programs, skits, dialogues and story-
telling.” At their worst, he wrote, “some speakers have no need to bother with macaroni and 
indulge only in propaganda.”103 Nor did consuls need to exert significant economic pressure in 
exchange for support from radio stations. Though companies certainly depended on good 
relationships with the Fascist regime to continue using Italy’s ports, factories, and markets, their 
support of Fascism came just as much from a desire to promote ethnic consumerism among 
Italian Americans as it did from their need to maintain access to Italy. In his 1944 study of 
Italian-language radio audiences, Edward Suchman argued that the commercialization of radio 
stations “permit[ted] the growth of these foreign language broadcasts without taking into account 
the effects such broadcasts might have upon the acculturation of foreign-born minorities.”104 But 
Italian companies certainly did take into account their programs’ effects on acculturation as they 
sponsored radio programs hoping to stall assimilation among the second-generation.  
 Fascists, newspaper editors, and radio programmers shared common ground in their 
concern over the second generation’s assimilation. Newspapers like Il Progresso Italo-
Americano addressed the problem of the second generation by printing an English page in its 
Sunday supplement. The page summarized the week’s news and sometimes offered an “Easy 
Course in Italian” that presented a new Italian grammar lesson each week. Radio stations 
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similarly offered Italian language classes through the radio, which consuls helped establish by 
finding suitable instructors from their own schools or from local universities. Both newspapers 
and radio programs also gave space for Italian language schools to advertise their classes, 
especially those put together by the Dante Alighieri Society (DAS).  
 The DAS sponsored conferences, established libraries, and printed informational 
pamphlets, but its central focus was teaching Italian to the second generation. They made slow 
progress initially, as they faced obstacles of low enthusiasm from American educators; well-
established language curriculum for French, Spanish, and German; and difficulty finding “the 
right teachers” of Italian.105 “All the above-mentioned difficulties, however, could readily be 
forgotten and discounted were it not for this one,” the president of the Italian Teachers 
Association wrote to Ambassador de Martino in 1927. “The chief reason…for the slow increase 
in the number of students of Italian, is the apathy of the Italians themselves,” he wrote. The 
president complained that many Italians “actually prefer French or Spanish or German,” and that 
“a great many, who speak the very worst of dialects, think they already know Italian.” “Some are 
of the opinion that there is not economic gain in studying Italian,” he added, and many of the 
girls “consider that French, for instance, is the more stylish and socially advantageous 
language.”106  
 The Italian government, Dante Alighieri Society, and any of the prominenti whose 
financial and social success depended on a vibrant, growing, Italian American community, 
recognized early that support for Italian culture among the second generation was hampered by 
their lack of pride in the Italian people. Whether they aimed to recruit students for an Italian 
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course or consumers for Italian products, their goals would be more easily accomplished if they 
first fostered a sense of cultural Italianità among the children of immigrants. In a series of short 
speeches over WOV in the spring and summer of 1937, the secretary of the New York DAS 
chapter attempted to do exactly that.  
 Beginning in May, Secretary Fioroni spoke to Italian mothers and their children 
explaining how joining the DAS was an act of patriotism, since their spiritual and material 
contributions to the society supported “the great and noble cause of Italianità.”107 Beyond their 
financial support, Fioroni told mothers they could demonstrate their patriotism by ensuring that 
their families’ “affections, joys, [and] pains are always only expressed in our sweet tongue” and 
that they make their children understand “the spiritual and material importance of knowing the 
Italian language.”108 On Memorial Day, Fioroni marked the holiday by remembering not only the 
Americans who died for their country, but also all of the Italian “writers, scientists, and 
courageous men of politics and art” who “left permanent marks of attachment and affection for 
our beautiful country in the pages of their books, in their speeches, and in their acts.”109 In June, 
Fioroni spoke directly to graduating students asking them not to forget that they, like their 
mothers and fathers, had Italian names. He reminded them “Italian origins are now even more 
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esteemed in the American opinion because today Italy is strong, dignified, united. The time of 
humiliation has closed forever.”110 
 Because the government of Italy controlled the Dante Alighieri Society from Rome, it 
should be recognized as a Fascist—rather than pro-Fascist—institution. As anti-Fascists 
regularly named WOV one of the worst Italian American stations, it is likely the station’s other 
speeches, serials, and programs were just as supportive of Fascism even if not directed from Italy. 
Fioroni’s broadcasts about Italianità probably matched the tone of the station’s more commercial 
programs, like the one sponsored by the Parodi Cigar Company. Though the scripts for the 
Parodi program have not survived, Parodi had specifically instructed WOV to employ Giovanni 
Favoino di Giura as an announcer for its news program. Favoino di Giura worked for the pro-
Fascist papers Il Progresso Italo-Americano and Corriere d’America, served as a secretary for 
New York’s FLNA branch, and had once declared himself “a loyal servant and faithful soldier of 
Italy and Fascism in America.”111 Days after Pearl Harbor, the FBI arrested him along with at 
least six other pro-Fascist radio announcers.112  
 Pro-Fascists like Favoino di Giura existed on almost every Italian radio station, but 
because he gave straight news commentary with a Fascist bias, the FBI easily identified him as a 
threat after Pearl Harbor. Other announcers, like WOV’s Gaetano Ferri and Leandro Forni, who 
had both been squadristi in Italy, WRAX’s Filippo Bocchini who founded the Fascist Party of 
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Philadelphia, and WPRO’s Captain Martella, who headed the Italian War Veterans in Providence, 
Rhode Island, all avoided detection by the FBI. Their Fascist propaganda went unnoticed 
because, as opponents bemoaned, they “sandwich it in with the Italian salami, and they mix it up 
with the Italian tomato paste, and dish it out with Italian macaroni, and serve it daintily with 
Italian pastries.”113 
 Few radio scripts from Italian American stations in the 1930s have survived to give 
testimony to the anti-Fascists’ claims. Rose and Angelo Fiorani’s Italo-American Broadcasting 
Company radio scripts are an important exception. The Fioranis began Italian programming in 
1933 with a Sunday night variety hour on Scranton, Pennsylvania’s WGBI, and by Pearl Harbor 
the couple produced ten hours of Italian radio every week on three different stations in Wilkes-
Barre, Hazelton, and Scranton. Preserved radio scripts give scattered glimpses of a company that 
produced religious, patriotic, cultural, and dramatic shows for an audience mostly comprised of 
the Italian wives of Pennsylvania’s anthracite coal miners. The 1935 serial “Michalauch and 
Martha,” remade and rebroadcast as “Ciccillo and Maria” in 1939 offers insight into how radio 
programmers hid their Fascist propaganda from outsiders, and served Italianità alongside 
macaroni and olive oil.  
 The fictional stars of the show “Ciccillo and Maria” are a young married couple of mixed 
immigration status. In the 1935 version Michalauch is an immigrant and Martha his American 
wife. In the later version, both Ciccillo and Maria are Italian, though while Ciccillo has a thick 
accent and speaks southern dialect rather than Italian, both Maria’s English and Italian are 
flawless, suggesting she was born in America. Language is not the only area in which Maria 
surpasses her husband; nearly every episode centers on Ciccillo making a mistake—forgetting 
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their anniversary, breaking a lamp, or getting caught in a lie—and Maria threatening to break a 
rolling pin on his head. “Poor Ciccillo!” the announcer comments as the episode ends with the 
couple making up—usually over a macaroni dinner Maria made using Balbo Oil. 
 On October 8, 1939, the fictional Ciccillo and Maria attended the Columbus Day Banquet 
held by the town’s Christopher Columbus Society. As president of the society, Ciccillo was 
tasked with delivering the keynote address. In the English version of the script, Ciccillo gets 
nervous before the speech and asks Maria to correct him if he should make a mistake. His errors 
in pronunciation are ubiquitous, and he soon gets tired of his wife’s many interruptions. In return, 
she becomes exasperated at her husband’s rendition of the Columbus story, which deviates 
wildly from the version she wrote for him. In Ciccillo’s version, Columbus receives orders from 
George Washington to come discover America from a telegram which reads “Buy sheeps, Christ, 
and make yourself some overcoats, because we got too much cold ‘hair’ over here…that is the 
only way you can discover America.” Columbus asks the King of Spain for money, who 
responds, “Christ, I am too much sorry, because I was play the stock market and I am broke.” 
Queen Isabella saves the venture by hawking her crown and a gold tooth to finance his trip. 
Columbus then telephones Giuseppe Garibaldi and the pair use Isabella’s money to buy 
steamship tickets to “discover” America.114 
 The Italian version begins much like the English, with Ciccillo getting nervous and 
asking his wife to correct him. He makes a few comical mistakes speaking in his rough accent, 
but unlike the English version, in the Italian he tells a traditional Columbus story. The 
differences between the two language versions were atypical. The Fioranis saved the English and 
Italian versions to several Ciccillo and Maria sketches, and with the significant exception of 
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Ciccillo’s speech at the Columbus Day banquet, the English translations were faithful to the 
original Italian. The reasons for the deviation become apparent as Ciccillo’s Columbus reaches 
America and the speech begins delivering Fascist propaganda. While government censure of 
radio did not begin until after Pearl Harbor, radio stations had been self-censoring since the 
creation of the FCC. With American public opinion decidedly against Mussolini by 1939, the 
Fioranis might have developed a fake English-language version of the Columbus Day broadcast 
to appease the company’s own censors.115 
 Ciccillo’s version of the Columbus story matched contemporary pro-Fascist speeches 
about Columbus’s life by emphasizing three main Fascist propaganda points: proof of the 
enduring greatness of the Italian race, justification for the Ethiopian War as a mission of 
civilization, and a defense of Fascism as a pursuit of justice from the Treaty of Versailles.  
 Neither Ciccillo nor the Fascists developed the idea of using Columbus as evidence for 
Italian greatness, but they frequently used him and other Italians to demonstrate virtues they 
admired. A typical pro-Fascist Columbus Day speech might begin the way Boston’s Mayor 
Timothy Curley opened his city’s 1930 Columbus Day banquet: “The contribution of Columbus 
to human progress and human happiness does not differ materially, except in volume, from the 
character of contribution the Italian race has made in every century to religion, art, literature, 
science and government.” Curley continued by listing famous Italian men including Dante, 
Michelangelo, Verdi, Cavour, and Mazzini, paying special attention to how “a waiting world has 
never failed to receive spiritual guidance from the Holy See.” The three characteristics common 
to all, according to Curley, were that they were Italian, they did something great, and they had 
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faith in God. “This sublime faith,” he continued, “appear[s] to be a part of the very atmosphere 
itself of Italy, and when at the close of the recent World War the forces of destruction sought to 
substitute communism and anarchy for the established order…it was a son of Italy…that made 
possible the estoppel of the mad march of the forces of destruction and chaos, the present 
Premier—Benito Mussolini.”116 With just a few sentences, Mayor Curley had connected “the 
sublime faith of Columbus” to that of Benito Mussolini, and gave the Italian race credit not only 
for major contributions in the arts and sciences, but also for defeating anarchy and communism 
in Europe. It should not be surprising that five months earlier Boston’s consul general awarded 
Curley with the medal of Commendatore of the Order of the Crown of Italy.117 
 By the time of Ciccillo’s 1939 radio speech, few American politicians would have so 
openly supported Mussolini or been so blatant in comparisons between the two Italians. Within 
the Italian community, as Ciccillo’s speech demonstrates, those connections continued. Not only 
does Ciccillo portray his Columbus as a deeply religious man who prays to God throughout his 
journey, but also as a skillful leader who convinces the crew not to mutiny when they begin 
running low on rations. Notably, Ciccillo uses the word sciopero (strike) rather than the more 
accurate words ammutinamento (mutiny) or rivolta (revolt) when describing the conflict. 
Without having to make the obvious connection to Mussolini’s well-known defeat of labor 
unrest, Ciccillo’s word choice would have reminded any listener of earlier speeches, like 
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Curley’s, where Mussolini’s sublime faith helped him stamp out communism and anarchy in 
Italy.118 
 Soon after Columbus puts down the strike, his ships make landfall and Ciccillo takes the 
opportunity to offer support of Italy’s presence in Africa. Of the many justifications pro-Fascists 
in America made for the invasion of Ethiopia, they most commonly explained the war as a 
humanitarian mission. Upon conquering Addis Ababa, pro-Fascists argued, they would be able 
to help the Ethiopians by abolishing slavery, eradicating deadly diseases, cultivating idle land, 
and spreading Christian civilization. For years, Ciccillo’s listeners would have read these 
justifications in their newspapers, heard them on the radio, and spoken them in church when they 
prayed to God to “sanctify the hard work and generous heroism of our soldiers who fight, in the 
name of Rome, for the fulfillment of their duty and for the diffusion of Christian civilization.”119 
They would have remembered Ethiopia when Ciccillo described Native Americans watching 
Columbus and his men arrive on American soil, make a cross, and thank God for allowing them 
to discover “this beautiful land.” “The Indians, who for the first time saw a civil Christian, 
wanted to skin them,” Ciccillo narrates, “but Columbus immediately explained that he was an 
Italian and that he came to civilize them…and they quickly became friends.”120 
 After using Columbus as a stand-in for the Italian race on the Santa Maria and for the 
Italian army on American soil, Ciccillo turns Columbus into a symbol of the Italian nation upon 
his return to Spain. At first, according to Ciccillo, Queen Isabella delights at Columbus’s news of 
America and gives the navigator a medal of honor. “But enemies and jealous people tried to 
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convince the Queen that Columbus had not discovered anything,” Ciccillo explains, “and since 
poor Columbus could not prove what he said…they arrested him and threw him in prison… 
without any lawyer to plead his case.” Columbus’s story here parallels that of the Italian state 
during and after the World War, at least as Fascist propaganda interpreted it. Listeners who for 
years heard lamentations of how the Great Powers ignored the 1915 Treaty of London and 
denied Italy its rightful territories in the Treaty of Versailles, would have understood the 
humiliated and robbed Columbus to be Italy, stripped of its “medals” of Fiume, Rhodes, and 
Dalmatia. “But all good things come to those who wait,” Ciccillo reminds his audience. Just like 
Italy under Fascism, Ciccillo concludes, “Columbus was vindicated and honored by all the 
world.”121 
 In the English version, Maria chastises her husband for getting the story “ALL wrong,” 
and the audience laughs at Ciccillo as he tries finishing his story. In the Italian, Maria 
congratulates her husband for such a pleasant speech, and Ciccillo takes the opportunity to 
address his captivated audience with his own thoughts about Italianità before the sketch closes 
with “frenetic applause” and the Garibaldi Hymn:  
 “Only a courageous Italian like Columbus could discover such a great country… 
(Applause) Friends, brothers, and countrymen: I want each of you to remember that 
Columbus was an Italian of pure blood and that Italians have brought civilization to every 
part of the world. Garibaldi was a true Italian who made Italy one, and that great and 
glorious Marconi was a true Italian. (Applause) I invite you to raise a glass of wine and 
toast our health and the health of beautiful Italy. Long live Italy…”122  
 
Columbus is not the only allegorical figure in the banquet speech; Ciccillo is as well. In both the 
English and Italian versions of other episodes, Ciccillo is the archetypal Italian buffoon: 
uneducated, disrespected, and a lackey of his padrone. While he remains those things for his 
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English audience, by embracing Italianità in the Italian version of his Columbus Day address, 
Ciccillo turns into a proud, important member of a strong community—just what the prominenti 
hoped all Italian Americans would do.  
The two versions of Ciccillo’s Columbus Day speech suggest how ineffective self-
censorship was before World War II, and to the anti-Fascists’ chagrin, the Office of Censorship 
that Roosevelt established in December 1941 did not do much better. If they could not get 
Fascist propaganda taken off the air, anti-Fascists would have to counter propaganda on domestic 
and shortwave stations by drowning it out with their own programs. 
 Dr. Joseph Facci, a San Francisco-based radio announcer, serves as an example of the 
difficulty individuals faced trying to use the airwaves to criticize Mussolini. As a business owner, 
Facci had served as secretary of San Francisco’s Italian Chamber of Commerce—a pro-Fascist 
association—until 1933. His tenure was cut short when the society’s vice president, Ettore 
Patrizi, forced him to resign for making anti-Fascist remarks on a radio show. In response, Facci 
began his own anti-Fascist publication and radio broadcast “to teach democracy to the Italian 
Americans,” but could not find sponsors.123 Local merchants boycotted his program following 
the example of the country’s most prominent and profitable Italian-run business, the Bank of 
America. A.P. Giannini, the bank’s founder, kept his sympathies for Fascism out of the public 
eye, but San Francisco’s Italians knew that if he refused to sponsor Facci’s show, the only anti-
Fascist broadcast in the city would go silent.  
 Not all anti-Fascists failed on the airwaves. In the early 1930s, Luigi Antonini, president 
of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union’s Local 89, began a weekly Sunday 
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broadcast on New York’s WEVD called the “Voice of Local 89.”124 Local 89, also known as the 
Italian Dress and Waist Makers Local, made up the majority of anti-Fascist activity in New York. 
Antonini’s radio show launched him as a national leader in the anti-Fascist movement when 
stations outside of New York picked up his broadcast. Antonini succeeded where other anti-
Fascists failed by following the Fascist example of mixing musical and cultural elements with 
political talks about the status of workers in the United States and Italy. He answered criticisms 
from newspapers such as Il Progresso Italo-Americano and Il Grido della Stirpe, and responded 
to accusations made about him from other radio announcers, politicians, and pro-Fascist 
prominenti. Unfortunately for the anti-Fascist movement, his ego and dictatorial hold on his own 
local, combined with his decision to cooperate with Generoso Pope after Pearl Harbor, caused 
him to lose supporters.125  
 At the same time that Antonini’s star faded, the Mazzini Society started making a 
comeback with help from the American government. The Office of War Information gave 
several Mazzini members free radio time in Boston, New York, Los Angeles, and other cities. 
Like Antonini, Mazzini announcers often used the Fascist technique of disguising political 
propaganda through dialogues and speeches about Italy’s cultural, historic, and military valor.  
During the war, they addressed Italians’ dual identities by speaking to immigrant women who 
might have sons in the American military and brothers in Mussolini’s army. They fought 
Fascism’s claims that loving Italy meant loving Mussolini by constantly asserting that being anti-
Fascist did not mean being anti-Italian. And they reclaimed Italianità by playing music by Verdi, 
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arias by Caruso, and symphonies conducted by Toscanini with anti-Fascist jokes in between. 
One such joke poked fun at the Italian language schools and the consuls’ obsession with 
Italianità while trying to convince Italian Americans that their community had been secretly 
anti-Fascist all along: A teacher asks a few students to give the name of an immortal man. One 
says Dante because he wrote the Divine Comedy, another Marconi because he invented wireless 
radio, and a third says Mussolini. The teacher applauds the student and asks why Mussolini is 
immortal, to which the student responds “well, I just know my father is always muttering to 
himself ‘that man will not die, he just won’t die…’”126 
Film: Organizations Spread Propaganda 
 Even after the Mazzini Society’s rebirth, Fascism’s pervasiveness on the shortwave and 
domestic airwaves made anti-Fascists’ work reclaiming Italianità difficult. But radio was not a 
perfect medium. Italian American radio audiences had a long history of distrusting their home 
government, and San Francisco’s Consul General E. Arrighi worried that not many believed 
what they heard. Even Radio Roma’s militant listeners knew they heard a censored version of 
life under Fascism.127 To convince Arrighi’s constituents of the amazing differences between the 
country they left behind decades ago and modern Italy under Fascism, the Ministry of Popular 
Culture turned to cinema. “Nothing is better than for them to see the beauty of Italian streets or 
the power of hydraulic works and hospitals and clinics” Arrighi wrote to the Ministry. He 
showed his appreciation for film as a propaganda tool when describing the screening of a 
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127 Bruner and Sayre, “Shortwave Listening in an Italian Community,” 648. As one militant listener 
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documentary in Los Angeles about modern-day southern Italy. The Italians watching the film 
mostly came from the southern province of Puglia, and he happily described how “the audience 
exploded in applause at various moments, confronted evidently by the superb visions of modern 
Bari with their still living memory of the city they left so many years ago.”128 
 Arrighi’s image of Italian Americans cheering at the sight of hydraulic works in Bari 
must have been encouraging to the Ministry of Popular Culture, but to achieve such results was 
not a simple task. The substantial cost of producing, sending, and projecting films meant that 
unlike the Ministry’s use of written and aural propaganda, the consuls could not simply give 
films to prominenti and hope they reached large audiences. Showing Italian Americans the 
successes Fascism achieved in Italy and in Ethiopia required the cooperation of Italian 
filmmakers, the consuls, American prominenti, and the organizations they led. 
 The films Arrighi showed to the Los Angeles Italians in 1936 came from a subsidiary of 
the Ministry of Popular Culture, L’Unione Educativo Cinematografica (LUCE). LUCE produced 
short propaganda films on a variety of subjects in Italy, and in 1934 sent more than one hundred 
films to New York’s Italy-America Society, an educational association managed by non-Italians 
sympathetic to Mussolini’s regime. The Ministry of Popular Culture paid the Italy-America 
Society a subsidy for the conservation, mailing, and projection of films, which the group loaned 
free of charge to high schools, colleges, churches, clubs, and even Civilian Conservation Corps 
camps. In just the first half of 1938, the society distributed 859 individual films for projection. 
The next year they sent only 522, complaining they could fulfill less than half of all requests 
because the films had become too worn out.129 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Arrighi, E. to Ministry of Popular Culture, November 23, 1936, MCP B. 220 F. “Invio Pellicole di 
Propaganda Negli Stati Uniti,” ACS. Bari is the capital city of Puglia.  
 
 
	   124 
 Because the society required groups to pay the cost of return postage, most rental 
requests came from within the New York metropolitan area, or from more financially secure 
American institutions. To reach Italian Americans across the country, Ambassador Rosso 
established a system for circulating films that LUCE had sent to the United States as part of the 
Italian Pavilion of the Chicago World’s Fair of 1933. After the fair, Rosso divided the pavilion’s 
thirty-three documentaries into monthly installments of three or four films each, sending the reels 
first to New York, from where they would move on to Detroit, San Francisco, Philadelphia, 
Pittsburgh, and finally back to New York.130 Rosso expected consuls in each city to hold onto an 
installment for a month, set up as many screenings as they could, and report on their successes. 
 The films New York sent to Detroit in April 1935 were typical LUCE productions. A 
short film, “Songs from Abruzzo” would have been the kind of regional folklore film Arreghi 
found so successful among Pugliese immigrants in Los Angeles. A film celebrating the culture of 
a southern province would have made a particular impact on immigrants who, according to 
Arrighi, still felt victimized by Italy’s northern-based government. It likely also celebrated recent 
changes to the area, crediting Mussolini with the region’s advancement, much as Angelo Flavio 
Guidi did in Il Progresso’s Sunday supplement. A longer film, “From the Marshes to the Lictor 
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Days” extolled Mussolini’s famous reclamation of the Pontine Marshes in the early 1930s, an 
engineering feat that affirmed Fascism’s superiority over the old liberal regime through hard 
work, discipline, and sacrifice. The third film, “Dizziness (Aeronautical Acrobatics)” showcased 
the greatest source of Italy’s militaristic pride—its air force, led by General Italo Balbo.  
 In 1933, Balbo led a fleet of twenty-four seaplanes on a transatlantic trip to the Chicago 
World’s Fair. Balbo, who “was one of the most violent warlords of the Fascist movement and 
had a pivotal role in bringing Benito Mussolini to power,” in one historian’s uncensored words, 
received a hero’s welcome in the United States.131 In Chicago, the city renamed Seventh Street 
Balbo Drive; in Washington, D.C., he ate lunch with President Roosevelt; and in New York City, 
where two million residents attended a parade in his honor, he spoke at a gathering of 60,000 
Italian Americans, reminding them to “be faithful to your adopted country and be faithful Italians. 
Above all, respect your country and Il Duce.”132 When Chicago’s consul general spoke on WGN 
days before Balbo’s arrival, he said “by closing my eyes I can see 25 great Savoia-Marchetti 
hydroplanes…I see General Balbo stern in discipline, yet always just and ever inspiring by his 
own valorous example; I see him ready, audacious, and careful at the same time…His men will 
follow him to the end of the world—into the jaws of death itself without fear, because where he 
asks others to go, he goes there first.”133 The film “Dizziness (Aerial Acrobatics)” helped Italian 
Americans see the same. 
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 Detroit’s Consul C.B. Gradenigo sent the three films to Youngstown, where he claimed 
1,200 individuals watched the film projected by the local lodge of the Order of the Sons of Italy 
in America. Youngstown sent the films to San Francisco in May, where eight showings of the 
film reached 1,600 spectators. That month, Alameda’s First Congressional Church, Castroville’s 
Italian Mutual Aid Society, and both the San Francisco and San Jose Italian Veterans circles 
projected the films. Other months YMCAs, masonic lodges, churches, and OSIA lodges hosted 
films as well. San Francisco typically supported more than a dozen showings a month of LUCE 
films with monthly audience totals of around 3,000, but all consuls found it difficult to plan 
events in late spring and early summer when many residents left the cities for vacation. 
 No one bothered trying to screen the films in June or July, and in August Pennsylvania 
only managed one showing of the films, for 120 people at the Dante Alighieri Orphanage in 
Concordville. If the films had played elsewhere in Pennsylvania that summer, it would have been 
on a Sunday in one of the many movie theaters managed by Italian immigrants. By law, 
Pennsylvania theaters closed on Sundays, only showing films for free or for the public good. 
Taking advantage of the law, Italian Americans watched LUCE documentaries in real theaters 
wherever they had a community member with an inside connection. In October, the films 
returned to New York, where the Italy-America Society distributed the films to churches, schools, 
immigrant associations, and CCC camps in Manhattan, Jersey City, and Long Island.  
 The films’ screenings across America show the difficulties of using movies to distribute 
propaganda to Italian Americans. When the Ministry of Popular Culture wanted to spread Fascist 
propaganda to Italian Americans through radio and print media it had two fairly simple options. 
It could send material to consuls to pass on to their local newspaper editors and radio 
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programmers, who employed editorial discretion to decide how much to use. Or the ministry 
could distribute the propaganda directly to Italian emigrants, either through Radio Roma 
broadcasts or by printing their own pamphlets and booklets for wide circulation. With both 
systems, the Ministry of Popular Culture could reach hundreds of thousands of Italian Americans 
by using diplomats as nothing more than clearing houses for information. When distributing 
films, however, several consuls did not consider the work of coordinating between institutions 
and other regional offices worthwhile for screening about an hour’s worth of low-quality 
propaganda to a few hundred people. 
 Even San Francisco’s Consul General Arrighi, who once wrote “I believe there is no 
other means except films today that truly give to these Italians, who have been on this far away 
Pacific coast for thirty to forty years, a precise and persuasive idea of Fascist Italy,” finished that 
sentiment to detail at length all the problems with films. In his jurisdiction, which included 
California, Arizona, and Nevada, he explained Italians were split into societies, parishes, and 
schools where it would be difficult to get more than fifty or one hundred people together for a 
screening. To project the film cost $20 just to rent the projector—a sum he was unlikely to 
recoup by selling tickets for what he considered a reasonable price of 10 or 15 cents. Newark, 
New Jersey’s vice consul could get a projector for just $10, but as his constituents were not as 
well off, he could not charge an entrance fee at all. Boston’s Consul General Armao refused to 
participate in the circuit, citing the associations’ lack of cinema rooms and projectors.  
 In addition to the prohibitive cost of mailing and projecting the films, LUCE produced 
the films for professional movie theaters, not for rented projectors in church basements. Though 
LUCE narrated all the films in Italian with English subtitles, almost none of the screenings 
included sound because the equipment cost too much to rent and could not be transported. 
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Additionally, the 35mm format that LUCE used did not work well for private use. St. Louis’s 
Vice Consul Alessandro Savorgnan suggested using 16mm film instead because it was cheaper 
to produce, transport, and project, and less flammable. He complained that renting a projector for 
35mm film required hiring one or more union workers to operate it, increasing the costs up to 
five hundred percent. 
 Greater than all the other problems, however, was the quality of the production and 
subject matter of the film. Consuls asked for films “limited to the salient events in the Italian life 
and principal works of Fascism,” rather than yet another movie about glass making in Venice. 
Perhaps tired of seeing and coordinating so many projections, one consul wrote that while the 
audience of a LUCE documentary appreciated the film he showed them, “in my personal opinion, 
the technical deficiencies take away from it.”134 Others were less diplomatic. After only his first 
viewing of a LUCE film at the Chicago World’s Fair, Consul General Giuseppe Castruccio 
wrote, “the film is on the whole some of the usual trash produced by the LUCE institute.” 
Technically, he explained, “the photography is poorly taken, poorly developed, poorly printed, 
and the scenes are poorly cut together.” He considered the drawings that adorned captions 
between scenes “especially atrocious.” The film, he wrote “completely lacks every sense of art 
and of aesthetics,” and “the banal drawings in atrocious taste all gives me the impression that 
Italian cinema in the last twenty years has made no progress.” “But,” he added, “it is not my 
place to critique the cinematography.”135 
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 If the cinematography in LUCE films was as terrible as the consuls claimed, it did not 
stop immigrant institutions from showing them. Some groups, like Chicago’s Federation of 
Italian Veterans, incorporated screenings into other celebrations, as they did for the anniversary 
of the birth of Rome in 1936. The veterans, their women’s auxiliary club, and the Royal Aero 
Club of Italy in Chicago put together a night that included patriotic Italian and American music, 
speeches by pro-Fascists, a lecture by an Italian history professor connecting the Roman empire 
to present day Italy, and a screening of three LUCE films.136 Similarly, Philadelphia’s Calabrese 
Union played LUCE films for 300 people at a movie theater as part of a cultural demonstration, 
and Akron’s Sicilian Association projected films to 5,000 Italians and Americans at an outdoor 
picnic in July.137 Very often, a priest might coordinate with the consul to project films for his 
parish as a way of drawing Italian Americans into the church beyond Sunday mornings, or a 
fraternal association would show films as a way of bringing in outside family members. 
 For each of these institutions, films became a way of augmenting their calendar of 
activities and potentially recruiting new members who might be drawn to an OSIA lodge or an 
athletic clubhouse for the chance to see Italy on the silver screen. Reflecting on the first circuit of 
LUCE films, Ambassador Rosso wrote to the Ministry of Popular Culture that the government 
should repeat the process with new films, since “besides the direct propaganda exercised by the 
film, these film screenings offer a perfect occasion for reuniting periodically and in a systematic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 “Manifestazione Di Propaganda Italiana Negli Stati Uniti (Manifestations of Italian Propaganda in the 
United States),” n.d., MCP B. 220 F. 56, ACS. 
 
137 “Invio Materiale Di Propaganda Negli Stati Uniti (Dispatch of Propaganda Materials in the United 
States),” n.d., MCP B. 218, ACS. 
 
	   130 
way our communities, which increases their cohesion and puts them more frequently and in more 
open contact with the consul.”138  
 Despite the hard work of screening films and the small audience sizes, Rosso recognized 
that personal interactions between Italians, their immigrant institutions, and the government 
would pay off politically. By passively listening to, reading, or watching Fascist propaganda, 
Italian Americans learned the rhetoric of Italianità but did not necessarily become politically 
engaged. When a newspaper editor extolled the virtues of Columbus they learned Italian 
immigrants were crucial to the history and success of the United States. When an Italian cigar 
company broadcast Verdi over Marconi’s invention, they learned about the historic brilliance of 
the Italian mind. And when they watched General Balbo’s pilots perform aerial acrobatics, 
showcasing Italy’s technological advancements, they learned to thank Fascism for their pride in 
Italy and their Italianità. As de Martino forecasted in 1927, however, bringing Italian Americans 
out of their “political virginity” could not be achieved by spreading Italianità alone.  
 The prominenti had made a crucial first step in politicizing America’s Italians by turning 
Italianità into their own creation. From newspaper editors, Italianità became about the prestige 
of Italian Americans, from radio programmers it meant the essence of living Italian, and from 
organization heads it meant participating in the Italian institutions. Throughout the 1930s, the 
prominenti built a national consciousness based on shared pride in Italy, and in so doing made 
themselves central to Fascism’s success in America. 
 Without the prominenti and the use of their papers, radio stations, and theaters, Italian 
American Fascism would have died with the FLNA, something the Italian consuls eventually 
came to understand. Working closely with immigrant communities and watching them succeed 
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where the FLNA failed to spread Fascist support, the consuls eventually accepted the 
prominenti’s definition of Fascism and style of Italianità. When Italy needed Italian Americans 
to wield their full political potential during the Ethiopian War in 1935 and after Italy’s invasion 
of France in 1940, the consuls again relied on the prominenti to organize their communities 
politically. Working to bring Italian Americans together on behalf of their motherland, 
prominenti turned Italianità from a strictly cultural ideology into a political one. The next 
chapter addresses how newspaper editors, radio stations, and organizations worked with the 
consuls to use Italianità as a way of organizing Italian Americans around two political issues: the 
status of Italy in the world and the status of Italian Americans in the United States. 
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Chapter Three:  
Marrying the Fascist Cause: Italian Americans Embrace Italianità, 1935-1936 
 
In March of 1936, Congressman Vito Marcantonio, of New York City’s Twentieth 
Assembly District in East Harlem, gave an interview to an Italian American student magazine. 
The article appeared in the magazine’s first issue, and the student interviewing the congressman 
worried about his magazine’s chances for success. “Everyone I talk to about our review says we 
won’t succeed because we Italian Americans don’t know how to cooperate,” he admitted, asking 
the congressman “what do you think?” Marcantonio replied dismissively, “Old stuff and 
nonsense. It may be that the older generation were too much divided by their provincialism, but 
the younger generation is different.”1 Citing the city’s 1933 primary as an example, Marcantonio 
explained how, after years of his district resting solidly in the hands of the “Tammany Irish 
Democrats,” “we got together and took things over completely,” winning him—a socialist-
Republican-Italian—a seat in Congress.  
 The exchange between the student and Congressman Marcantonio highlight the blurring 
lines between culture and politics occurring in 1936 within Italian American communities. 
Though the student had asked Marcantonio about whether Italians could unite as cultural 
consumers to purchase his magazine, the congressman responded with an example of how the 
community had started uniting as voters in a political bloc. Beginning in 1930, the Italian 
American elite, or prominenti, worked with the Italian government to develop an elaborate 
system of spreading political propaganda inconspicuously through cultural channels. Though a 
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solid anti-Fascist, Marcantonio’s response to his interviewer in 1936 indicates the extent of the 
pro-Fascists’ success binding Italian Americans’ cultural consumption to their political actions.  
 Anti-Fascists like Marcantonio did not immediately benefit from the rise of Italian 
American cultural consciousness in the early 1930s. Beginning in 1930, the prominenti had 
worked to blend cultural pride with an ethnic nationalism based on Fascism. They used the term 
Italianità to describe the ethno-cultural nationalism they spread through the newspapers, radio 
stations, and organizations they owned and operated. They also made anti-Fascism synonymous 
with anti-Italianism. When Marcantonio gave his interview in March he had already lost the 
endorsement of the city’s largest Italian-language newspaper owner, Generoso Pope, for not 
being Fascist enough.2 Pope’s newspapers reached a quarter of a million readers, so when he 
endorsed Marcantonio’s opponent as someone who regularly gave “tangible proof of his spirit of 
Italianità” the congressman fought back.3   
 “I am accused of being a lukewarm pro-Italian. Very well” the congressman conceded in 
his interview. Yet as he explained, in the previous two years he spearheaded the campaign to 
institute Italian courses in New York public schools, he “practically single-handedly” stopped 
the deportation of thousands of Italian immigrants, and he spoke on the House floor against 
placing harsh economic sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian War. Marcantonio’s 
interview not only pointed to a hardening bond between Italian American consumptive culture 
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3 “La Campagna Elettorale: James Lanzetta Ed Il Suo Record (The Electoral Campaign: James Lanzetta 
and His Record),” Il Progresso Italo-Americano (New York, October 16, 1936). 
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and politics, but also an emerging platform of political issues unique to the Italian American 
voting bloc. Marcantonio had won his seat in 1934 by campaigning to East Harlem voters on 
issues of veterans’ benefits, unemployment relief, and workers’ rights. In his 1936 interview he 
emphasized his record on the status of Italian language in the public schools, the deportation of 
Italian aliens, and the Ethiopian War. Whereas historian Lizabeth Cohen found the mass 
production of American culture led to the formation of a cross-ethnic working-class identity 
during the Great Depression, Marcantonio’s changing platform in the 1930s demonstrates how 
pro-Fascists had actually used cultural institutions to increase Italians’ political identity as 
transnationalistic citizens. 4 Though he did not abandon his working-class voters on issues of the 
economy, Marcantonio’s 1936 interview highlights changes he made by speaking to Italian 
American voters as a unified ethnic voting bloc with a specific agenda of local, national, and 
international issues.5  
In the 1920s, Italian Americans put forward a new theory of transnationalistic citizenship 
that placed pressure on America and Italy to modify their demands for immigrants to conform to 
nationalistic citizenship. As transnationalistic citizens, Italian immigrants asked both nations to 
recognize them formally as a unique group with specific, though different, rights and privileges 
in each nation. The movement towards transnationalistic citizenship in the 1920s affected the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Cohen addresses how ethnic institutions brought immigrants into American society through mainstream 
culture in Chicago in her book Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1930 
(Cambridge University Press, 1990). Where she found the CIO was able to capitalize on that unified 
working-class culture to unite workers during the Great Depression, this chapter argues that bringing 
Italians into mainstream politics actually reinforced their ethnic identities, even leading workers to 
privilege Italian nationalism over a working-class solidarity when the two came into conflict. 
 
5 These were not the only issues that occupied the minds of Italian Americans in the first half of the 1930s. 
Derogatory portrayals of Italians in film led to limited organized boycotts in 1932 of the films Scarface 
and Farewell to Arms. Juvenile delinquency, particularly among young Italian men in the cities, caught 
the attention of educators, priests, and parents throughout the period. And debates surrounding labor, 
unemployment, and relief continued throughout the depression. 
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emerging “Italian vote” in the 1930s in three important respects. First, Italian Americans 
approached American politics the same way they approached Fascism: as an arena for raising 
their status as immigrants and winning recognition for their unique political value. As such, 
immigrants gave their greatest support to causes that reinforced the conviction that they had 
“made it” in American society. Positive actions like establishing Italian in schools received more 
attention than protests against the Johnson-Reed Act, which reminded immigrants of old insults. 
Second, the strength of the Italian vote relied on pro-Fascists and their ability to organize their 
communities. Achieving united political action among Italian Americans required simultaneous 
use of several cultural propaganda networks recently developed and perfected by prominenti and 
Italian consuls. The most successful campaigns brought together pro-Fascists, American 
politicians, and Italian diplomats through newspapers, radio, and ethnic associations. Finally, the 
question of immigrant citizenship did not end with the FLNA in 1929. Through American 
political campaigns, Italian Americans and their political leaders continued the international 
conversation about the rights and obligations of transnationalistic citizens as political actors. 
 What follows is an analysis of two political campaigns carried out in New York City 
from the spring of 1935 to the summer of 1936. The campaign to teach Italian in schools and the 
efforts to support Italy’s war in Ethiopia both spread the rhetoric of Italianità through established 
pro-Fascist organizational networks to successfully organize Italian Americans. For the first time, 
politics fully entered Italian Americans’ homes, wallets, meeting homes, and churches, and 
brought Italian Americans into mainstream American politics. Beginning with conversations 
between parents regarding their children’s education, and culminating with testimonies on the 
House floor about American neutrality, Italian Americans created a new ethnic political power 
based on the conception of transnationalistic citizenship Agostino de Biasi pursued in 1921. 
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They used this power to help themselves and their homeland, to solidify an Italian ethnic identity, 
and most significantly, to make room for that ethnic identity in American politics. By the end of 
the Ethiopian War in the summer of 1936, Italian Americans had forced politicians to recognize 
transnationalistic citizenship as a theory of citizenship that not only tolerated, but actually 
respected ethnics’ enduring political interest in their homeland. 
Italianization: Language Instruction for the Second Generation 
 In his keynote address at the 1931 Supreme Convention of the Order of the Sons of Italy 
in America, Supreme Venerable Giovanni di Silvestro asked the largest Italian organization in 
America to carry the cause of Italianità to their children. Recalling the history of OSIA, he 
outlined three phases of their organization. First, the “organizational phase,” when OSIA 
overcame “prejudices against the race” from outsiders and defeated the cliques, regionalism, and 
“the incompetence of the vain and gossipy prominenti system” among their own people. The 
second phase served to assimilate the masses and bring them fully into American life. The third 
phase, which ushered in his own administration, clarified the ideals of the Order within their own 
community and their American “hosts.”6 
 While they had not fully completed the work of the first three phases, di Silvestro called 
upon his audience to embark on a fourth phase: the “Italianization of the Italo-Americans.” By 
this, he meant “to keep alive, with steadfastness, in the spirit of our children, Americans by birth 
and by culture, the pride in their origins.” The Order, as he envisioned it, would help the second 
generation recognize “their racial pride” by teaching Italian culture, history, and language in 
their lodges. He knew language to be “the most powerful tie that attaches us to our origins, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Giovanni di Silvestro, “Supremi Delegati (Supreme Delegates),” 1931, Box 1 FF 14, The Di Silvestro, 
Giovanni M., 1879-1958. Papers, Italian American Collection, IHRC. 
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most secure vehicle that reconnects us to our history, to our culture, and consequently, 
[language] is the element sine qua non for the conservation of our racial and group pride.”7 
 Italian Americans had already been working seriously on preserving and spreading Italian 
language in their communities for at least a decade when di Silvestro made his speech. The early 
campaigns made little headway until the early 1930s, when the Italian government’s switch to 
spreading indirect cultural propaganda renewed energy for the cause by highlighting an 
important problem in the community: Italianità spread easily among first generation Italians but 
not among the Americanized second generation. To save the Italian American community from 
disintegration, di Silvestro believed his organization would need to fight on three fronts 
simultaneously: in the home, in the community, and in American society.  
 Di Silvestro’s audience members probably first noticed the problem in their own homes. 
“The whole Italian family…is still solid as granite,” their Supreme Venerable acknowledged, 
“but those of us who are not used to acting like an ostrich, who hides his head under the 
sand…we would be lying to ourselves if we did not admit that even in this foundational 
institution of our society, we have begun to notice cracks.”8 Leonard Covello, the principal of 
East Harlem’s Benjamin Franklin High School, an important supporter of Italian language 
instruction, and a recognized leader in the city’s education system, similarly wrote of the 
immigrant home, “Often, it is a home divided against itself because of conflicts engendered by 
dual heritages and a lack of a common origin.”9 He saw hope through the study of Italian by 
providing illiterate or undereducated parents a way of connecting with their children’s schools, 





9 Leonard Covello, “An Italian Anniversary Year,” May 13, 1939, MSS 40 Leonard Covello Papers, Box 
92 F. 21, Balch Institute, HSP. 
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arguing, “the language itself may become a healing force for unity within the family circle.”  
 If language differences created cracks in the family’s granite foundation, then di Silvestro 
called on immigrant mothers and fathers to become stonemasons. Not only would they need to 
speak proper Italian—not dialect—to their children at home, they also needed to establish free 
Italian classes in their communities and get Italian taught in their children’s public schools. 
Beyond directing parents to politically organize for the Italian cause di Silvestro offered little 
direct help. He chose instead to focus the national organization’s energies on scholarships and 
student trips to Italy that reached a few hundred children annually.  
 Generoso Pope had a similar strategy for pursuing the Italianization of the Italian 
American. In 1935, after a few years of work on the education problem, he thought back to a 
question he had posed in the beginning about the lack of Italian in public schools: “is it the 
apathy or thoughtlessness of parents that allows such a desertion of the children?”10 Investigating 
the still unanswered question in 1935, he learned that the Board of Education required schools to 
institute courses when at least sixty students formally requested the class. Students simply 
needed to ask and the classes would be offered. “Parents, wake up,” Pope chastised his readers, 
“The fault will be yours if your children do not learn a language that will be a great advantage to 
them in life.”11 The next day he asked why the city’s schools refused to offer Italian. “Maybe 
because there exists antipathy or discrimination against our language or our nationality?” he 
suggested rhetorically, answering “No. It does not teach Italian because there have never been 
the required number of requests.” Both Pope and di Silvestro believed Italian Americans had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Generoso Pope, “Due High Schools Assicurano G. Pope Che Insegneranno L’italiano Se Gli Alunni Ne 
Faranno Regolare Richiesta (Two High Scools Assure G. Pope That They Will Teach Italian If Students 
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overcome past discrimination and that only their own apathy blocked their ascension. To the 
parents, Pope offered “a gentle reproach,” stating, “It is time to open your eyes and look reality 
in the face.”12 
 The Italian family received most of the blame for their children’s Americanization and a 
large share of the work for the youth’s Italianization, but di Silvestro also recognized that ethnic 
institutions like his needed to help. The second front for the campaign to teach Italian lay with 
organization leaders and the prominenti who ran Italian American newspapers, radio programs, 
and associations. Ethnic institutions had particular motivations for maintaining the Italian 
language, as Generoso Pope aptly summarized in an editorial in his newspaper. Studying Italian, 
he wrote, “is the best way for keeping our great immigrant family united with our new 
generations; it is the best means for assuring a formidable moral, political, and economic force in 
the hands of our youth.”13 Unity of the immigrant group and preservation of the community 
through the study of Italian would not only allow Italians to “know ourselves better, to keep us 
more united, and to better help ourselves,” Pope editorialized, but would also keep his Italian-
language newspapers in business for another generation.14  
 The Italo-American Educational Bureau, organized and run by Leonard Covello, 
similarly beseeched the ethnic associations to embrace their obligations to the second generation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Generoso Pope, “Volete Che Nelle Scuole Frequentate Dai Vostri Figli S’insegni La Lingua Italiana? 
Induceteli a Farne Regolare Domanda (Do You Want Your Children’s Schools to Teach Italian? Persuade 
Them to Make Regular Requests),” Il Progresso Italo-Americano (New York, May 4, 1935). 
 
13 I. C. Falbo, “L’Italiano Nelle Pubbliche Scuole (Italian in the Public Schools),” Il Progresso Italo-
Americano (New York, January 12, 1935). 
 
14 Generoso Pope, “‘La Lingua Italiana Ci Serve per Meglio Conoscerci, per Meglio Mantenerci Uniti, 
per Meglio Aiutarci a Vicenda’ -G. Pope (’The Italian Language Permits Us to Know Ourselves Better, to 
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In a radio address on the pro-Fascist station WOV in 1934, the Educational Bureau gave a 
speech directed at ethnic associations. “Our educational activities are of great interest for you,” it 
began, arguing the teaching of Italian would “renew, create, and develop the intellectual, moral, 
and spiritual means of your children and of the entire Italian community of America.” The 
speech continued: 
“Ask yourselves, members of societies; is it not perhaps the goal of every Italian 
organization to keep alive the cult of mother Italy? Is it not in every preamble of your 
statutes to cultivate, defend, and pass on Italian language, history, and culture in 
America? Is it not included in the articles of every Italian association to create a force that 
elevates the Italian prestige in America? Do you not believe, dear and courteous listeners, 
that the school is the focal point of support from where this potent force brings 
about…the progress of the Italian people of America.”15 
 
To members of societies and parents who felt racial pride, the Bureau ordered: “Organize 
yourselves among your friends, in the hearts of your associations and clubs, and make a free 
school of Italian.” “The battle is already engaged; the work is not so difficult anymore,” it 
continued, “Wake yourselves up—even you—unite!”16 Whether speaking to parents or 
organization leaders, both Pope and Covello argued that the work would not be too difficult, that 
the community did not face discrimination, and that only the Italians’ own apathy blocked them 
from greatness.  
 The third front of di Silvestro’s speech, American society, brought the home and the 
ethnic association together in pursuit of Italian classes in public schools. Despite a crumbling 
family structure and a weakening ethnic force, the prominenti saw Italian Americans’ status in 
the United States increasing, and believed the public school could be a symbol of both the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Leonard Covello, “Free Italian Language Schools” (New York: WOV, May 19, 1934), MSS 40 
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prestige and unity of the community. In the spring of 1935, in what had become almost daily 
editorials on the status of Italian in New York’s public schools, Generoso Pope wrote, “While 
Italy sees its world prestige increasing more and more, and while in all civilized countries the 
Italian language and culture is held in higher esteem, it is painful to think that the children of 
Italians in America do not contribute more to our language’s dissemination, when they should be 
its natural, diligent, enthusiastic propellers.”17 The immigrants had earned the status symbol of 
Italian courses not only because of Italy’s greater world prestige, but also because of Italians’ 
raised status compared to other nationalities in America. The persistent low numbers of Italian 
instruction compared to other languages, as Pope saw it, was simply “the result of indifference in 
our community.” “We must end this indifference,” he continued, “if we want to put ourselves at 
the same level of other nationalities and we want to be as respected as the others.”18 
 In addition to pitting Italians against other nationalities in the competition for space in 
American public schools, the campaign to teach Italian also brought Italian Americans directly 
into confrontation with “100% Americanists” over the place for multiculturalism in society. 
When Leonard Covello began teaching his first Italian class in 1920 he reasoned, “surely the 
student from the lower or upper East Side had a right to that spiritual lift that comes from 
knowing that the achievements of one’s people have been recognized.” His colleagues and the 
public disagreed, criticizing his classes for “keeping the boys ‘foreigners.’” Over his lifetime he 
saw Italians pressured to forgo everything foreign about their identities, particularly the language 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Generoso Pope, “Per La Lingua Italiana (For the Italian Language),” Il Progresso Italo-Americano 
(New York, April 14, 1935). 
 
18 Generoso Pope, “L’Italiano Sarà Insegnato Anche Nella Bayridge High School Se I Connazionali 
Seguiranno I Consigli Del Gr. Uff. Pope (Italian Will Be Taught Also in Bayridge High School If Co-
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and culture of their people. “The amazing paradox” of how Americanization functioned in the 
public school, he wrote, “lay in the fact that it was perfectly all right of the Italo-American boy to 
study Latin or French, German or Spanish.”19 
 In the campaign to Italianize the Italian American, the public school as an embodiment of 
American society brought together questions both Italians and Americans debated at the time of 
assimilation, ethnic endurance, and the desirability of different nationalities. Though no one 
spoke of the National Origins Act, the comparison between resources allocated for German or 
Italian courses and quota spots allotted to German and Italian immigrants was all too apparent. 
For the prominenti, every Italian class instituted meant a victory over other nationalities. If the 
prominenti could unite with individuals and ethnic institutions to bring Italian to the public 
schools, they would not only fully realize di Silvestro’s four organizational phases—overcoming 
community disunity, assimilating and participating in American life, clarifying group ideals to 
insiders and outsiders, and Italianizing the Italian American—they would also give proof of 
Italian Americans’ ascension in the United States. 
  Pro-Fascists and the Italian government fully appreciated how educating the second 
generation would help their own causes, but struggled with the campaign’s execution in 
comparison to other efforts. When the consuls wanted to spread Italianità into immigrants’ 
homes through newspapers and radio programs, they found few complications. Newspaper 
editors who saw Italianità as a way of asserting their status in the community and the 
community’s status in the country eagerly wrote about Italy’s glory and Italians’ contributions to 
American history. Radio program sponsors who believed Italianità could conserve or even grow 
an Italian American consumer base readily incorporated pride in Italian culture into 
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advertisements for Italian products. When the consuls needed to bring immigrants out of their 
homes, as they did when screening propaganda films, they had to rely on organizers working 
within their communities to promote events across associations and working outside their 
communities to share resources. Cities with strong organizational networks, an active consulate, 
and a central hub of pro-Fascist activity, like San Francisco, easily hosted over a dozen 
screenings a month reaching four thousand people. Places like Boston, with plenty of 
propaganda on the radio and in the press but less community organizing, did not screen a single 
film in 1935. Similarly, when pro-Fascists wanted to bring immigrants into the public sphere to 
agitate for Italian in the public schools, they found newspaper editorials and radio broadcasts less 
effective than the work of the community organizer Leonard Covello. 
 When di Silvestro asked his lodge members to simply enroll their children in Italian 
classes at school, and when Generoso Pope gently reprimanded his readers for not gathering 
sixty signatures per school, neither fully understood the impediments to their requests. In 1931, 
almost none of OSIA’s members had children enrolled in high schools that offered Italian classes. 
Although the United States had close to three million second-generation Italians in 1930, and 
high schools taught modern languages to two million students, just over 9,000 students took 
Italian nationwide. That number already indicated improvement; in 1924 less than 2,000 
American high school students studied Italian. 
 New York City, the cultural center of Italian American life, and home to a quarter of the 
nation’s Italians, did not fare much better. In the early 1930s an estimated 200,000 of the city’s 
public school students had Italian parents, and the schools instructed 140,000 students in foreign 
languages. Nearly half took French, with the rest divided primarily between Spanish, Latin, and 
German. Less than 3,000 students, or three percent of all foreign-language students, took 
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Italian.20 Over the next four years, Italian courses spread to eighteen of the city’s forty-three high 
schools. Enrollment reached 7,700 students by 1936, comprising six percent of New York’s 
modern language students. As demonstrated in Chart 1, though Italian numbers paled compared 
to students of French (71,400), Spanish (38,700), and German (17,900) in 1936, enrollments for 
other modern languages either barely increased or, with the case of German, slightly decreased 
between 1932 and 1936.21 After working on the problem of Italian language in New York’s 
public schools for more than a decade, Leonard Covello wrote to Italy’s Ambassador Giacomo 
de Martino in 1932, “There has been progress, but slow; too slow when compared to the 
possibilities for development.”22 
 
 Even the slow growth that did occur caused problems for the city that could not meet 
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increased demand. Schools struggled to find and finance qualified Italian teachers. Unable to hire 
new teachers, they relied on substitutes or teachers of other languages. Some even used math, 
drawing, and history teachers for their Italian classes. In 1935, nearly half of the city’s Italian 
instructors had no license to teach Italian, and several only held substitute licenses. As a result, 
although Italian enrollment increased by 145 percent in four years, the city only increased its 
spending on Italian teachers by 48 percent. Worse still, in 1936 the city spent $10.61 per student 
learning Italian while spending $24.15 per student in Spanish, a language that increased only 4.3 
percent since 1932.23 
 Board of Education member Alberto Bonaschi reported the discouraging numbers in an 
effort to stop the discriminatory financing of foreign language instruction. Bonaschi worked 
within the municipal government to bring more WPA Italian instructors into the schools and 
remedy the problem he saw as “an absolute insufficiency of teachers of Italian and the use of 
substitutes instead of regulars to teach Italian.”24 His efforts could have offered an opening for 
the prominenti to mobilize their constituents around political issues of WPA labor and New Deal 
spending, but Bonaschi’s report presented a challenge to the triumphant narrative of Italianità, 
and his work within the city’s government prevented the Italian state from taking part in the 
campaign. As a result, both Pope and Covello quietly approved of Bonaschi’s efforts while 
choosing to align their campaigns with the Italian consuls rather than the Board of Education. 
Even Covello, who would have intimately understood the concerns Bonaschi detailed, presented 
the problem to Ambassador de Martino as one of spreading propaganda and organizing families. 
He summarized the problem by posing the same question Pope and di Silvestro had been asking: 
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“how can we deal effectively with Italian students and families to increase the enrollments?”25 
 The choices prominenti made when campaigning to spread the Italian language reveal the 
strength of the Fascist government’s influence on Italian American political organization. When 
campaigning for the Italian language, pro-Fascists employed strategies that followed the Italian 
government’s decentralized, cultural approach to politics after the fall of the FLNA. Spreading 
ethnic nationalism indirectly through Italianità limited the government’s exposure to public 
backlash, but resulted in redundancy and conflicts as local associations tackled issues—like 
Italian language instruction—simultaneously. When di Silvestro called on OSIA lodges to open 
their own schools without national coordination, for example, they ended up competing against 
dozens of other local organizations for students, teachers, and resources. 
 A second repercussion of the 1929 change in policy was the Italian government’s 
decision to rely on the propaganda and logistical work of unpaid and loosely supervised pro-
Fascists who carried their own motivations for assisting the Fascist cause. To organize 
immigrants politically, the consuls first turned to the same prominenti who had helped them 
spread propaganda, but found they also needed the cooperation of the general public and 
American politicians who held firm and wide-ranging opinions about Fascism. Partnering with 
anti-Fascists, apathetics, and die-hard pro-Fascists in the campaign to teach Italian resulted in a 
compromise that weakened the cultural Fascist interpretation of Italianità while strengthening 
the institutions that transmitted Italianità and bringing them into American politics. 
 The most successful organizer in the campaign to bring Italian to the public schools, 
Leonard Covello, had been working on the issue of Italian education in the public schools since 
before Mussolini rose to power. Though he did not openly support Fascism or Mussolini, 
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Covello partnered with New York’s Italian Consulate General and Columbia University’s pro-
Fascist Italian cultural center, the Casa Italiana, to achieve his goals by establishing the Italo-
American Educational Bureau in 1931. The bureau worked under the supervision of the Casa 
Italiana and its director, Giuseppe Prezzolini, to coordinate various efforts among ethnic 
organizations, and reported to the Italian Consulate General. In keeping with the consul’s 
avoidance of direct political organizing, the Bureau encouraged smaller, local associations to 
lead the charge within their own communities, acting only as an advisor and coordinator. 
 Within one year of the Educational Bureau’s opening, Covello doubled Italian enrollment 
in the city. Writing to Prezzolini in 1932, he outlined the steps he had taken to reach 6,100 
students.26 In New York, he began by asking Italian language papers for assistance appealing to 
parents and students and collecting information from Italian families to direct their efforts. 
Italian-language newspaper editors were an obvious first choice for a partner in a campaign that 
promoted Italian literacy, but it was not Covello’s only move. Though Il Progresso Italo-
Americano presented Covello’s work as “Generoso Pope’s Campaign for the Diffusion of the 
Italian Language,” Covello’s fourteen-step program did not rest solely on a millionaire editor’s 
gentle reproaches. In the town of Montclair, New Jersey, for example, Covello’s two-year, six-
step approach did not include Generoso Pope at all. There, Covello began by meeting with the 
superintendent of the town’s schools as well as the president of Montclair State College. If the 
high school did not give Italian the same credit it gave to other languages, and if students could 
not use their high school Italian for college entrance, he could not hope to enroll students. Even 
at the height of Italian American pro-Fascism, cultural nationalism could not trump practicality.  
 After receiving the support of the high school and the college, Covello reached out to 
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Montclair’s Italians and Americans by bringing speakers to a local American church, the Rotary 
Club, and the Italo-American Political Club of Montclair. He sent letters to all Italian American 
families with forms to fill out and mail back to him. Working with a New York University Italian 
student club, he invited families to a festa in the high school. The celebration included Italian 
music, comedies, and speeches performed by the college students. A final organizational meeting 
in the spring led to a sixth step: the establishment of Italian as a summer course that year.  
 When organizing Italian classes in New York City, Covello added newspaper articles, 
radio talks, conferences, and canvassing Italian neighborhoods. Though he could take advantage 
of larger propaganda networks with far greater audiences, Covello cited neighborhood 
canvassing as “the most effective part of the campaign.”27 In his autobiography, he recalled his 
early efforts as “lessons in democracy, trying to make the immigrant understand his rights and 
privileges.” His labors in teaching democracy to parents speak to Pope’s ineffectiveness: 
“How many homes I entered at this period where I had to guide a trembling hand in 
signing of an ‘X!’ How many cups of coffee I drank, jet black with just a speck of sugar, 
while explaining our purpose! The parents were usually astonished that they should be 
consulted in the matter of what was to be taught to their children. They couldn’t believe 
the schools were really interested in their opinion.”28 
 
Where Pope chastised his readers to wake up to his call for action, Covello’s grassroots 
organizing opened the principal’s own eyes to how immigrants’ illiteracy, inexperience in 
American politics, and alienation from their children’s education blocked their ability to organize. 
To institute Italian classes in the public schools, Covello relied on Italian and American 
politicians, pro-Fascist propaganda networks, and the grassroots organizing of people who 
believed in his cause. Each group’s activities ended once the school adopted Italian, and the task 
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of education fell on the instructor. At that point, the work of Italianità might end, especially as 
American instructors balked at Fascist interpretations of Italian history. The Teacher’s Guild at 
Brooklyn’s Abraham Lincoln High School, for example, rejected the grammar book, Andiamo in 
Italia, for including “sheer Fascist propaganda.”29 Though the textbook was written by two 
Americans, one offensive chapter, “The Rebirth of Italy,” portrayed Fascism as a necessary 
anecdote to the disorder and “abject misery” of post-war Italy when the weak democratic 
government “surrender[ed] their prerogatives to the caprice of the mob.” The guild argued the 
pro-Fascist material “does not belong in any text-book in a democratic school, least of all in a 
grammar text” and convinced the publishers to produce substitute materials for the chapter.30 
 When Italian groups sought to bring Italian to the public schools, they underwent a long 
period of intense planning and organization followed by total relinquishment of responsibility 
and control after classes began. In contrast, organizing doposcuole, or after-school classes in 
ethnic associations, required less community work initially and allowed the consuls near total 
control. To stay open, however, the schools needed to build and maintain the community’s 
investment and continuously reach out to benefactors who could defray their costs. For the 
doposcuole, community political organizing did not end, but began with the class’s formation. 
 The Italian Bronx Community House, incorporated on Columbus Day of 1934, offers an 
example of the type of coordination required for a doposcuola to flourish. The school, opened by 
Maria Inquisitore, taught several Italian language and drama classes every week in addition to 
embroidery, piano, singing and drawing for students who paid monthly dues of twenty-five cents. 
Four times a week the school offered an English and Citizenship class free of charge.  
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 Inquisitore decided to open a school in the Bronx in the summer of 1934 and began 
teaching classes that October, thanks in large part to the Dante Alighieri Society’s donation of an 
Italian teacher. The newly reorganized Dante Alighieri Society began making real attempts to 
teach Italian in its own schools nationwide in 1933, and by 1935 it counted five hundred students 
in New York City, including Inquisitore’s. Though the DAS had headquarters in Rome and acted 
as an agent of the Italian state, its leadership in America reveals the overlap between the Italian 
government, the pro-Fascist prominenti, and Italian communities. The head of New York’s DAS, 
Italo Falbo, simultaneously directed Il Progresso Italo-Americano. The advisory board included 
Il Progresso’s lead reporter, Angelo Flavio Guidi, as well as the heads of several Italian banks. 
Similarly, in San Francisco, the owner of the city’s pro-Fascist newspaper L’Italia ran the DAS 
and sat on the society’s state board of directors, supervising thirty-six DAS branches. The Dante 
was strongest in Ohio where over eight hundred students learned Italian in churches, clubs, and 
schools. Cleveland’s consul general wrote of his most active instructor, “Fumagalli’s activities 
are not limited to teaching but rather…he has given for more than two years to this Consulate the 
most substantial cooperation in the field of political and patriotic propaganda that, as per my 
suggestions, he has carried out…with all the tact necessary for the local conditions.”31 
 In addition to the DAS teachers’ tactful propaganda inside and outside of the classroom, 
the Italian government provided the doposcuole with textbooks printed especially for students 
abroad. The textbooks’ propaganda was neither tactful nor indirect, as one excerpt from the 
chapter “Soldiers of the Homeland” in a 1933 textbook demonstrates: “When I am big, when I 
will finally become a soldier, I too, like grandpa, will fight for the Homeland and I will win; I 
will snatch up flags and prisoners and who knows how many medals of valor I will earn! This is 
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the dream of all Italian children, this is your dream, child.”32 Such obvious examples of pro-
Fascist militarism and Italian nationalism filled nearly every page of the textbooks distributed to 
Italian Americans from level one through four. 
  The Italian government was not the sole benefactor of Inquisitore’s school, or any of the 
others begun in church basements, OSIA lodges, and club-houses from New York to San 
Francisco. Over the years, Inquisitore thanked Italian Americans including Leonard Covello, 
Generoso Pope, Casa Italiana’s Professor Prezzolini, and a host of American politicians. New 
York’s Department of Education provided the English and Citizenship teacher, and over the 
years Inquisitore’s school benefitted from the support of two pro-Fascist Tammany judges, the 
Republican Party captain of East Harlem, an Italian political exile, and even anti-Fascist 
Congressman Vito Marcantonio.  
 Though she presented her school as a “non-partisan, non-political organization” with “a 
message of Italianità,” and relied on the support of politicians with opposing views on Fascism to 
sustain her school, there can be little doubt that Maria Inquisitore’s school, like others throughout 
the country, acted as a conduit for Fascist propaganda masking as Italianità.33 In addition to 
classes taught by Fascist-funded teachers using Fascist-published textbooks, the school held 
conferences, concerts, parties, and dances where students celebrated the Fascist state. The 
performances her students staged for the school’s inaugural celebrations included scenes titled 
“Salute to Authority,” and “Long Live Italy,” and when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, her 
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students collected cash, gold, and silver, which they gave to Consul General Vecchiotti.34 Across 
the country, schools like Inquisitore’s served as sites of community organization and pro-Fascist 
propaganda with the support of the Italian government, the prominenti, and American politicians. 
 An event Generoso Pope organized the evening of March 28, 1935 offers a closer look at 
how education united Italian Americans, brought their community into American politics, and 
helped them work through issues of dual patriotism and hyphenated identities. In conjunction 
with his campaigns to spread Italian language in the schools, Pope hosted a banquet honoring 
New York’s five hundred university graduates of Italian descent of 1934 to increase the profile 
of Italian American scholars. 
 Pope’s event drew three thousand people to one of the largest banquet halls in the city. 
Thirty-five politicians and educators sat at the table of honor, with Generoso Pope at the center. 
Most of Inquisitore’s benefactors surrounded him, including Covello, Marcantonio, Prezzolini, 
and Italian Ambassador Augusto Rosso. The table also included Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, 
Commissioner General of Immigration Cornel Daniel MacCormack, Postmaster General James 
Farley, New York Board of Education President George Ryan, and four of New York’s 
congressmen: Vito Marcantonio, William Sirovich, Martin Kennedy, and Samuel Dickstein.  
 Mayor LaGuardia gave one of ten speeches that night which Pope simultaneously 
broadcast on radio station WMCA and later reprinted in Il Progresso. LaGuardia opened by 
thanking Pope for the invitation, and reminisced about the year when he received his own 
diploma. Speaking to his host, he remarked “in that era, dear Pope, you could have held the 
graduates’ banquet in a telephone booth.” He turned next to Augusto Rosso, Italy’s ambassador 
to the United States: “This, Mr. Ambassador, is the index of the progress of the people of your 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 “L’Inaugurazione Dell’italian Bronx Community House (The Inauguration of the Italian Bronx 
Community House),” Il Progresso Italo-Americano (New York, January 8, 1935). 
 
	   153 
country and of the country of our ancestors, in just a generation.” Finally, addressing the crowd, 
he said, “There is a great satisfaction in my spirit, and it is that our people, the Americans of our 
race, have no need to apologize to anyone anymore. We are of the arrived.” Though most of the 
graduates, like him, did not come from academic families, he enjoined them not to forget “that 
for every year that other nations have preceded us in this country, we have a century of 
civilization more than them. There is a great tradition in this country, of the descendants of the 
Mayflower. But you and I belong to descendants of the Santa Maria.” 35 
 LaGuardia’s speech, like others that evening, evoked Italianità by speaking to the 
immigrants’ pride in their progress and their contributions to America, as well as a belief that the 
future of the Italian American community rested on the second generation’s ethnic pride. 
Columbus’s Santa Maria served as a symbol of Italian Americans’ historical contributions to 
their adopted land and the greatness of the Italian Man, in the spirit of Italianità. It also accepted 
Italian immigrants as transnationalistic citizens—different from Mayflower Americans and 
deserving of special status and recognition. Congressman William Sirovich, who represented 
LaGuardia’s old district in East Harlem, similarly spoke that night of the Italian geniuses 
Mazzini, Garibaldi, Cavour, Galileo, and Marconi. Unlike LaGuardia, Sirovich carried the 
rhetoric of Italianità to its pro-Fascist apogee: “When we think of ancient Rome and when we 
see what has happened in Italy in these last ten years under the brilliant and magnificent 
leadership of Benito Mussolini, the greatest statesman in the world, we are forced to make a 
parallel between the two great epochs of Italian history.” “The new Caesar has made Italy more 
respected in the world, and is growing grandly its prestige” he declared.36 
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 Not even Italy’s ambassador to the United States, Augusto Rosso, dared to make such 
obvious pro-Mussolini statements that evening. His address opened with familiar claims to 
historic ties between Italy and the United States and well-worn representations of Italianità. In 
the heart of his speech, Rosso addressed one of the central complications in spreading Italianità 
to the second generation and encouraging their transnationalistic citizenship: navigating dual 
patriotism. Before exploring the contentious topic, he protected himself against any accusations 
that he encouraged “the least allusion to a lack of fidelity…towards America in which many of 
you are citizens,” asking, “would it be improper for me—a representative of a foreign country—
to say that I wish and I hope that these ties will always remain so strong?” “Honestly, I don’t 
think it is” he answered.37 Rosso’s hesitations to make clear statements of pro-Fascist 
propaganda reflected the lessons Italy learned from the demise of the FLNA. But his conclusion 
showed the pro-Fascists’ determination not to let Americanism set the rules of citizenship’s 
obligations and privileges: 
“I certainly don’t see any lack of fidelity if you remember the land of your progenitors, if 
you study and speak the language of your father or your mother, if you feel pride in the 
history of the Country of your origins, if you respect the traditions of your family, and—
permit me to add this—if you follow with affectionate interest the current life of the 
nation from where you come.”38  
 
Ambassador Rosso’s speech and the success of the graduates’ banquet proved Italy’s 
strategy of indirect propaganda through Italianità worked. Pro-Fascists achieved their first major 
political success using Italianità to mobilize Italian Americans for the Italian language. Beyond 
spreading language opportunities for Italian American students, Rosso’s speech demonstrates 
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how the campaign also helped redefine Fascism and Americanism. At the graduates’ banquet, 
Fascism meant a celebration of Italian American progress and the reinforcement of the family 
foundation; Americanism meant recognizing immigrant origins and allowing space for the old 
world in immigrants’ political lives. By accommodating the immigrants’ unique and important 
political status, the ideologies’ redefinitions contributed to the discourse on transnationalistic 
citizenship. Rosso’s speech was a contribution to this effort as he reassured second generation 
Italian Americans of their important status as successful Americans while simultaneously 
reminding them of their duties to remember, respect, and care about Italy.  
Ambassador Rosso could make such open claims to Italian Americans’ obligations to 
Fascist Italy because in March of 1935 few Americans cared to stop the pro-Fascists’ political 
organization. Samuel Dickstein, who sat at Pope’s table of honor that night, and heard speakers 
all evening laud Italy, the Italian race, and Mussolini, had just co-chaired a congressional 
investigation into subversive foreign propaganda. After a year of work, his committee published 
their report just one month before Pope’s banquet. Following six pages on the activities of the 
German American Bund, the report included just one sentence on Italian American Fascism: 
“There have been isolated cases of activity by organizations which seemed to be guided by the 
fascisti principle, which the committee investigated and found that they had made no progress.”39 
Sirovich’s and Rosso’s speeches could have piqued Dickstein’s interest that night, but the 
congressman attended the event to court the Italian vote, not to investigate Fascist propaganda.  
Pro-Fascists set the precedent for Italian American political organization through cultural 
channels at a time when Italy enjoyed good relations with the United States. The test of the pro-
Fascists’ success at reinventing ethnic politics and citizenship would come seven months later, 
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when Mussolini went against the League of Nations and the United States in its invasion of 
Ethiopia. 
The Ethiopian War: Italy, America, and International Politics 
 On October 3, 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia to fulfill Fascism’s promise of vindicating 
Italy’s “mutilated victory” from the Great War. On the eve of the invasion, Mussolini spoke to 
his global nation through shortwave radio from the balcony of Palazzo Venezia, explaining his 
cause. After suffering a million casualties supporting France and England in the war, he 
explained, Italy only received table scraps from the other nations’ feast of colonial spoils. “We 
have waited forty years for Ethiopia,” he stated, “It is time to say enough.”40 For Mussolini, 
conquering Ethiopia restored pride and glory to Italy and honored the nation’s war dead.  
In the United States, his supporters offered different justifications. Speaking at the OSIA 
annual convention in Boston days after the invasion, Ambassador Rosso explained Italy’s 
mission in Ethiopia under the pretext of humanitarian aid, economic necessity, and benevolent 
imperialism. First, he declared, Italy invaded Ethiopia to liberate the country’s two million slaves 
and force the nation to comply with promises made to the League of Nations. In addition, just as 
the United States had for the Philippines and Panama, Italy would eradicate deadly diseases, 
cultivate idle land, and exploit the earth’s riches for the benefit of all. Second, Italy’s action was 
a necessary defense against acts of aggression carried out by the Ethiopian government. Finally, 
Italy’s invasion allowed the small country to take its rightful place among other imperial nations 
on the African continent. Rejecting the negative connotation of imperialism, Rosso explained 
Italy’s desperate need for new land and for new markets in which to sell its products. Without 
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Ethiopia, the ambassador foresaw a dismal future in which Italy’s restless and unemployed 
population would resort to disorder, anarchy, or worse, bolshevism.41 
For the following seven months of combat, Italian Americans spoke of the Ethiopian War 
in humanitarian terms, as Rosso did, to engender support among their American neighbors. To 
further their cause, prominenti even made frequent comparisons between Mussolini and 
Abraham Lincoln as emancipators and unifiers of fractured nations.42 Weeks after the invasion, 
Generoso Pope printed a front-page editorial—in English—making the parallel clear, writing, 
“the same high spirit that brought Abraham Lincoln to action is the guiding star for Premier 
Mussolini as he sends his soldiers—ultimately envoys of peace—into the wastelands of 
Abyssinia.” Underscoring his point, he continued, “no sinister motive is behind their drive, even 
though blood, regrettably, is shed. But a program of liberty, enlightenment, and progress is back 
of the Italian army’s advance against a people that has known naught but slavery, even though 
they exist in the deluded belief they are freemen.”43 
 The comparisons did little to convince the American public that Italy’s invasion of 
Ethiopia was anything but an unjustified colonial land grab. Highlighting the humanitarian 
mission of the war and its precedents in American history, however, did allow Italian Americans 
to feel comfortable venturing into the public arena to show support for the imperialistic venture. 
Whereas most of the political work done in the campaign to teach Italian occurred in immigrant 
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homes, the Ethiopian War propelled Italian Americans out of their houses and into public spaces.  
Italian Americans brought the war into their public spaces immediately. On the day of the 
invasion, one reporter marveled at how Jersey City’s Italians rallied together in such an atypical 
fashion: “Some times, in fact so many times, we have noted that in the undertaking of so many 
initiatives, after long publicity campaigns, after invitations and invitations, the meeting rooms 
were deserted or almost empty.” On October 3 however, “without any preparation, without the 
work of committees and subcommittees, without clamor…the Italians ran to the meeting places.” 
In Jersey City’s Columbus Hall he saw the Italian Veterans, Dante Alighieri Society, regional 
societies, OSIA lodges, mutual aid societies, and clubs come together. Why, he asked did the 
“societies in constant conflict, men divided by past battles, irreconcilable adversaries, hold out 
their hands to each other, forgetting every hard feeling? In the name of Italy.”44  
 Over the next seven months, Italian Americans continued to unite for Italy, using their 
purses, their bodies, and their pens. Their efforts helped unite their ethnic group, fund a foreign 
war, and prevent the United States from aiding its English and French allies. Beyond the short-
term benefits to the immigrants and their homeland, the Italian Americans’ political mobilization 
between October 1935 and June 1936 changed a national conversation about the rights and 
obligations of immigrant citizens. The long-term result of the Ethiopian Campaign in the United 
States was a new understanding in America of transnationalistic citizenship, patriotism, and 
assimilation. Replacing the much-maligned hyphenated label of “Italian-American,” community 
leaders tested out a new term to fit their new public presence. Over the course of the Ethiopian 
War and the presidential campaign that immediately followed it, “Americans of Italian origin” 
became a voting bloc of transnationalistic citizens with an obligation to help their homeland in 
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its time of need and a right to use the full political powers of a United States citizen to do so.  
 The first group to publicly organize—the Italian Veterans—were also Fascism’s 
staunchest supporters. The State Department would later describe the Italian Veterans as “so 
closely identified with the Italian Government that they must be regarded as organizations acting 
for or on behalf of that government.”45⁠ Similarly, the pAssociation of Italians Abroad announced 
before the invasion even began that thirty-five of its members had applied to volunteer in East 
Africa.46 On October 20, the first hundred volunteers left New York to serve in Italy’s war in 
Africa. When they arrived in Naples the next month, they were greeted by a visibly moved Count 
Thaon di Revel, former leader of the FLNA. Il Progresso reporter Angelo Flavio Guidi admitted 
feeling his eyes water as he waited from Naples, wondering how many of his American brothers 
would disembark. As the men alit, he described the scene “like a great family coming back 
together” with all the pomp of Fascist patriotism. “In the rush someone forgot his passport,” he 
noted, “No matter: he has the passport of the Fascist faith and he disembarks all the same.” As 
the new enlistees boarded the buses to begin their service and a band played the Fascist hymn, 
Guidi overheard one man remark “we came here to find our Mother who we left but never 
forgot,” to which another responded “And Mother waited for you, and she was always certain 
you would come.”47  
 Few of the four million Italians in America responded to their motherland’s call in quite 
the same way. In the 1920s, Italy had pushed its nationalistic citizenship claims on migrants by 
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demanding military service to the seventh generation abroad. By 1935 she acquiesced to the 
migrants’ transnationalistic citizenship by calling not for military service but financial sacrifice, 
especially after the League of Nations followed through with its threats of economic sanctions. 
Beginning on November 18, the League prohibited members from exporting arms to Italy (but 
not Ethiopia), as well as cotton, oil, iron, copper and other necessary materials. It banned loans 
or appeals for money to Italy except for humanitarian projects such as the Red Cross, and 
stopped all imports from Italy. The world’s first experiment with economic sanctions proved a 
failure not only in curbing Italy’s militarism, but also in undermining the will of the Italian 
people to follow their dictator to war. Outside the peninsula, the sanctions equally stoked Italian 
emigrants’ fierce anti-British sentiments and encouraged their financial support of the 
motherland. 
  Pro-Fascists interpreted the sanctions as a second front in Italy’s war against barbarism. 
Generoso Pope emphasized their effect on Italy’s civilian population, calling the sanctions a 
“war of aggression…a barbaric war that relentlessly attacks the blind, women and children, the 
elderly and the sick.” 48 The head of New York’s Italian Chamber of Commerce similarly spoke 
for pro-Fascists on radio station WOV in the winter of 1935. While Italy fought its war in 
Ethiopia to bring liberation, humanitarian aid, and “conditions of civil life” to enslaved Ethiopia, 
he found it ironic that the League’s “economic war—the most monstrous plan of collective 
starvation that has ever come out of the human mind—is declared ‘humanitarianism’ by the 
League of Nations.” Paraphrasing Mussolini’s Palazzo Venezia speech, he declared: “To acts of 
economic war we will respond with economic war. To participate in this war of defense is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Generoso Pope, “L’Agressione Economica (Economic Aggression),” Il Progresso Italo-Americano 
(New York, November 19, 1935).  
 
	   161 
sacrosanct duty which no Italian can fail.” If Italy’s enemies fought through economic 
strangulation, he argued, Italian Americans would fight with their wallets.49 
 Italian Americans found unity, visibility, and a community voice through the economic 
battle they fought against England on behalf of their motherland. In the early days of the 
invasion, Il Progresso reportedly received hundreds of letters from readers asking how they 
could support Italy financially. Soon after, the paper announced it would accept contributions to 
the Italian Red Cross and Aid Work for Families of the Fallen. On Columbus Day 1935, Il 
Progresso posted its first advertisement for donations, making a familiar claim to the immigrants’ 
obligations to their homeland as children to their parents: “The Motherland knows that while she 
fights an epic battle in the name of her legitimate interests and in name of the supreme interests 
of civilization, her faraway sons are nearby with their hearts today, tomorrow, always.”50 The 
next day, Il Progresso printed the first list of names of donors, totaling more than a thousand 
dollars, sent from eighty individuals, five garment factories, three mutual aid associations, and 
one church. Over the next twelve months Il Progresso regularly repeated the call of the 
motherland as it printed a total of 262 lists amounting to $741,662.52 in contributions.  
Within two weeks, Pope received enough contributions to fill an entire page of the paper 
nearly every day, and did not print his last list until the end of September 1936, four months after 
Mussolini declared victory. Though historians have often cited the impressive sum of donations 
collected through Il Progresso, they have not looked further into how exactly Italian Americans 
came to donate such an impressive sum of money. Pope listed every single donation amount, 
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whether it was three thousand dollars from the Benito Mussolini Patriotic Society of New Haven, 
Connecticut or the nickel one individual found on the street while walking to his friends’ homes 
to collect a total of fifty-six dollars and five cents.  
Studying the lists in depth provides a wealth of information about how grassroots 
fundraising functioned during the Great Depression and how Italian Americans became 
politically engaged. After years of pro-Fascists experimenting with different forms of indirect 
propaganda, the lists reveal which groups most effectively induced immigrants to act. An 
analysis of the first thirty-four lists, which amounted to ten percent of all donations, or 
$73,922.55 given by more than 35,000 donors, shows how Italians donated through informal 
networks of friends and families, inside the heart of anti-Fascist territory on union shop floors, 
and within formal pro-Fascist spaces in the Italian community. As they donated, they carried out 
a public and contentious debate about the obligations immigrants owed their homeland, their 
fellow laborers worldwide, and their host country. 
 Chart 2 shows the breakdown of money collected by the newspaper from October 13 to 
November 17, 1935. About one third of the money Il Progresso received came through 
individuals and informal collections gathered between friends, neighbors, and family members. 
Individuals who wrote letters to Il Progresso with their donations cited reading about the 
Ethiopian dispute in the newspaper, hearing Pope’s call to donate, and feeling an obligation to 
serve Italy in whatever way they could. They also cited personal connections to Italy and its war, 
whether because they had served in the Italian army themselves or still had family remaining in 
Italy. The largest individual donation in the study was four hundred dollars, and the smallest just 
ten cents. On average, individuals donating directly to the paper gave six dollars, while those 
who gave through an intermediary tended to give just one. As a result, though individual 
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donations amounted to twelve percent of all money given, only four percent of donors gave 
individually (see Chart 3). Italian Americans were eleven times more likely to donate because a 
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As the collections continued, a small but growing number of barber shops, restaurants, 
and banks collected money through clients and customers, and neighbors stationed in parks or on 
street corners asked passersby to contribute. As one example, Il Progresso highlighted the story 
of little Miss Maria Cristina Ciancio, a twelve-year-old girl, who heard her parents discussing 
sanctions at the dinner table. Overcome with sadness, she ran out the door. Ten minutes later she 
returned, dropping eleven dollars in coins on the table collected from neighbors on the street, 
saying, “Look look! Send this money to Italy, so the elderly and the babies can eat!”51 By the 
spring, Italian Americans felt so accustomed to giving Red Cross money to friends, neighbors, 
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and strangers, that scammers went door-to-door collecting money and gold for their own 
pockets.52 
Few wondered why Maria Ciancio’s donors gave to their young neighbor, but confusion 
turned to controversy over the question of why factory workers donated on their shop floors. 
Labor unions were the anti-Fascists’ base of support, but workers donating through company 
collections gave one third of all Red Cross Donations. Why, the anti-Fascists wondered, were 
forty-one percent of donors giving as a part of a workplace collection? One of the first lists Pope 
printed illustrates the complexity of understanding which workers donated and why.  
 On October 16, Il Progresso printed the names of four collections. The first collection 
came from the Scorsone Dress Company. Serafino Scorsone personally donated $50, which he 
added to the $60 he collected from thirty-two of his employees.53⁠ It is possible that Scorsone, a 
proud veteran corporal of the Italian army, gave his employees no option to decline his request 
for donations, but one anti-Fascist newspaper accused him of more. The paper charged Scorsone 
with subtracting Red Cross donations from his workers’ paychecks without their consent. 
Outraged, Scorsone wrote to Il Progresso, averring, “the subscriptions of my workers was 
spontaneous and loyal.” 54 Being “an honest and hardworking Italian,” he stated “not only have I 
never subtracted, I have not even begged for a subscription.” According to Scorsone, when his 
workers willingly gave their money, they proclaimed, “For our Italy, for our brothers of Italy that 
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sacrifice themselves to make the great name of Italy immortal once again!”55 
 It is impossible to assess Scorsone’s claims, but the donation lists show that if some 
employers encouraged or forced his employers to add to their own donations, as the anti-Fascists 
accused Scorsone of doing, it was not the norm. Rather than a boss spearheading a workplace 
collection among his employees, most workplace collections looked like Lina Provenzano’s from 
Rochester, New York. The same day that Scorsone gave his collection, Provenzano gave $55 
from “a group of Italian workers that understand the importance of your call…for the Italian Red 
Cross.” 56 Provenzano wrote that one hundred and twenty-three of her working-class friends gave 
to her because “At this time every Italian of America wants to fulfill their own duty. Workers are 
first in line. We must all give to the Patria. Because if it should lose we would all die from 
pain.”57 Her largest donors gave up to two dollars, the smallest just ten cents, with an average 
donation of forty cents. The majority—though by no means all—of the collections looked like 
Provenzano’s, with an average donation of one dollar and fifty cents given through co-workers. 
 Italian Red Cross collections between co-workers became a point of pride for Pope and a 
major source of conflict within the labor unions, the base of American anti-Fascism. One of the 
country’s most prominent anti-Fascists, Luigi Antonini, served as general secretary of Local 89 
of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), also known as the Italian Dress 
and Waist Makers Local. Antonini founded the local in 1919, and by 1940 it counted 33,500 
members, making it one of the largest in the nation. To the extent that anti-Fascism existed as a 
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movement in the United States, it existed primarily in Local 89.58 
 Throughout his career, Antonini tried navigating between his own strong anti-
communism, the anarchism and socialism of the anti-Fascist leaders in America, and his less 
radical rank-and-file. By most accounts, he did not succeed in satisfying any of his constituents. 
During World War II, the Office of Strategic Services interviewed scores of Italian American 
union leaders who described Antonini as “a stupid demagogue” “a first class louse and dictator” 
and a “fascist.”59⁠ He earned the last label by partnering with Generoso Pope to unite Italian 
Americans for the war effort after Pearl Harbor. Many labor leaders insisted that Antonini did 
not speak for Italian Americans; most did not even believe he spoke for his own Local 89. 
 Antonini’s efforts to lead his members to anti-Fascism turned from a point of conflict in 
his union to open rebellion after Pope’s call for Red Cross donations. In 1934, when ILGWU 
President David Dubinsky announced a campaign to fight Nazism abroad, Antonini used his new 
position as vice president of the ILGWU to add a campaign against Fascism in Italy. The next 
year Antonini went a step further, prohibiting members from collecting money for the Red Cross 
under penalty of expulsion from the union. “Are the heads of Local 89 the padrone of our 
spirits?” one letter writer asked Il Progresso.60 The same day, an “American Citizen and 100% 
Unionist” wondered if the Local could legally forbid the collections and if “the Italian 
seamstresses are free to follow their consciences or are they truly slaves of vile intrigue?”61 The 
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writer claimed even his anti-Fascist friends gave willingly to the Red Cross. To illustrate his 
point, he recalled how an anti-Fascist in his ethnic society responded when a member proposed 
taking $100 from the social fund to give to the Red Cross. The anti-Fascist stood up and declared, 
“No! Either give $200 or nothing.” The society unanimously approved the sum. He finished with 
some advice for Local 89, concluding that above all, “the union must be apolitical.”62 
 Several letter writers stated a similar demand for the union to keep out of politics, even as 
they called for the union to increase its political fight for the collective interests of workers. At 
least one writer recognized the conflict in his demands. E. Rubino believed “the ILGWU in 
general and Local 89 in particular would do much better to concern itself with the serious 
troubles of the workers in the needle trades rather than wasting time in politics.” As if an 
afterthought he added, “Or at least in politics related to this land.”63 That a unionist during the 
height of the ILGWU’s political power could call for his union to avoid politics speaks to 
Italianità’s enormous success at masquerading political issues as ethno-cultural nationalism and 
branding anything anti-Fascist as anti-Italian. One garment presser in Local 89 added his voice to 
the daily protests after he heard a union head shout “Long live Italy and down with the war!” 
“With what nerve does he call himself Italian while making anti-Italian propaganda?” the worker 
asked, warning, “the day will come when the workers will rebel.” 64 Another Local 89 member 
believed the rebellion had already begun. “It’s enough to glance at the list of contributions to 
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know with how much scorn and disgust we are treating these denigrators of Italy,” he wrote of 
his union’s leaders. The writer, who had already collected from co-workers twice in the first 
month of war, stated “I am not, and I have never been, a Fascist, but I am an Italian, in fact I am 
the most Italian…because in my veins runs Italian blood, of that I am proud.”65 Whether the 
workers identified themselves as Italians by blood or American citizens, by defending their 
obligation and right to donate to Italy they were articulating their transnationalistic citizenship to 
each other, their union leadership, and Il Progresso’s readers.  
 The letters Pope printed represented just a handful of the more than 14,000 self-identified 
laborers in the greater New York area who donated money to the Italian Red Cross in the first 
month of the war. Even if some donations were coerced, Antonini’s need to issue an edict 
prohibiting his own members from collecting money suggests most were not. Workers did not 
blindly follow their prominenti, bosses, or union leaders during the Ethiopian War. As the letters 
and donations reveal, they actively participated in a rich and contentious debate about privileging 
ethnic or working-class identities, and their rights as transnational citizens to support Italy.  
Though there is no record of how that debate played out on shop floors, the two sides 
came together very publicly the night of December 14, 1935, when they presented the terms of 
their debate to an American audience. That night, Pope sponsored an Italian Red Cross 
fundraiser, concert, and rally at Madison Square Garden with a sold-out crowd of twenty-two 
thousand. The event raised $55,000, and Pope presented the Italian consulate general with a 
second check of $100,000. Outside, six hundred policemen blocked a nearly three thousand-
person coalition of American socialists and Italian anti-Fascists from storming the rally in protest. 
 The anti-Fascists targeted their criticism of the event through accusations that Pope 
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tricked the American public and Italian laborers in his fraudulent appeal for donations. In New 
York’s anti-Fascist press, anarchist Carlo Tresca accused Pope of scamming his working-class 
readers by telling them the money would go towards humanitarian aid, when it supported 
Mussolini’s army. Tresca was less forgiving of Italian American politicians, refusing to believe 
the guests of honor did not know the real purpose of the rally. In the days before the event, 
former Socialist Party presidential candidate Norman Thomas and a few leading Italian anti-
Fascists launched a substantial but unsuccessful campaign to convince Mayor LaGuardia and 
New York district Supreme Court justices Salvatore Cotillo and Ferdinand Pecora to boycott the 
rally. The anti-Fascists met with the mayor and instructed their supporters to barrage each 
politician’s office with telegrams of protest. Thomas told LaGuardia not to be fooled by Pope, 
who was “playing a clever game, saying to the English-speaking public that the concert was for 
the Red Cross and to Italians that it was for their country.”66 
 Despite the anti-Fascists’ protests and LaGuardia’s intimate knowledge of how Pope 
operated, the mayor undoubtedly saw the rally as a chance to rehabilitate himself for skipping 
some of the Columbus Day celebrations two months earlier. LaGuardia had sent the pro-Fascist 
politician Edward Corsi in his place, but when the city’s Emergency Home Relief Bureau 
director delivered the Mayor’s greetings, the audience of sixteen thousand booed LaGuardia’s 
name. In a profile on Corsi, The New Yorker commented, “the atmosphere of the celebration was 
definitely Fascist, and the Mayor is anti-Fascist, but even so LaGuardia appeared to set a new 
high in political ineptitude when he dedicated Leiv Eriksson Park in Brooklyn that day.”67⁠  
LaGuardia ultimately decided to ignore the anti-Fascists and appease his Italian 
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constituents by attending the rally, though he arrived late and only spoke after the crowd 
demanded remarks. Not ones to mince words, the anarchists at Il Martello titled their paper’s 
article condemning the rally, “Regurgitations of Imbecilic Sewers Overflow Madison Square 
Garden,” with a subheading, “Honorable LaGuardia! You have supported a great scam.”68 
 The politicians at the event may have been the scoundrels Tresca believed them to be, but 
not because they lied about what the Red Cross donations really meant. Just as Pope had written 
in his papers, and donors echoed in their letters to Il Progresso, speakers before and at the event 
explained in clear terms what the fundraiser meant for Italy and for Italian Americans. Leading 
up to the event, Pope asked several prominenti to speak on pro-Fascist radio station WOV about 
the rally to help sell tickets. When OSIA Supreme Venerable Stefano Miele spoke on WOV 
about the rally, he did not mention the Italian Red Cross once. Focusing instead on Italy’s 
justifications for war and more importantly, Italian Americans’ right to defend and support the 
war, he remarked, “I want to speak today to remind the timid among us that the American citizen 
of Italian origin, like every other citizen of other races, has the right to enjoy all the privileges set 
forth and guaranteed in the constitution of the United States.” “Every American citizen,” he 
continued, “has the right to demonstrate and express his own thoughts as best as he pleases.” 
Much like the graduates’ banquet Pope hosted nine months earlier, and countless other pro-
Fascist events in between, Miele explained “this is the moment for us American citizens of 
Italian origin to take our position in our land of adoption and according to the spirit of the 
constitution, speak and operate with openness, courage, and sincerity.” Miele could have hardly 
been more sincere when he closed his address stating that on the night of December 14, “held 
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tight in a single pact, animated by a single faith, we will ask the God of war for the victory of 
Italy’s soldiers, for the honor of Rome, and for the greater prestige of our people in America.” 69 
 In many ways the Madison Square Garden rally looked and sounded similar to Pope’s 
graduates’ banquet that March. Though the crowd was much larger, the speakers and their topics 
did not differ greatly. The forty-two guests of honor at the Garden included many of the same 
Italian government representatives, prominenti, and American politicians that spoke in March to 
a few hundred graduates at the Hotel Commodore. Congressman William Sirovich spoke again 
about great Italian geniuses, Pope reasserted Italian Americans’ power, and loyalty to Italianità, 
and Consul General Vecchiotti gave his usual remarks about pride in the Italian race and the love 
Italians felt for Mussolini. But Judges Pecora and Cotillo, who had delivered short and generic 
remarks about Italian racial pride and progress in March, took the opportunity of speaking to 
twenty-two thousand constituents in December to contribute to the pressing conversation about 
the rights, privileges, and obligations of transnationalistic citizens. 
 Pecora and Cotillo had less to prove to the Italian voters than LaGuardia did, having long 
ensconced themselves in the pro-Fascist political and cultural scene. As American politicians, 
however, they were not immune to the controversy over the rally, especially when Norman 
Thomas’s protests reached the attention of the American public. Both judges addressed the 
controversy directly in their speeches, which were broadcast on radio station WCMA and 
reprinted in Il Progresso, just as their remarks at the graduates’ banquet had been. This time they 
spoke to a wider audience than the Italian American community, as reporters from English-
language papers also reported on their speeches.   
 Pecora spoke first. He opened by remarking, “in the last forty-eight hours, the telegram 
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offices of New York must have been inundated with messages of protest against the individuals 
that were invited to present at this magnificent celebration.” He read from one such telegram, 
which stated “we consider your participation as an approval of Fascism, as a violation of 
American neutrality, and as a violation of your oath as a public official.” He answered the 
accusation for himself as well as for LaGuardia, Sirovich, and Cotillo. “We are here tonight 
because we believe in the right that the American laws give to every citizen to act according to 
their own conscience” he stated, adding that the protesters “should have read the American 
Constitution before sending their messages.” Remarkably, at a time of heightened hostility 
against Nazism, Fascism, and especially Communism, Pecora explained that being American 
meant having the free will to choose the political philosophy that fit one’s conscience. Just as 
LaGuardia had stated at the graduates’ banquet in March that Italian Americans no longer needed 
to apologize to anyone anymore, Pecora explained that as Americans, “we do not have to explain 
ourselves or make anyone understand.”70 
 Cotillo felt he did have to explain himself, and in so doing, articulated what was 
becoming a more popular interpretation of transnational citizenship among Italian immigrants: “I 
would not be a true American, nor would I be a loyal American, if I forgot the land of my origins. 
No one could be more grateful than I am for the unlimited opportunities I have been able to take 
advantage of in America. But I believe that being proud of my Italian origins can make me a 
better American citizen.” 71 His speech built off a theme present in Italian American addresses 
since the closing of the FLNA, and seen especially clearly in Ambassador Rosso’s speech at the 
graduates’ dinner—that being a good American meant remembering one’s ethnic origins. In 
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March, Rosso had hesitantly asked his audience if it would be wrong for him to hope American 
citizens of Italian origin continued to feel a connection to their homeland and follow its political 
events with interest. By December, pro-Fascists had stopped second-guessing themselves on the 
issue of dual-patriotism. If they wanted to continue supporting Italy in public, they needed to 
regularly and definitively affirm their rights as American citizens to do so, and to redefine 
American citizenship in a way that allowed for political allegiances to a foreign nation.  
 Generoso Pope’s event was only unique for its impressive size and the attention it 
garnered from the American press. Across the country, Italian American organizations hosted 
smaller, but equally important demonstrations in support of the Italian Red Cross. East coast 
associations from West Virginia to Boston made up the final third of money sent to Il Progresso. 
In the beginning, organizations collected money from individual members and voted in regular 
meetings to donate large sums from their social funds or coffers. Most were mutual aid societies, 
but the paper also received money from political, cultural, and regional societies, churches, 
Italian-language schools, OSIA lodges and sections of the Italian Veterans. Outside of the 
northeast, those same organizations tended to send the money they collected to the consular 
representative or newspapers closest to them, rather than to Generoso Pope. Most of those 
newspapers and consular records have not survived, and so it is only possible to make guesses 
about collections that did not go through Pope’s papers in New York City and Philadelphia. 
 Over time, many associations hosted events to raise money for the Italian Red Cross, or 
launched their own fundraising campaigns to fulfill Italy’s needs in kind. The national leadership 
of OSIA committed to raising four thousand bales of cotton and the Italian Veterans raised 
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money for an ambulance.72 The Scavengers Association of San Francisco collected tons of scrap 
iron for Italy for free—a kindness they did not extend to the United States during the Second 
World War.73 After Roosevelt asked American industry to place a “moral embargo” against 
selling copper to Italy, radio announcers in Boston, Philadelphia, and New York City pressed 
their audiences to purchase copper postcards to send to Italy. Italian Americans sent two hundred 
tons of copper in postcards baring inscriptions such as “Before the altar of the fatherland we 
place this offer and our devotion” which Mussolini melted down to make bullets.74 
 One ethnic institution noticeably absent from the fundraising efforts was the Catholic 
Church, with Italian parishes giving just one percent of donations. While churches did not 
contribute much money to the war in its first month, they were instrumental in collecting the next 
wave of donations: gold wedding rings. Days after Pope’s Madison Square Garden rally in 
December, Italy held a “day of faith” in which the government brought Italian mothers to town 
squares to donate their gold wedding rings to the state. Soon after, Italian Americans began 
sending their own gold—rings, earrings, medals of honor, candlesticks, and crosses—to the 
consulates, Generoso Pope, and ethnic associations. Collections typically happened as public 
events with multiple associations coming together to give directly to the consul. When 
Cleveland’s Consul General Romeo Montecchi participated in a gold collection event in his city, 
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he counted four thousand people and the flags of sixty unique organizations, in addition to 
musicians from the Italian Veterans and the Church of the Savior, and a chorus of students from 
an Italian parochial school. He collected five pounds of gold and a few hundred dollars that 
month from similar events, which he sent to Ambassador Rosso, bringing his jurisdiction’s 
fundraising totals up to $40,000. 
 As with the Italian schools, events and donations flourished where networks between 
prominenti, consuls, and associations of different types already had experience working together. 
One of the strongest centers of pro-Fascist activity throughout the 1930s was the city of 
Youngstown, Ohio. Though the city’s census counted only seven thousand Italian immigrants in 
1930, it supported an OSIA lodge with a junior branch, an Italian Veterans’ lodge, a Dante 
Alighieri branch, ten fraternal lodges, three political clubs, and twenty-two professional, regional, 
or cultural associations all for Italians. Youngstown’s activity made the city such a shining 
example that Cleveland’s consul general once remarked, “When I go back to Cleveland, I’ll tell 
my people to come to Youngstown to learn how to cooperate.”75 In the first four months of the 
war the community collected $7,000 and 500 gold and silver objects. 
 Just as prominenti and politicians did at Madison Square Garden, when pro-Fascists 
collected gold in public ceremonies they reaffirmed their communities’ rights to financially 
support the homeland. In February, Dr. Enrico Di Iorio, the president of Youngstown’s Dante 
Alighieri Society, Italian Veterans, and the Italian Red Cross, spoke at a fundraising rally about 
the meaning of transnationalistic citizenship. “I desire to touch upon a delicate question, 
principally upon the moral and legal obligation of the Italo-Americans and of their duties toward 
their mother country and the land of their new homes” he said to his two thousand-person 
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audience in a speech reprinted by the English-language press. “Does the fact that many of us 
have a double citizenship justify us to renounce this duty? No.” He asserted that when taking the 
oath of American citizenship, “no Italian intended to renounce his spiritual patrimony of 
affection and devotion to Italy.” At the same time, however, he claimed Italians “intend also to 
be honest citizens of faith and devotion to our new country which gives us shelter and protection.” 
In closing, he invited his audience “to set aside your political differences and to unite your 
energies not only in the defense of Mussolini or Fascism but primarily to preserve the existence 
of Italy, our mother land.” 76 Just as the Local 89 union members had seen their donations to the 
Italian Red Cross as apolitical, Di Iorio positioned the political act of donating money to a 
military campaign as outside the realm of politics while also making strong assertions about how 
Italian Americans understood their citizenship oaths. 
 For many who gave up their wedding rings, the act of donation transcended politics to 
become a religious as well as patriotic rite. In late March 1936 Ambassador Rosso sent a “Prayer 
for the Homeland” to his agents in America, asking them to transmit the pro-war prayer locally. 
In Youngstown the churches went above Rosso’s request and printed the prayer in pamphlets 
alongside propaganda poems in promotion of their day of faith in April.77⁠ On April 26, in 
conjunction with the consulate, the churches distributed steel rings inscribed “Gold to the 
Fatherland” with the date of sanctions in both the Christian and Fascist calendar year. 
 Because the steel bands given to women came directly from the Italian consuls, Italian 
diplomats in America became more visible in fundraising efforts when associations began 
hosting days of faith. For most of the war, New York’s consul general purposefully kept his role 
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in monetary fundraising to a minimum, as per the ambassador’s orders, even forwarding 
donations he received to Generoso Pope. In May of 1936, however, he became the center of a 
major fundraising event when he presented steel bands to women on the anniversary of Italy’s 
entrance to the Great War. In the auditorium of New York’s Consulate General, Vecchiotti 
thanked mothers and wives for their donations and presented them with steel rings, blessed by a 
priest. As he spoke, telling his audience to remain faithful to Mussolini and his divine mission in 
Ethiopia, radio station WOV broadcast his words to 52 churches throughout New York, New 
Haven, and Boston, where priests facilitated identical rituals for their Italian parishioners. 
 Nine years earlier, Ambassador de Martino had complained to his superiors in Rome 
about the difficulties he faced bringing Italian Americans “from a patriotic virginity to marrying 
the Fascist cause.”78 By the end of the Ethiopian War, Italian consulates in the northeast married 
100,000 Italian American women to the Fascist cause by giving them steel rings in exchange for 
their gold. De Martino not only doubted his own ability to bind immigrants to Fascism, he had 
also derided Generoso Pope’s approach to political organization, describing it as 
“monumentomania, banquetomania, [and] parchmentomania.” 79 Continuous political rallies 
disguised as cultural events and hosted through coordinated efforts between the consuls, 
newspapers, radio stations, associations throughout the war showed how central cultural events 
and institutions had become in the political lives of Italian Americans. 
  The question that remained was whether individual and local actions in support of 
Ethiopia could lead to a nationally unified Italian American political force. Could Italian 
Americans give more than their dollars and gold? Could they exert political influence in 
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Washington? The expiration of America’s Neutrality Act in February of 1936 would give Italian 
Americans an opportunity to test their community’s political strength and bring their 
interpretation of transnational citizenship to a national audience.  
 The standing Neutrality Act, which Roosevelt put into effect after Italy invaded Ethiopia 
in October and which expired on March 1, 1936, barred the sale of arms and munitions to 
belligerent nations.80 It did not bar any other materials sanctioned by the League of Nations, and 
when Italy turned to the United States to meet its desperate needs for copper, oil, and other war 
materials, Roosevelt condemned American exporters for profiting off the war. Though outside 
the scope of the Neutrality Act, he urged a moral embargo on exports to Italy. Hoping to go 
farther, when Congress reconvened in January of 1936, Roosevelt had Senator Key Pittman of 
Nevada and Congressman Sam McReynolds of Tennessee introduce his new neutrality bill. The 
bill expanded the president’s discretionary powers by allowing him to restrict to peacetime levels 
the exportation of “certain articles or materials used in the manufacture of arms, ammunition or 
implements of war, or in the conduct of war.”⁠81 Italy only received six percent of its annual oil 
needs form the United States before the war, but would need to purchase more when it could no 
longer buy from League of Nations members. Italian Americans saw the proposed restrictions as 
de facto sanctions that would effectively bring the United States in line with the League of 
Nations. 
 Italian Americans made three major interventions against the sanctions that displayed 
their political strength not only in controlling American foreign policy but also in defining 
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transnational citizenship. First, beginning in November, a newly formed association, the 
American Friends of Italy, called on Italian organizations to pressure Congress to extend the 
original Neutrality Act. Advertising themselves as an organization of “Americans of Italian 
origin,” the leadership included President Zefferino Aversa, who belonged to the Italian 
Veterans; Domenico De Gregoriis, who simultaneously directed the “Arnaldo Mussolini” 
education circle in Philadelphia; and Giovanni di Silvestro, former Grand Venerable of OSIA, 
who had entered OSIA into a pact of cooperation with the Mussolini’s government in 1922.82 
  The strength of the American Friends of Italy came from the connections Aversa, de 
Gregoriis, and di Silvestro already had as leaders of highly active community organizations. The 
trio organized their association in New Jersey in August of 1935 and by the next spring they had 
sub-committees throughout Southern Pennsylvania and Delaware, and a women’s auxiliary. 
Over the course of the war, the group sponsored galas, fundraisers, and celebrations of the 
invasion, spoke regularly on the radio and printed over a thousand pieces of propaganda in 
support of Italy’s cause. In January, de Gregoriis wrote Benito Mussolini that the AFI had raised 
$35,000 and collected two hundred gold objects. Their women’s sub-committee collected 
another $50,000 for the Italian Red Cross and raised $15,000 in precious metals. ⁠83 
 In November, the AFI began a letter writing campaign through its own organization and 
through the Italian educational circles, the Order of the Sons of Italy, the Italian Veterans, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 John M. di Silvestro, “The Neutrality Measures Now Pending in Congress Have the Mark of Hostility 
Against a Friendly Nation” (The American Committee Friends of Italy, January 26, 1936), Box 3 FF 1, 
The Di Silvestro, Giovanni M., 1879-1958. Papers, Italian American Collection, IHRC; Domenica De 
Gregoriis to Benito Mussolini, January 20, 1936, MCP 1936 B. 220 F. 4, ACS; “Il Combattente” 
(Federazione Combattenti Italiani Degl S.U.D’A., February 2, 1935), Cleveland Consul General, B. 106 F 
“Il Combattente,” ASMAE. 
 
83 De Gregoriis to Mussolini, January 20, 1936.  
 
 
	   181 
the ethnic newspapers. In addition to pre-stamping 100,000 postcards for members of their 
various associations to sign and mail, they also sent form letters to 400 pharmacies in New York 
City so even Italian Americans who did not read newspapers, belong to an ethnic association, or 
listen to the radio could still participate in the campaign. Estimates of how many letters Italian 
Americans sent range from one hundred thousand to over a million by the end of January. The 
AFI encouraged Italian Americans to send a form letter to the president, Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull, their two senators and their congressman, making it difficult to count the total 
volume received in the capital.84 
 However many letters actually reached Washington, they were enough to cause 
politicians to notice and react. Although one Italian statesman reported to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs that the letters of protest had simply “irritated the most influential senators” Ambassador 
Rosso defended the letters, responding “I have good reasons to believe rather that certain 
pressures, even if they could have displeased some members of Congress, have effective results 
for their electoral reach.” ⁠85 Their exchange underscores Italy’s reluctance to politically organize 
emigrants; the tensions between Italian American communities and the Fascist government 
which the diplomatic corps mediated throughout the 1930s; and Rosso’s political astuteness. A 
full month before the Neutrality Act expired, the Washington Post wrote, “So effective and 
widespread has been the campaign of Italian societies” concerning neutrality, “that a serious jolt 
has been given to the prospects of the pending bills.” ⁠86 When the Pittman-McReynolds bill failed 
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to reach a vote, Congressman Joseph Green gave his own interpretation of what happened: “The 
Italian Americans are such a highly organized minority that Representatives facing election in 
November did not dare to vote for a neutrality bill which met with their displeasure.” ⁠⁠87 
The second major intervention came through Generoso Pope. Pope not only controlled 
the largest Italian-language newspapers in the country with a quarter of a million readers 
nationwide, Il Progresso was also the country’s second largest foreign-language newspaper. 
Pope saw his papers as extensions of his political influence, which he had established in the 
1920s by assuming control of New York’s ethnic political clubs. In 1932 Pope began his tenure 
as head of the Italian Division of the Democratic National Committee, a position he held 
throughout Roosevelt’s presidency. Italian Americans, who were quickly becoming the country’s 
largest group of naturalized citizens, had been making politicians aware of their organizational 
abilities at Red Cross rallies since October. Pope believed his influence among Italian Americans 
gave him the right and responsibility to speak for the emerging voting bloc, and his work for the 
DNC earned him the private audiences with President Roosevelt to do so. 
 A month before the Neutrality Act’s expiration, Roosevelt and Pope spoke for forty-five 
minutes in the oval office. Though the president’s neutrality bill suggested otherwise, Roosevelt 
cordially told Pope, “Gene, America wants to be honestly neutral, and I want you, through your 
papers, to tell the Italians that our neutrality will in no way imply discrimination that harms Italy 
and favors any other nation.” ⁠88 Roosevelt implied that his bill allowed Italy to continue 
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importing all materials from the United States without restriction, though Pope remained 
unconvinced enough to suggest the president simply extend the present Neutrality Act for 
another year. Roosevelt seemed to agree, and in the end, Pope got his wish.  
 Though Generoso Pope would have liked to believe his meeting with Roosevelt brought 
about the end of the Pittman-McReynolds bill, a final intervention on behalf of Italian ethnic 
associations both in formal hearings and lobbying brought down Roosevelt’s bill. Twenty-four 
organizations represented the pro-Fascists’ neutrality position on the House floor in January and 
February of 1936. Appearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Italian Americans 
representatives cited the rights and obligations of ethnic citizens just as they had at Red Cross 
rallies. Judge Eugene Alessandroni of OSIA established his group’s political significance by 
testifying that he represented three hundred thousand members across sixteen hundred lodges 
nationwide, adding “We are American citizens and we are, moreover, a part of the body of 
citizenship.” Like so many other politicians had, he then defended their rights to organize on 
behalf of Italy, stating “there is in our blood a sense, a sentiment, an affection for the Mother 
Country, which is not inconsistent with our duty and loyalty to America.” ⁠89 
Not everyone was as convinced as Alessandroni that transnationalistic citizenship would 
succeed either as a political strategy or as an ideological system. After OSIA’s executive council 
asked its members to aid in a campaign against the Pittman-McReynolds bill, many lodges 
protested. They wondered if American citizens of other races should take on the responsibility of 
lobbying Congress in favor of the old neutrality, since non-ethnic Americans had more political 
power and could avoid criticism as an ethnic voting bloc. OSIA’s Executive Council objected, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 “Il Gr. Uff. Generoso Pope a Colloquio Con Roosevelt (Gr. Uff. Generoso Pope Meets with Roosevelt),” 
Il Progresso Italo-Americano (New York, January 31, 1936). 
89 U.S. Congress. House, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1936, 209. 
 
	   184 
stating in a circular to all lodges, “We believe that an American citizen of Italian origin is as 
good as the best American citizen of other races. We believe that all American citizens have the 
ability to enjoy all rights: and if citizens of other races have a right to advocate in favor of Italy, 
it is our right as well.” ⁠90 Just as Leonard Covello had to instruct immigrant parents of their rights 
in a democracy to advocate for their children’s education, those who fought the Pittman-
McReynolds bill still had to convince Italian Americans of their rights to politically organize on 
behalf of Italy. 
Supporters of the old neutrality had to convince American politicians of the same. Judge 
Francis Pallotti, speaking for the American League of Neutrality in Connecticut, came under fire 
from Congressman Frank Kloeb of Ohio when he testified in January. As Judge Pallotti finished 
arguing Italy’s case for the Ethiopian War, the congressman, explaining his own German 
ancestry, recalled how his ethnic group paid a political price for supporting Germany before the 
Great War. “Regardless of what position we take,” Kloeb told the Judge, “we must try to 
submerge our preracial characteristics, and our leanings in that regard, isn’t that true?” Pallotti 
voiced his agreement, but added, “remember we are a cosmopolitan country. Any person who 
does not respect the land where he was born, or where his father was born, could not become a 
good American citizen.” ⁠91 Kloeb did not argue the point. 
By late February, Democratic Congressman Maury Maverick of Texas spoke out against 
nearly eight weeks of fruitless debate on the subject of neutrality, targeting his criticism at “the 
letters of certain leaders of Italo-American groups.”⁠ He criticized the letter-writers for assuming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Umberto Billi, “The Order of the Sons of Italy for the Neutrality of the United States,” Il Progresso 
Italo-Americano (New York, N.Y., January 11, 1936). 
 
91 U.S. Congress. House, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 208. 
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Italian Americans were entitled to special consideration from America on behalf of Italy, stating 
“I deny to any racial group in this country the right to special consideration.” On the topic of 
neutrality, he continued “Let us not look at this from a racial viewpoint whatever; let us look at it 
from a viewpoint of what is best for America.”92 Vito Marcantonio, who had been quiet on the 
issue of neutrality to that point, rebutted his Texan colleague.  
 Marcantonio did not support Italy’s imperialistic war in Ethiopia, but he saw a much-
needed opportunity to defend his constituents on the House floor and decided to take it. In the 
spring of 1936 Marcantonio learned that Generoso Pope would endorse James Lanzetta, his 
opponent, in the primaries. Marcantonio’s interview with the student at Romanica cited at the 
beginning of this chapter was part of an attempt to challenge Lanzetta’s exclusive claims on 
Italianità. When Marcantonio spoke to the magazine, he brought up voting for the extension of 
the old neutrality act as an example of how he exhibited Italianità in Congress. Aiming his 
rebuttal as much against Maverick as against Lanzetta, he explained to Romanica,“For the first 
time in history, Italian Americans have been defended, as such, on the floor of the House.”93 The 
student reprinted Marcantonio’s statement to Congress in full: 
“I simply want to inform my colleagues of the House that these so-called Italian- 
Americans are Americans of Italian extraction and that the Americans of Italian 
extraction are not requesting special consideration. They are interested only in the 
welfare of the United States. They have demonstrated this by working for, fighting for, 
and dying for our Nation. They are willing to fight and make any contribution or sacrifice 
for the United States, but they expect justice. It is their desire to keep our Nation out of 
war. They want peace…That is the cause they espouse. Who can say that it is not a just 
one? Who can say that it is not American?” 94 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, “Congressional Record,” 74th Cong. 2nd sess. Vol. 80, Part 2 
(February 17, 1936): 2200–2277. 
 
93 Micocci, “Vito Marcantonio.” 
 
94 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, “Congressional Record February 17, 1936,” 2221. 
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When Congress voted a fourteen-month extension of the old neutrality act that day, Americans 
of Italian extraction won an impressive political victory. Not only had they influenced American 
foreign policy, they had also proven themselves a national political force, strong enough to grab 
the attention of the American press, president, and Congress.  
Italian Americans’ political successes came with limitations, however. In the spring of 
1935 Congressman William Sirovich proposed five bills reforming the 1924 National Origins 
Quota Act to allow non-citizens to bring in family members outside of the quotas, and grant a 
stay of deportation and potential legalization to immigrants who had entered illegally. Like the 
other political campaigns that year, Generoso Pope supported the cause in his papers, met with 
Roosevelt and Vice President Garner, and encouraged a letter-writing campaign by his readers. 
Unlike the other campaigns, Pope failed to enlist the help of Italian government or ethnic 
associations or get Italian American voters to participate. Sirovich and Pope’s inability to use the 
resources of the Italian government or the organizing experience of the ethnic associations 
ensured Italian Americans’ inactivity. Though their lack of participation was not the only reason 
the bills died in committee, it did expose the limits to Italian American political participation. 
Both the campaign to spread Italian and the campaign to aid Italy’s war in Ethiopia came 
from places of strength within the Italian American community. As Mayor LaGuardia affirmed 
at the graduates’ banquet and Judge Pecora repeated at the Red Cross eight months later, in the 
1930s Italian Americans felt they had arrived in American society and earned the right to reap 
the benefits of transnationalistic citizenship. The campaign to reform immigration laws affected 
the Italian American community as much as the other political causes that year, but because the 
quotas and deportations highlighted Italians’ ongoing subordinate position in American society 
the campaign against them could not evoke Italianità in the same way. Additionally, as 
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Marcantonio indicated in his rebuttal to Maverick, Italian Americans’ political standing came 
from both their distinctiveness as a united ethnic group and their indisputable Americanness. 
Immigration reform only highlighted Italian Americans’ foreignness, the vulnerability of their 
members without papers, and the comparative delay of their ethnic group to pursue citizenship. 
For similar reasons, boycotts in the 1930s against films that portrayed Italian Americans in a 
derogatory manner—such as Scarface, Little Caesar, Is My Face Red? and Farewell to Arms—
did not match the participation of Italian language and Ethiopian War efforts. 
By the spring of 1936, an idea formulated in classrooms, ethnic lodges, and banquet 
halls—that a naturalized immigrant has a right and obligation to an ethnic political identity—had 
reached Washington. The next chapter will address how American politicians accepted that idea 
by embracing the prominenti’s version of Italianità even after Pearl Harbor. World War II would 
complicate Italian Americans’ delicate balance of ethnic distinctiveness, nationalistic pride, and 
American assimilation, but the foundations laid in 1935 allowed them to build a political 
movement long after Mussolini declared war on America and Roosevelt declared 600,000 Italian 
immigrants as “enemy aliens.”  
	  
	  
Chapter Four:  
The Italian American Vote  
 
After seven months of battle, Italian forces captured Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, in 
the spring of 1936. For Italians in the homeland, the war with Ethiopia ended when Benito 
Mussolini declared victory on May 5. For Italians in America, the economic war against 
sanctions and the political battle for American neutrality ended when Franklin D. Roosevelt won 
reelection on November 3. The prominenti who mobilized their communities in financial and 
political support of the war balked at the idea of letting the rising momentum of community 
organizing fall with the last of the war dead. As their group’s unity and visibility increased, pro-
Fascist leaders saw an opportunity to use the Ethiopian War to turn Italian Americans into more 
than Italian nationalists. They could also become a coveted voting bloc in the upcoming 
presidential election. To do so, they would need to convince American politicians of the strength 
of their political community and the viability of their theory of transnationalistic citizenship.  
The idea to convert Italian nationalism into American political power post-war emerged 
naturally from the pro-Fascists’ experiences organizing their communities during the war. In 
Philadelphia, that transition began on the evening of May 21, when 63 lodges of the Order of the 
Sons of Italy in America (OSIA) refused to let Italy’s victory thwart their plans for hosting a pro-
war event. Money raised at the event, according to Philadelphia’s Il Popolo Italiano, would go 
“solely and exclusively” towards Aid Work for Families of the Fallen, the Italian state agency 
that provided for “the families of our heroic soldiers who fought for the foundation of the new 
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Roman Empire.”1 
Twenty thousand people passed through the doors of Philadelphia’s Convention Hall to 
attend the OSIA fundraiser. As they entered, volunteers stationed at kiosks throughout the lobby 
collected donations of gold wedding bands, offered spots on OSIA’s upcoming victory 
pilgrimage to Italy, and sold raffle tickets for a chance to win a radio set, a refrigerator, and an 
Oldsmobile that night. Leafing through the thick programs as they waited for the event to start, 
attendees read poetry on Fascist themes including “Rome Eternal” and the “Lament of the Exile” 
between advertisements from local Italian businesses.2 When at last the doors to the auditorium 
opened, two hundred girls dressed in regional folk costumes welcomed the audience into the hall 
by singing the Fascist hymn of New Italy. As the song concluded, the girls—beneficiaries, no 
doubt, of the free Fascist schools—descended from the stage to offer white gardenias in 
exchange for donations. Performances by dancers, opera singers, and radio celebrities followed. 
Philadelphia’s Mayor S. Davis Wilson, “visibly moved and impressed by the unending sea of 
people” gave a few remarks. “I can not help but admire your spirited interest in national and 
international events, and your attachment to your homeland,” he told the immigrant audience. 
His speech continued with a promise to potential voters: “what I do for the wellbeing of 
Philadelphia is also for the wellbeing of your community.”3 OSIA’s Grand Venerable of 
Pennsylvania closed the evening by reading a telegram OSIA would send to Benito Mussolini on 
behalf of the audience, congratulating Il Duce for his recent victory. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Italiani Tutti Stasera Alla ‘Convention Hall’ (All Italians Tonight at ‘Convention Hall’),” Il Popolo 
Italiano (Philadelphia, PA, May 21, 1936). Balch Institute, HSP. 
 
2 The Order Sons of Italy in America, “A Souvenir of Faith: The Order Sons of Italy in America for the 
Italian Red Cross.” Affari Politici 1931-1945 Stati Uniti, B. 28 F. Miscellanea, ASMAE. 
 
3 “Memorabile Trionfo Di Giovedì Sera Alla Convention Hall (Memorable Triumph of Thursday Night at 
Convention Hall),” Ordine Nuovo (Philadelphia, PA, May 24, 1936). Affari Politici 1931-1945 Stati Uniti, 
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An American citizen witnessing the massive crowds animated by the cultural and 
political pageantry commented, “If the Italians were united like tonight in their political lives 
they would run the United States.” ⁠4 The Grand Lodge of Pennsylvania heartily agreed. In its 
official newsletter, the Ordine Nuovo, the lodge explained the night “was a revelation,” to the 
Americans in attendance who “could not help but express their surprise” at the size and 
enthusiasm of the Italian community. In addition to Philadelphia’s Mayor Wilson, the American 
audience included a host of local and state dignitaries who, according to the Ordine Nuovo 
“could never have imagined the great latent force of our masses.”5  
Since 1930 the country’s prominenti had been working with the Italian consuls to build a 
coalition of politically active Italian Americans organized around the principles of Italianità—
pride in the historic, cultural, and scientific achievements of the Italian race worldwide. From the 
establishment of Italian schools to Ethiopian war rallies, pro-Fascists’ efforts at spreading 
Italianità proved to Italy the value of accepting migrants as transnationalistic citizens—a special 
group of migrants with unique obligations and privileges recognized by their two nations. 
Though Italian Americans did not fulfill the militaristic duties of nationalistic citizens “to the 
seventh generation” during the Ethiopian War, they nevertheless showed their devotion to the 
homeland in wedding bands donated and letters to Congress written. In return, the Italian State 
acquiesced to their transnationalistic status and recognized them for their political value abroad.  
As Philadelphia’s OSIA event demonstrated, whenever Italian Americans came together 
in support of Italianità, they made themselves and their causes visible to American politicians. 
Eager for a share of the emerging Italian American vote, candidates first accepted invitations 
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from pro-Fascists to attend events. At Columbus Day rallies, graduates’ banquets, and Red Cross 
fundraisers they learned the language of Italianità and the issues immigrants cared most about. 
Recognizing the potential for a significant Italian vote, politicians progressed from passive 
guests at pro-Fascist events to active recruiters of pro-Fascist organizers. In the 1936 and 1940 
elections, Republicans and Democrats openly employed pro-Fascists to mobilize the Italian vote 
as effectively for the parties as they had for Mussolini’s war. To sustain Italian American 
political participation after Ethiopia, pro-Fascists transformed Italianità into an ethnic political 
platform that called for the protection and uplift of Italians in Europe and Italian Americans in 
the United States.  
Politicians saw the Italian American platform as a cheap concession to a politically 
emerging ethnic group whose partisan loyalties were not yet solidified. In the context of the 
Great Depression, supporting Italianità meant politicians could avoid discussing difficult issues 
like immigration reform and relief eligibility by extoling immigrants and their homeland. But the 
Italian American platform was more than a simple call for recognition. When politicians 
employed the pro-Fascist leadership, organizational network, rhetoric, and political platform to 
win the Italian vote they conceded Italians’ right to vote primarily on behalf of Italy and their 
ethnic community. By addressing voters as both former Italians and new Americans 
simultaneously, politicians were moving closer to an acceptance transnationalistic citizenship. 
The consequences of this movement would only emerge after Italy declared war on the United 
States in 1941. By then, pro-Fascism was an entrenched aspect of American ethnic politics, as 
was the Italian Americans’ right as citizens to advocate on behalf of themselves and Italy.  
Characteristics of Ethnic Politics: Germans, Jews, and Italians 
The organizational successes of the 1930s seemed miraculous to Italian Americans who 
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had never imagined their ethnic group could achieve unity or eclipse the more settled ethnicities. 
The obstacles that prevented Italian Americans from “transform[ing] their political virginity for 
marrying the Fascist cause” also prevented them from obtaining the political capital in 
proportion to their size of the migrant population.6 Responding to the comment that Italians 
would “run the United States” if they united politically, the Ordine Nuovo wrote, “And it’s true. 
Because no other ethnic group in Philadelphia has ever succeeded by themselves in bringing 
together at one time for any reason so many people of every economic and social class.”7 For the 
Italian American political platform to succeed they would first need to stand out from other 
ethnic groups and distinguish themselves as a formidable voting bloc on their own. 
Italians’ greatest competition for ethnic political dominance came from other Europeans, 
who made up 82 percent of the country’s foreign-born population in 1930, and who enjoyed the 
rights of naturalization and the franchise denied to non-white migrants. Among Europeans, 
Germans dominated demographically, with 6.8 million first and second-generation residents in 
the United States in 1930, compared to just 4.5 million Italians, the next largest immigrant group 
(see Chart 4).8 Rather than act as a model of political organizing, America’s largest ethnic group 
served as a stark warning to Italians. The first indicator of decline lay in the Germans’ 
demographic changes: while the total Italian population in America increased by 2.4 million 
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7 “Memorabile Trionfo Di Giovedì Sera Alla Convention Hall (Memorable Triumph of Thursday Night at 
Convention Hall).” 
 
8 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930 Population. Western 
Hemisphere migrants comprised the bulk of the remaining immigrants, at 15 percent. Within this group, 
Canadians were the largest group counted by census takers, though Mexican migrants were greatly 
undercounted and politically underrepresented. Asian migrants, at only two percent of the foreign-born 
population, were barred from citizenship by laws that limited naturalization to white immigrants and 
persons of African descent. 
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from 1910 to 1930, German America decreased by 1.6 million in that time. Moreover, foreign-
born Germans were shrinking as a percentage of the German ethnic group, so that by 1930 three 
quarters of America’s ethnic Germans were born in the United States.9  
 
As the immigrant generation dwindled, so did their institutions, providing the second 
indicator of ethnic decline. German newspapers and associations started losing readers and 
members beginning in the 1890s.10 Xenophobia during World War I accelerated the assimilation 
of German Americans, motivating the population to quickly and permanently shed cultural and 
political ties to the homeland. One marker of ethnic communities’ strength, the foreign-language 
newspaper, reveals the collapse of the postwar German American community. Before the First 
World War, German Americans produced more than 800 newspapers in their native language. 
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Chart 4: Change in Ethnic Groups over Time 
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By World War II they had 178.11  
Hoping to save the community from assimilation, the Nazi Party in Germany sponsored 
and directed a string of associations in the United States aimed at rekindling ethnic pride among 
Germans, beginning with the Nationalist Socialist Teutonia Association in 1924 and ending with 
the German-American Bund in 1941. Much like the Italians’ Fascist League of North American 
of the 1920s, the German government controlled the Bund and its predecessors. And like the 
FLNA, the German organizations came under attack regularly from American media and 
politicians for acting as an organization of foreign politics. Unlike the Italians, who disbanded 
the FLNA after a 1929 magazine exposé threatened a federal investigation, the German 
government responded to criticism by simply renaming and reorganizing groups with similar 
structures and aims. 
In addition to coming under attack by American government investigators, the Nazi 
associations faced similar problems to the Italians in recruiting members from their own ranks in 
America. The bulk of Bund members were young, disillusioned workers with limited job 
security, who had lived in Germany through the first world war, and felt threatened by Jews and 
Communists at home and abroad. With such a selective population base, the Bund never counted 
more than 6,500 members from the 5 million ethnic Germans living in the United States by 
1940.12  
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Experience, 57. 
 
12 Holian, The German-Americans and World War II, An Ethnic Experience, 27. Bund leader Fritz Kuhn 
ordered all Bund papers destroyed before an investigation by the Special Committee on Un-American 
Activities run by Martin Dies and Samuel Dickstein. Kuhn claimed the Bund had 230,000 members, Dies 
said 100,000 and Dickstein 450,000. Each had reason to exaggerate. Holian’s number of 6,500 came from 
the German ambassador, Justice Department, and FBI who had fewer motives to inflate the numbers. He 
also noted that the Bund only printed 5,000 copies of its official publication, which it mostly distributed 
for free. 
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Whereas the disbanding of the FLNA forced Italian consuls to cultivate relationships with 
the prominenti, opening access for the consuls to major propaganda distributors, Germany did 
not have the same luck with German American cultural brokers. German American newspaper 
editors in particular eschewed any connection with the German government as a direct result of 
their experiences in World War I. By the 1920s, the German press stopped printing editorial 
content and subsequently showed no support for the Nazi Party. One striking example of the 
editors’ differing attitudes towards the Fascist governments in their homelands can be seen in the 
value they placed on medals of honor. Italian American editors and prominenti fought each other 
over official recognition from the home government, even paying for the privilege; German 
Americans did not. While Il Progresso Italo-Americano owner Generoso Pope received three 
awards from Mussolini, allegedly paying $23,000 to win his first medal, the president of the 
Cincinnati Freie Presse turned down an offer of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle, Second 
Class. When refusing the medal he explained that the United States, not Germany, was his 
country.13 
Hoping to better understand the problem of German American organizing, the president 
of the Deutsches Ausland-Institut, Germany’s equivalent to the Italian Director of Fasci Abroad, 
visited America in the fall of 1936. During the visit he attended a German Day celebration at 
New York’s Madison Square Garden. Though the audience of 22,000 seemed to rival OSIA’s 
pro-Fascist event in Philadelphia that spring, the president noted that less than a quarter of the 
audience showed any sympathy to New Germany. More importantly, he wrote “it was striking 
that no official representatives of the Government or of the City Administration attended this 
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most important rally of the German American community of New York.”14 He noted that neither 
political party campaigned to German Americans in the presidential race, and he concluded with 
the evaluation that “the German American community must not be described outwardly as a 
German political element. In its present state it cannot be judged to be even remotely an effective 
political factor.”15  
Germany’s diplomats agreed with the assessment. In 1936 Germany’s ambassador in 
America, Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff, used the cautionary tale of the Fascist League of North 
America as a warning to the Director of the Political Department that “the United States, as a 
land of immigration has consistently opposed any political influence upon its citizens and new 
immigrants by foreign governments.” The Bund, which he estimated at just 3,000 members, was 
causing more problems than it solved. He believed it should be dismantled, but rather than 
“abandon racial Germans to their fate,” he wrote, “our efforts should be aimed at giving them 
moral support.” They could best accomplish this “by confining ourselves entirely to cultural 
activities, as Italy has done.” He suggested the creation of an Immanuel Kant Society in America 
“along the same lines as the Italian Dante Alighieri Society.”16 Italian anti-Fascists never 
succeeded in convincing the American government of the extent to which Italy politically 
organized its emigrants and spread Fascist propaganda through cultural institutions, but the 
German diplomatic corps certainly understood what Italy had done. 
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Just as Italy’s Ambassador Giacomo de Martino had explained to Mussolini nearly a 
decade earlier, Ambassador Dieckhoff informed his superiors that political action by the German 
government was “risky business” which had already sparked government investigation through 
the House Un-American Activities Committee, launched in 1934. Moreover, Dieckhoff did not 
think German Americans contributed much politically to Germany since he suspected they held 
far less political weight than Bund members made his government believe. “In no Presidential 
election since Lincoln’s has the German element voted as a bloc” he claimed, arguing there was 
no possibility of resurrecting an electoral bloc that had been dead for over seventy years.17 
Dieckhoff used Chicago as an example of his problems in America. He estimated 
700,000 German Americans lived in the city, though he considered all but 40,000 had 
completely abandoned their German heritage. Of those, only 450 belonged to the Bund. To 
create a unified organization out of the Chicagoans still “conscious of their German origin,” he 
concluded, “is a hopeless affair.”18 Once again, he pointed to the Italian strategy of cultural 
organization as a model. In Chicago, 8,000 of the city’s estimated 250,000 Italian Americans 
belonged to the two most prominent pro-Fascist organizations in the city; the Italian American 
National Union and the Order of the Sons of Italy in America.19 Several hundred more belonged 
to the Italian Veterans’ Federation and the Dante Alighieri Society, and 35,000 read the city’s 
pro-Fascist newspaper L’Italia. A full year into America’s involvement in World War II, an 
Office of Strategic Service analyst wrote of the city: “My conclusion is inescapable: Chicago’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff, “The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the State 
Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, January 7, 1938,” in Documents on German Foreign Policy, 
1918-1945, from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, vol. 1, 24 vols., D (Washington, D.C.: 




19 INT-17IT-419, Report on the Italian-American Situation in Chicago, October 1, 1942, OSS, FNB, 
NARA. 
 
	   198 
Italian community is still a hotbed of surly Fascism.”20 Ambassador Dieckhoff did not have the 
exact numbers at his disposal, but he did not need hard data to envy the cultural nationalism he 
witnessed spreading openly through Chicago’s Italian enclaves. 
While Dieckhoff referred to the Italians as a model for ethnic organizing, Italian 
Americans compared themselves to the third largest immigrant group in the country at the time: 
Eastern European Jews. Seeing Germans as too assimilated, and the Irish as too entrenched in 
America’s political system, Italians often looked to their Jewish neighbors as an example of an 
emerging ethnic bloc and a benchmark against which to measure their own political 
achievements. Comparisons between Italians and Jews were easy to make since the two groups 
experienced mass migration to the United States at the same time and in equal numbers. In just 
about every metric of group success, however, Jews outpaced the Italians, including political 
power.21  
Most of the Jews’ success could be traced to their pre-migration experience. Jews 
emigrating from urban centers in Eastern Europe arrived with higher literacy rates, more 
employment skills, and a stronger tradition of labor organization than Italians. Their experience 
with unions allowed them to quickly organize in the garment industry and to translate that unity 
into electoral influence. As a political bloc they tended to support the Socialist Party, which 
posed a significant enough threat to the Democrats that Tammany Hall courted the Jewish vote 
through ethnic representation on the ticket and support of pro-labor causes.22 
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Italian American organizers envied Jewish immigrants’ ability to break into Tammany 
Hall, even on a limited basis, and tried convincing their compatriots that they would benefit from 
the same level of political achievement. When Leonard Covello spoke on radio station WOV in 
1934 urging Italians to organize for the “hegemony of our race,” he asked his audience to think 
of the Jews as a perfect example: “For millennia, cast out, ridiculed, reviled everywhere they 
went, they have managed to preserve their characteristic traditions, they have been able to take 
offices and high positions…especially through their firm resolve and ability to organize.”23 
Covello argued that the spread of the Italian language would help them attain the same political, 
cultural and organizational unity that Jews held by speaking Yiddish.  
Jews had more than diasporic experience and history to help them politically organize. 
They also had certain contemporary characteristics that made political organization significantly 
easier. First, Jews landing at Ellis Island considered the United States a final destination, which 
caused them to naturalize faster and organize quicker than Italians. Because Jews migrated to the 
United States in response to physical and political persecution in Eastern Europe, only 7 percent 
of Jewish immigrants returned to their homeland, the lowest repatriation rate among all new 
immigrants. Conversely, the majority of Italians saw America as a temporary sojourn, a place to 
earn enough money to purchase land back in Italy. Rather than permanent residents, they were 
“birds of passage” in the United States, with an average repatriation rate of 54 percent during the 
peak years of migration, 1880 to 1920.24  
Italians’ attitude towards America meant few bothered with the hassle and cost of taking 
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out first and second citizenship papers, or with the humiliation of being tested on American 
civics in an open court by an immigration judge. As a result, Italians were among the slowest to 
naturalize. In 1920, Germans, Italians, and Russians made up the three largest immigrant groups 
in the country, with Germany only leading the Italians by 70,000 immigrants. Germany and Italy 
each made up 12 percent of America’s immigrants, but while Germany contributed 20 percent of 
America’s naturalized citizens, Italy counted just 7 percent. 74 percent of German immigrants, 
42 percent of Russians, and 30 percent of Italians had naturalized by the end of World War I.25  
Naturalization numbers began changing in response to the Immigration Quota Acts of 
1921 and 1924, which also significantly altered the migratory behavior of Italians. The 
Emergency Quota Act of 1921 cut Italian immigration from its prewar peak of 259,000 to just 
42,057 entries annually. The 1924 revision further reduced the number of Italian entries to 
5,802.26 Immigrants who had temporarily left their families behind in Italy faced a choice: return 
home and risk never reentering, or become American citizens to bring their relatives in as non-
quota immigrants. They chose the latter, reducing their repatriation rate from 63 percent in the 
decade before the quota laws to 25.6 percent in the 1920s and 8.5 percent in the 1930s.27 Italians 
who stayed called their family members to the United States, so that in 1927 over 60 percent of 
non-quota immigrant entries to the United States came from Italy.28 While total German and 
Russian immigrant numbers slightly decreased from 1920 to 1930, Italians grew by 180,000 in 
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the same decade. By 1930, Italians overtook Germans as the country’s largest immigrant group 
with 1.8 million Italians to Germany’s 1.6 million.29  
In addition to immigrant quotas, the Great Depression of the 1930s brought added 
incentives for immigrants to naturalize. Restrictionists in Congress and in the states pressured 
governments to limit relief and public jobs to American citizens or immigrants in the process of 
naturalizing.30 Reacting to outside forces of the quota laws and the economy, 63 percent of 
Italian immigrants obtained citizenship by 1940, more than doubling the 1920 naturalization 
numbers. With nearly a million Italian-born American citizens in the country in 1940, Italians 
were not only the largest immigrant group; they were also the largest group of naturalized 
citizens.31 
Higher naturalization numbers did not necessarily correlate to greater political power, 
however. Italians also needed a targeted political agenda and a unified identity, two things that 
Jewish Americans found in Zionism but had eluded the German Americans even after the rise of 
Nazism. When the Deutsche Ausland-Institut president toured the United States in 1936, he 
spoke with a politician in Chicago about why, with 700,000 German Americans in the city, there 
was no “German vote.” The politician kindly explained, “the Germans in the United States of 
America, with their many thousands of associations, groups, factions, and their eternal quarrels 
and dissensions have not advanced from the attitude of the German Little Man of 1929.”32 
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Germans had little reason to unite for a common cause despite their large numbers, and without 
leadership and a political agenda to bring them together, they remained fragmented.  
In the 1920s Italian Americans were just as divided as the Germans were in Chicago. In 
both Italy and the United States Italians divided themselves along regional lines through 
campanalismo, meaning exclusive attachment to the land within earshot of a village campanile, 
or bell tower.33 For prominenti trying to amass power, the first step towards a political bloc 
would be creating a single Italian political community out of many regional identities, a daunting 
task considering the Italian state had not been able to accomplish the same in the sixty years 
since unification.  
Italians’ historic apathy towards the Italian state became exacerbated overseas. The 
inauguration of the Italian liberal regime, in 1861, helped bring about the exodus of thirteen 
million Italians from the peninsula.34 Italy did not fully realize political unification until World 
War I, so the 870,000 people who left Italy for the United States during that period carried their 
campanilismo with them.35 Upon arriving in America, immigrants encountered other Italians for 
the first time with whom they did not share the same language, food, culture, or customs. Settling 
in urban centers, they tended to work, eat, live, and socialize only with Italians from their home 
regions. The divisions could become so extreme that one immigrant recalled in New York City, 
“if a boy from Mulberry Street married a girl from Elizabeth Street—that was considered a 
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mixed marriage.”36  
Even in cities with small migrant populations Italians still organized through 
campanilismo, undercutting their political influence. In November of 1934, Memphis’s The 
American Citizen, an Italian-language weekly, noted, “everyone knows that there is really no 
Italian community in Memphis.” Although the city counted just 3,500 Italian Americans, the 
article pointed to an organizational problem, not a demographic one. Despite their small size, 
Memphis Italians were able to support ten Italian associations and a weekly Italian newspaper 
but could not unite as a single group because of campanilismo, it argued. The community, wrote 
The American Citizen, “began to divide itself in groups through the madness of ‘regionalism.’ By 
becoming even more separated it lowered itself to the bottom rung of the ladder of national 
dignity. Meanwhile Jews, Germans, and Nordics who united their ranks were not acting in vain. 
Power went to them and we distinguished ourselves as ‘dagos’ and ‘wops.’”37 Nationwide, 
Italian Americans regularly blamed campanilismo for a large share of their community’s 
problems, especially for their lack of political power. Comparisons with Jewish, German, and 
other ethnics exacerbated their frustrations with their inferior status as dagos and wops.  
By the 1930s, Italian Americans had already come a long way from their earlier 
indifference towards Italy and had reason to feel optimistic about their ability to replace 
nationalism for regionalism. Campanilismo had been waning in the United States since the First 
World War sparked Italian nationalism among immigrants, even if, as The American Citizen 
noted, the change was only temporary. American society also helped impose an Italian identity 
on migrants by treating them as one nationality long before the immigrants internalized that 
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identity. After the FLNA’s demise in 1929, prominenti worked with Italian consuls to push the 
project of nationalism further. They disseminated Italianità to the first generation through 
newspapers, radio, and film, and to the second generation through Fascist schools and Italian 
classes, as seen in chapters two and three. 
The dogged cultural propaganda work of Italianità, mixed with the rebirth of nationalism 
ignited by the Ethiopian War elevated Italian American unity to an unforeseen high. No stranger 
to hyperbole, the Ordine Nuovo had cited OSIA’s Philadelphia fundraiser as a triumph “with no 
comparison in the history of [Italian] immigration all over the world.”38 The newsletter liberally 
applied the label “miracle” in describing the success of the event, considering how just a decade 
earlier Philadelphia’s organizers would have deemed a plan to bring 20,000 Italians together 
under one roof for a single aim too difficult. For a nationalist political event and fundraiser it 
would have felt impossible.  
Even after Italians naturalized in higher numbers and united as an ethnic group through 
the pro-Fascist project of Italianità, a third obstacle still prevented them from becoming a 
political force until the 1930s. Compared to Jewish immigrants, Italians’ lack of education 
constituted a significant block to political power both in terms of general literacy and political 
experience. Just as regionalism seemed to particularly afflict Italians, education was a greater 
barrier to Italian voting than for most other ethnic groups. Although Europe’s emigrants were 
generally less literate than Americans, in 1930 Italian immigrants were six times less literate than 
the general population, and more than twice as likely as any other immigrant to be illiterate.39  
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Illiteracy prevented Italians from educating themselves on campaign issues, registering to 
vote, and casting their ballots more than it had hindered their predecessors. In the mid-nineteenth 
century, political machines had helped Irish and German immigrants overcome illiteracy by 
registering new voters, instructing them on how to vote, and even filling out their ballots for 
them. By the end of the century however, new reform efforts including the secret ballot limited 
the assistance political machines could give to illiterate voters, hurting Italians more than any 
other group.40 Coinciding with the arrival of massive waves of new immigrants in the late 
nineteenth-century, many states in the north also began passing literacy tests for first-time voters. 
Encouraged by the success of such exams in the south at limiting black voting, northern states 
instituted similar tests to curb the political strength of new immigrants under the guise of 
electoral purification.  
In New York, reformers attempted to pass a literacy test for voting four times between 
1846 and 1921, when it finally became the twenty-third state to pass such a law. Until 1970, 
first-time voters in the state of New York needed to prove fourth-grade literacy in English before 
they could cast a ballot.41 They could do so by presenting proof of schooling, which was easy for 
American-born voters to procure, or by taking a literacy test administered by local schools. By 
requiring English literacy, as opposed to literacy in any language, the initiative went beyond the 
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tests Congress required for immigrant entry beginning in 1917, which immigrants could take in 
their native language. The English literacy test served its purpose of limiting immigrant voting, 
especially among Italians.42 When 44,000 people took New York’s voter literacy test in 
anticipation of the presidential election of 1924, 22 percent failed, all of whom were immigrants. 
Not surprisingly, the highest rate of failures came from a school in an almost entirely Italian 
district, where 53 percent of potential voters were denied the franchise for failing the literacy 
test.43  
For the 69 percent of Italian immigrants nationwide who could have passed a literacy test 
in 1930, their ability to exercise full American citizenship was still hindered by the limited 
political education they received in Italy.44 Italians in the homeland had some political 
experience, particularly through labor militancy, but few Italian immigrants ever voted in an 
election at home. Italy only introduced universal male suffrage in 1912, after the bulk of 
migrants left, and even then only half of eligible men voted in southern Italy as late as 1921.45 
Italian women would not get the vote until 1946.46 Through the end of the 1920s Americans and 
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Italians considered Italian immigrants irredeemably apolitical and apathetic. When describing his 
ethnic group in a 1925 magazine article, Italian American politician Edward Corsi wrote, “the 
Italian, by the way, is not much of a politician. He is too poetic for the ‘game.’ He prefers loftier 
pastimes. While the Irishman is organizing the ward and the Jew listens attentively to the 
platitudes of the soap-box orator…the Italian is at home, enjoying the rapturous strains of ‘O 
Sole Mio.’”47  
As long as politicians like Corsi considered political apathy an inherent Italian 
characteristic rather than a failure of education, they would have the same problem getting out 
the Italian vote that newspaper editor Generoso Pope had asking parents to petition their schools 
for Italian language classes. Exhortations made to immigrants to overcome their apolitical nature 
and exercise the vote would not suffice. Politicians also needed to teach Italian immigrants about 
their rights and obligations to vote, and help them navigate the process. In several cities, that 
process might include overcoming measures intended to curb immigrant voting such as poll 
taxes, lengthy residency requirements, shortened registration periods, and annual registration 
laws in addition to the literacy tests imposed in thirteen northern states.  
In urban areas, political machines often helped ethnic voters by paying poll taxes and 
appointing ward bosses to individually register potential voters ⁠.48 In more rural company towns 
employers filled that role by having foremen escort workers to polling places and even handing 
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them pre-marked ballots.49 But outsiders only helped Italians vote when they felt an incentive to 
do so, which was not often. In New York City, where the Irish controlled Tammany Hall, just 
four percent of the country’s largest Italian community registered to vote in 1905.50 In turn-of-
the-century St. Louis, 180 residents of the city’s Little Italy registered to vote, and only 3 of 
those voters were actually Italian.51 Scholars have found similar rates of registration in 
Philadelphia, Buffalo, Kansas City, Utica, and Rochester into the late nineteenth century.52 After 
women won the franchise in 1919, the lack of political participation among Italian American 
women hurt the Italian vote even more. While only 15 percent of eligible Italian men registered 
to vote in Boston’s North End in 1920, less than one percent of eligible Italian women 
registered.53  
 When political machines wished to court the Italian vote and increase Italian turnout they 
first did so by placing an Italian name on the ticket, a strategy that often worked. After 
Philadelphia’s Democrats nominated Anna Brancato for the State House of Representatives in 
1932, for example, Italian American turnout increased 16.8 percent overall and 23.4 percent 
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among women.54 An over-emphasis on Italian candidates could work against real political power, 
however. Italian Americans often considered the number of Italian names on a ticket to be a 
greater marker of their status than how parties responded to their community’s unique needs, 
allowing substantive issues to lose importance. In addition, prominenti encouraged both parties 
to add Italians to their tickets, which only divided their vote, nullifying Italian political power.  
The passionate pleas of Judge Nicola Pette on station WOV on the eve of the 1936 
election points to the problem of emphasizing symbolic representation over shared political 
ideology: “I am asking for the support of all Italians, without party distinction,” he told his radio 
audience in a speech reprinted in Il Progresso Italo-Americano. “We Italians must have one 
party only—the party of Italianità—because only this way can we be respected. Italians! Hear 
the voice of your conscience—listen to the voice of your blood.” Pette implored Italian men, and 
especially Italian women, “the guardian angel of the family,” to exercise their right to vote. 
Speaking for all Italian candidates that year, he continued, “even you, oh Italian women, must 
use this most powerful weapon of the vote to raise the prestige of the Italian name in America. 
Vote for all the Italian candidates, whether Republican or Democratic: race and blood come first, 
and then, the party.”55 
 For the Italian vote to have power, Italian Americans needed citizenship, community 
unification, literacy and political training. They also needed a unique political platform that 
parties could not subsume by simply placing Italian candidates on their ballots. What 
Philadelphia’s OSIA lodges found so miraculous about their pro-war gala in 1936 was that for 
the first time in history it seemed the community had all of the required conditions for Italians to 
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run the country. The Ethiopian War and the ensuing fight over sanctions and neutrality helped 
Italians find their common cause.  But the war and sanctions would come to an end, and for 
Italian Americans to have enduring political power their leaders would need to keep them as 
engaged in American domestic issues as they had been about Italy’s war. Once the parties 
launched their presidential campaigns in the summer of 1936 Italian Americans would need to 
develop a uniquely Italian political platform for the candidates to adopt or let their issues get 
subsumed by the generic “foreign vote.” 
Foreign Born Issues: Immigration Reform, Relief, Recognition 
 Though himself a Republican, Philadelphia’s Mayor Wilson returned to the same 
Convention Hall that held OSIA’s pro-war rally in May to open the Democratic National 
Convention on June 21. The hall could not fit more than the twenty thousand who had squeezed 
inside for the OSIA fundraiser, but the Democrats in Philadelphia and their Republican 
counterparts in Cleveland hoped to reach audiences of several million. With radio use on the rise 
since the last campaign, both parties saw an opportunity of launching their campaigns nationally 
with radio coverage of the convention at home. In May, Bruce Barton, promoter for the 
Republican convention, made news when he proposed wooing ethnic voters with “racial 
choruses of singers” broadcast on the radio. A chorus of African Americans would remind black 
voters of their traditional allegiance to the Republican Party, and “then would come an Italian 
chorus—the best that could be found in the country.”56 “There again the Italian vote would be 
flattered, and thousands of voters of that race, it is assumed, would be glued to their receiving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 J. Fred Essary, “Musical Festival Proposed for Republican Convention,” The Baltimore Sun (Baltimore, 
Md., May 12, 1936). 
 
	   211 
sets waiting for their favorite native airs,” wrote a reporter for The Baltimore Sun.57 “If this idea 
goes across, we will carry the idea even further,” a Democratic spokesman responded. “We will 
have more jubilee singers, more choruses, perhaps even a symphony orchestra, and we will 
certainly have more traditional brass bands,” he declared.58 
 Competition over the ethnic radio audience reflected both parties’ preoccupation with 
winning the foreign vote that year. While concern over the foreign vote had consumed politicians 
since the birth of the Republic, immigrant voting was often considered a local issue, with corrupt 
political machines tightly controlling a mostly Irish vote in America’s cities for over a century. 
Beginning with the presidential campaign of 1928, both parties recognized a national foreign 
vote that was less solidly Irish and Democratic, more necessary to winning the White House, and 
easier to reach through radio broadcasts than ever before.   
In 1928, the urban, Catholic, and anti-Prohibitionist candidate Al Smith won 5.6 million 
more votes than Democratic candidate James Cox had in 1920, despite losing the White House. 
Smith’s candidacy increased total voter turnout 26 percent over 1924, and increased Democratic 
voting an impressive 79 percent from 1920. Smith’s added votes could not have come solely 
from America’s Catholic or Irish voters; Italian, Polish, and even Jewish immigrants voted Smith 
that year in overwhelming majorities well above their 1920 levels.59 Among Italian Americans, 
Al Smith increased voting by 21 percent in Philadelphia, 54 percent in Pittsburgh, 106 percent in 
Boston’s North End, and 200 percent in Utica, New York.60 
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The Democrats built on Al Smith’s momentum by registering new voters in urban centers 
to bring them more solidly into the Democratic camp, while Republicans did little to counter 
their efforts.61 Cities like Boston, for instance, saw a concurrent rise of Italian registration, voter 
participation, and Democratic allegiance. The Italian neighborhood of East Boston had twice as 
many male and three times as many female registered voters in 1940 as it did in 1924, and the 
North End saw Italian political participation triple among men and multiply eightfold for women 
during the same time period. Significantly, only 43 percent of Boston’s Italians voted 
Democratic in the 1924 election, but 94 percent voted for Al Smith in 1928 and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in 1932.62 Table 1 shows the actual voting behaviors of Italians in six major cities, and 
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Table 1: Percent Italians Voting Democratic  
for President in Six Cities, 1924-194464 
City 1924 1928 1932 1936 1940 1944 
Boston North End 61.3 94.5 93.2  51.1  
East Boston 66.9 92.6 94.5  62.9  
Chicago 31 63 64    
New York 48 77 80.5 78.7 42.2 33 
Philadelphia 3 56.9 46.4 65.1 53.5 41.3 
Providence 49.8 78.1 75.5 74.2 68.3  
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Recognizing the increase of immigrant voters up to 1936, a Republican strategist that 
year calculated that foreign born and their children made up 30 percent of all voters. His report to 
William Bell, Chairman of the Republican National Finance Committee, opened with a frank 
assessment: “Republican chances this year depend largely on what the foreign born voters will 
do.” “The foreign born vote holds the balance of power in the whole of the East, the Middle 
West, and in California,” he reported, warning the party could not win Pennsylvania and New 
York particularly, but also New Jersey, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Ohio unless it won “at least 
the majority” of the foreign born vote ⁠ in those states.65 Despite their recent trends towards 
Democratic voting, the Republican Party saw the growth of a non-Irish voting population as an 
opportunity to win new ethnic voters with precarious party loyalties. The Bell Memo claimed the 
Republican Party carried foreign voters in 1920, 1924, and 1928, and the party could avoid 
losing those votes permanently if it acted aggressively to win them back.  
Edward Corsi, founder of the Columbian Republican League, sent a copy of the report to 
Marshall Tuthill, director of the Naturalized Citizens’ Committee of the Republican National 
Committee. Though the Bell Memo reported on foreign voters generically, the memo’s findings 
that Republicans carried the foreign born vote before 1928 suggests it had Italians in mind 
specifically. Though a small number of Italian Americans voted before 1932, those who did 
tended to lean Republican nationally. They had been wooed to the party by President 
McKinley’s promise of prosperity and the “full dinner pail,” and turned off from the Democratic 
Party by the Irish dominance of urban machines and Wilson’s treatment of Italy at Versailles.  
Even with the Democrats’ aggressive pursuit of ethnic voters, party realignment varied 
by locality and was not permanent anywhere. Philadelphia’s Italians, who predominately 
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affiliated with the Republicans, briefly abandoned their party in 1928 to vote for Smith and 
against Republican Senator David Reed, who co-sponsored the discriminatory 1924 Quota Act.66 
But the city’s Italians still gave Republican Mayor J. Hampton Moore 91 percent of their votes in 
1931 and even Herbert Hoover won 53.6 percent of their votes in 1932. Other Pennsylvania 
towns had similar trends of mixed party allegiances in national and local elections, giving 
credence to the Republican idea that Democrats did not have the exclusive hold on ethnic voters 
that they claimed.67 
To win back the Italian vote, the Bell Memo suggested addressing ethnic Americans’ 
core concerns: immigration reform, relief and reemployment, and ethnic recognition within the 
party. Reading through Italian American newspapers it is clear these three issues were at the 
forefront of Italians’ minds. Though Italians cared deepest about reuniting with their families in 
Italy and ensuring the continuation of relief and government work, candidates chose to campaign 
predominately by giving recognition to Italian Americans. They chose recognition in part 
because it was far less controversial than immigration reform and more winnable than relief, but 
also because pro-Fascists had prepared the Italian American community to mobilize strongest 
around the political issues of Italians’ status at home and abroad.  
Immigration Reform 
Having passed the discriminatory Immigration Quota Act of 1924, the Republican Party 
was unlikely to win Italians on the issue of immigration reform, but the Bell Memo suggested 
Governor Landon exploit Roosevelt’s inaction in humanizing the immigration laws, specifically 
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with regard to deportations.68 Several Democrats had proposed bills to reduce the number of 
deportations and expand the categories of family members who may enter the United States 
outside of quotas. Congressman William Sirovich, a Jewish Democrat who represented 
LaGuardia’s old district in the Lower East Side, offered four bills at the start of the legislative 
session in 1935 that Generoso Pope strongly endorsed. The bills called for expansion of quota 
exceptions, prioritization within quotas for families, a five-year statute of limitations on 
deportations for unlawful entry, and the legalization of worthy undocumented aliens. As with 
other political issues Pope adopted, within a short period Sirovich’s immigration reform bills had 
become “Pope’s Campaign for the Union of Families.”69 
 Pope’s adoption of the campaign inspired Italian Americans to write to his paper about 
their precarious conditions either as “clandestines” fearful of deportation, or as legal citizens 
separated from aging parents, dependent children, and spouses in Italy. While most wrote from 
personal experiences, E. Canterino from Yonkers showed how easily personal needs and 
nationalism came together in a letter he wrote to Il Progresso on the campaign. “What I am 
about to tell you has been carved in letters of blood over many years in the hearts of our 
emigrants,” he began. It was, he wrote “one of the most painful wounds we have suffered, that 
the laws oppressively withheld from us, with savage recklessness, the most sacred rights of 
humanity…that of family.” “When can we kiss our mothers and sisters who warm our hearts 
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with their divine goodness?” he asked, echoing the personal anguish of so many other writers.70 
Though he felt desperation about his family’s condition as an individual, Canterino also 
spoke of Italians’ communal racial pride, with the language of Italianità taught to him through 
the same newspaper. “That which we ask of Congress is not pity, because our racial pride 
prevents us from asking that,” he asserted, “but it is justice in the full and humanitarian sense. 
Justice to which we are accustomed as the sons of the great Roma Imperiale that has governed 
the world wisely since ancient times.”71 The Seventy-Fourth Congress did not feel quite as 
beholden to Imperial Rome as Canterino believed it should. Instead, it held an animated debate 
about whether the strict immigration quotas should be relaxed and deportations limited to avoid 
separating families, or if America’s gates should be further closed and more migrants encouraged 
or forced to leave. A nearly equal number of bills were introduced on either side.  
In February of 1935, Pope traveled to the White House to meet with President Roosevelt 
regarding Sirovich’s bills. The president “expressed again his most lively sympathies for Italy 
and the Italians” and told Pope, “Gene, I will support these amendments with all my heart.”72 
Pope came away from the meeting confident that immigration reform would soon pass. His 
paper closely followed the congressional debate on immigration in May with extensive Italian 
translations, sure the results would be positive. As the debate ended and action stalled over the 
summer, his paper printed stories of desperate cases of elderly widows, mothers with young 
children, and hardworking illiterates who could be deported unless “Mr. Pope’s bills” passed. In 
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the end, Mr. Pope’s bills did not pass, nor did they get Roosevelt’s outright endorsement. That he 
reserved for a similar bill introduced by Democrat John Kerr or North Carolina which did not 
make it to a vote either, despite the Democrats’ control of.  
The Bell Memo pointed to Roosevelt’s inaction and inconsistency on immigration and 
reasoned the Democrats’ vulnerability in that area “offers a splendid issue for the Republican 
Party.”73 In late September 1936 the Republican State Convention of New York heeded the 
memo’s advice and included a plank in its platform in favor of the “humanization of the 
deportation laws by authorizing executive discretion in deserving cases to prevent the separation 
of husbands and wives or parents and dependent children.”74 On the national stage, however, 
neither party mentioned immigration or deportation in their platforms. Landon might have been 
able to point out Roosevelt’s inaction on immigration laws, as the memo suggested, but the cost 
within his own party might be too high. While Democrats argued amongst themselves about 
what to do with the country’s immigrants, Republicans’ position on immigration was no clearer.  
Relief and Reemployment 
Just as the Depression made Americans question the openness of their borders, it also led 
them to debate the inclusiveness of their safety net. The longer the Depression lasted, the more 
immigrants worried about the precarious situation of their alien relatives. Non-citizens were the 
first to get fired from companies, making them even more dependent on relief programs than 
naturalized immigrants. While the federal government distributed direct relief without distinction 
of citizenship status, relief jobs came with citizenship preferences in eighteen states in 1932.  
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Six of the states that passed legislation against work relief for aliens housed 75 percent of 
all Italian immigrants in the country, naturalized and alien. Pennsylvania, California, and Illinois 
barred aliens from taking any work relief, affecting 200,000 Italian aliens in their states. New 
York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts were home to half of all Italian immigrants in the country 
in 1932, and each passed laws giving non-citizens such low preference for relief jobs they 
effectively made almost half a million Italian aliens ineligible for work.75 Barred from taking 
public jobs, immigrants relied on direct relief, which only aggravated Americans’ intolerance of 
immigrants, leading them to press for further exclusion and increased deportations.  
The Bell Memo suggested Landon make repeated and explicit statements that he would 
continue relief for all America’s residents as long as workers remained unemployed. Landon had 
already promised continued relief as part of his platform, but when rumors spread towards the 
end of the campaign that Landon was anti-Semitic and prejudiced against immigrants, he took 
the suggestion of speaking directly to ethnic voters. Under the auspices of the Naturalized 
Citizens’ League, Landon gave a speech in New York City broadcast over a mainstream national 
station and the pro-Fascist WOV where he stated unequivocally, “as long as there is 
unemployment in this country and as long as men and women are in need, they will be 
adequately cared for.”76 
Landon’s strategy of promising Americans they would not lose the relief Democrats had 
already given them won him few native or foreign born voters. New Deal relief, administered by 
Democrats locally, was the key factor in determining party allegiances, especially among new 
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voters. The unique case of Philadelphia shows just how closely relief and votes were linked 
during the Depression. In the traditionally Republican city, Mayor J. Hampton Moore refused 
federal direct relief for three years, allowing Philadelphia’s dominant Republican machines to 
remain the major providers of relief for Italian Americans. Though Italian Americans needed 
more relief than the machines or city coffers could provide them, they still gave 53.6 percent of 
their votes to Herbert Hoover in 1932. Philadelphia was the only large city to give a Republican 
the majority of its Italian votes that year.77 Three years later, Philadelphia’s Italian Americans 
gave a small majority to the Republican Mayor S. Davis Wilson who then relented on Moore’s 
strategy and cooperated with the Works Progress Administration. Within a year, Italian 
Americans’ national party allegiances switched, with Roosevelt receiving 65 percent of the city’s 
Italian American vote. Republicans could not even buy votes among Italians for Landon, as had 
been their custom. One committeeperson remarked, “Most in our division regarded their vote for 
Roosevelt as a sacred thing…They believed they were protecting their relief and WPA jobs.”78  
Historians have debated the depth of the Italians’ conviction in the New Deal economy. 
Lizabeth Cohen has argued that immigrants in Chicago voted for Roosevelt because of a belief 
that their votes mattered on a national scale and bought into an ideology of “moral capitalism.”79 
Stefano Luconi, who documented Italian voting in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh found that while 
ideology mattered, so too did the Democrats’ control of relief administration.80 Those seeking 
new jobs needed the endorsement of their local Democratic ward leader to get hired, and anyone 
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not registered with the Democratic Party was discharged from WPA rolls.81 Though secret 
ballots should have allowed Italians to vote their conscience, Republicans worried enough about 
New Dealers’ tactics that a Landon campaign ad in Il Progresso Italo-Americano lead with the 
exhortation, “Italian Americans! Do not let yourselves be intimidated!” before explaining in 
great detail how relief would continue under Landon.82 The advertisement was not enough. 
Whether Italians voted Roosevelt for immediate practical gains or for the larger ideology of 
moral capitalism, when they voted for relief they voted Democratic. 
Recognition 
Neither party could win by campaigning on immigration reform, and the Democrats’ 
ownership of relief made that issue unwinnable for Republicans. The third issue proposed—party 
recognition to foreigners—gave no obvious advantage to Democrats, had very low political costs, 
and potentially reaped huge rewards, making it much more attractive to the Republicans. The 
Bell Memo argued that Landon needed to speak directly to immigrant voters, “express sympathy 
with their problems and pledge a fair deal in the event of election.”83 In addition, they needed to 
add ethnic politicians to their ticket. As an example, the memo stated, “a prominent Italian on the 
state ticet [sic] in New York would mean not only some 700,000 Italian votes in the State but 
thousands of Italian votes in nearby states. The effect of such a move would be felt nationally. 
The Party ought to consider such groups as the Italians, Germans, and Poles as exercising 
enormous voting power.”84 Notably, the memo did not mention the Irish as part of the foreign 
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born vote, presumably because the Republicans had no chance with them.  
Both parties placed ethnic names in key spots on their ballots to win immigrant voters. In 
1936, New York’s Italians found fifteen candidates from their ethnic group on the Republican 
ticket, including six congressmen. They also found eleven Italians listed by the Democrats, and 
in East Harlem’s twentieth assembly district Republican Vito Marcantonio and Democrat James 
Lanzetta battled over the same Italian voters. Pitting Italians against each other was a risky move, 
not only because it split the vote, but also because it could backfire if Italians thought a party 
used an Italian candidate as a tool to dilute the political power of their ethnic group. 85 Moreover, 
if New York’s politicians thought Marcantonio and Lanzetta’s names were enough to win 
700,000 votes for Roosevelt they would not have looked for other ways of showing Italian 
Americans recognition. Instead, as they noticed with Italians’ complaints about Mayor 
LaGuardia, an Italian name only carried meaning for Italian Americans if it also helped spread 
their platform of Italianità. 
The city’s first Italian mayor never had an easy time with the Italian American 
community, particularly because LaGuardia’s anti-Fascism put him at odds with Generoso Pope 
and the city’s prominenti. LaGuardia’s other slights to the Italian American community in his 
first term included appointing too few Italians to city positions and not attending a Columbus 
Day celebration in 1934.86 When LaGuardia ran for reelection in 1937, having again skipped the 
previous year’s Columbus Day festivities, candidate for city council Edward Corsi campaigned 
on behalf of the Mayor. In a speech on radio station WOV reprinted in his weekly magazine, La 
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Settimana, Corsi called for his community to vote for their own prestige by voting LaGuardia. 
Rather than beginning by recalling LaGuardia’s record, he recalled the history of the Italian 
immigrant: “Who can have forgotten the atrocious insult inflicted upon us when those who 
wanted to reduce the Italian immigration quota justified the drastic measure with the absurd 
claims that the Italians were an inferior race to the Anglo-Saxons?” He explained that for people 
with such harsh memories it would be reductive to think about LaGuardia’s election based on the 
number of Italians he appointed to city jobs. “Why diminish the value of an electoral campaign 
that each one of us must understand as a fight for an idea—an affirmation that even us, Italo-
Americans, have an undeniable right to have our place in the sun?” he asked. Lowering 
themselves to petty squabbles over patronage insulted their intelligence and their Italianità. Corsi 
imagined other races rejoicing at Italians’ expense if they did not reelect LaGuardia. “They 
would say with that condescension that so distinguishes them, that the Latin temperament, the 
impetuousness of their character, the inability to control their own passions, prevents Italians 
from rising to become great statesmen and great public administrators of America.”87 
To Corsi, LaGuardia’s election was not simply about having an Italian name in high 
office, but about demonstrating Italianità by disproving the inferiority of the Italian race. Italians 
seemingly agreed, giving LaGuardia 62.6 percent of their votes in 1937. But while LaGuardia 
gained 15 percentage points among Irish voters, 33.1 from Black voters, and 32.3 from Jews 
between 1934 and 1937, he only saw a gain of 0.4 among Italians, suggesting their interest in 
him had peaked.88 Politicians who paid attention inside of banquet halls and outside on parade 
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routes had learned an Italian name like LaGuardia wasn’t always enough to give Italian 
Americans the recognition to which they felt entitled. Moreover, they learned they could give 
Italians what they really wanted without having to sacrifice a spot on their ticket. The campaigns 
of Italian language in schools and American neutrality for Ethiopia had shown American 
politicians that putting Italians in office was just one aspect of a broader political platform of 
Italianità that fought for the increased status of Italians in America and Italy in Europe.  
The Platform of Italianità: Status in America and Abroad 
Politicians who thought to give Italians party recognition through Italianità tended to rely 
on the whole propaganda machinery connected to the platform: the rhetoric and symbols of 
Italian racial pride; the pro-Fascist leaders and organizations that mobilized their communities to 
action; and the political platform of supporting Italians in the United States and Italy abroad. 
Prominenti worked hard in the early 1930s to tie the three closely together, and politicians found 
they could not campaign to Italian voters without relying on all three.  
Symbols and Rhetoric 
The most obvious place to see the interconnectedness of Italian racial symbolism, mass 
mobilization, pro-Fascist nationalism, and American campaigning was the yearly celebration of 
Christopher Columbus’s arrival in America on October 12. LaGuardia’s snub of Italian 
Americans on Columbus Day of 1934 and 1936 seemed obtuse because politicians relied so 
heavily on the October 12 holiday to win over Italian voters at the height of their local and 
national campaigns. As more Italians attended Columbus Day events they learned to expect 
speeches from pro-Fascist prominenti giving Columbus credit for everything America had 
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accomplished since 1492 and using the navigator to justify Italy’s most recent actions. They also 
learned to expect more American politicians speaking about Columbus and Italianità while 
campaign staff registered new voters in the crowd. 
Fascists easily made use of Columbus as a stand-in for everything Italians and Italian 
Americans had accomplished since 1492. Chicago Grand Venerable of the Order Sons of Italy, 
George Spatuzza, epitomized the type of hyperbole pro-Fascists used in his speech for OSIA’s 
Columbus Day Banquet in 1936. Without Columbus’s discovery, Spatuzza explained, there 
would be no Revolutionary War, no United States, no Civil War, and during the Great War there 
would have been “no boys in khaki to go across, and over the top to make the world safe for 
democracy.” “Yes!” he exclaimed, without Columbus, “mankind would have been deprived of 
the beneficent contribution that this America gave to the sum and total of the civilization of the 
world.” “In this historical year of 1936,” he continued, transitioning to Italy's conquest of 
Ethiopia, “responding once again to the call of destiny, [Italy] did well to civilize another part of 
the world.”89 
American politicians similarly manipulated Columbus to suit their needs. In 1932 the 
New York Republican gubernatorial candidate Colonel William Donovan began the upstate leg 
of his campaign at a Columbus Day banquet in Buffalo hosted by the women’s branch of the 
Columbian Republican League. Describing Columbus as a man who had faith in himself and the 
ability to carry out his dreams, Donovan asked his audience to have similar faith in Republican 
politicians and their dreams of improving the economy. Four years later, an Italian newspaper in 
Tennessee endorsed Judge E. Bunvan Carter for Memphis Police Court Justice in its 1936 
Columbus Day issue. The paper emphasized Bunvan’s record of traffic safety, with the not 
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untrue observation that “when Columbus discovered America in 1492 traffic conditions bothered 
nobody. The spaces were wide open. There were no highways then. However, there had been 
considerable development since 444 years ago.”90  
If Columbus Day rallies only served to draw large crowds in exercises of self-
congratulations and manipulations of historical figures, the 1930s would only have differed from 
previous decades by the size of the crowds involved in what Ambassador de Martino had once 
bemoaned as “monumentomania, banquetomania, parchmentomania, etc.”91 Instead, pro-Fascists 
intended Italianità as a language of racial pride for Italians and a reminder to Americans that 
Italians deserved respect. They hoped figures like Columbus could influence policy makers on 
issues of domestic and foreign policy. Looking at the Congressional Record from the 1930s 
gives a glimpse into how politicians began using Columbus among themselves as pro-Fascists 
had intended.  
When debating immigration reform in the 1930s, several congressmen pointed to the 
irony of restricting Italian entries to a land Europeans only knew about because of an Italian 
navigator. In a heated moment over immigration reform during a debate in February of 1935, 
Samuel Dickstein (D-NY) made a sarcastic jab at Thomas Blanton (D-TX). In response to 
Blanton’s lengthy attacks against New York immigrants in general and Dickstein in particular, 
the congressman remarked, “There should have been a quota law during the time that Columbus 
came to this country. Had there been, I think we would be all right and in good shape. The 
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gentleman [Blanton] would not be here himself.”92 Dickstein’s comment may not have been 
intended specifically for Italian readers, but Generoso Pope highlighted the quip in Il Progresso. 
In a more earnest instance, when the Senate debated similar legislation the following 
February, Representative William P. Connery of Massachusetts spoke about his own experiences 
fighting in World War I with Americans of all ethnicities without care for 100% Americanism. 
After witnessing Congress debate immigration reform for several years with no action, he said 
with some exasperation, “I wonder what Christopher Columbus would say today if he could look 
down upon the Congress of the United States and see Congress barring from this country that he 
discovered his own people, his own nationality, simply because they do not happen to fit a 
certain standard.”93 
Pro-Fascists rejoiced in Congress’s use of Italianità when discussing domestic issues of 
immigration reform, and hoped to do the same for the country’s foreign policy. Feeling 
comfortable in their ability to spread Fascism to Italians, pro-Fascists stopped hiding their 
obvious propaganda in front of American politicians. Eager for Italian votes, politicians often 
ignored the pro-Fascist propaganda before them, and sometimes participated in it. Either way, by 
blending pro-Fascism and American political organizing at Columbus Day rallies candidates 
affirmed Italian Americans’ rights to transnationalistic citizenship.  
In reporting its city’s 1937 Columbus Day celebration, for example, the San Jose 
Mercury Herald stated matter-of-factly, “Both fascism and democracy were lauded here 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, “Congressional Record,” 74th Cong. 2nd sess. Vol. 79 Part 2 
(February 19, 1935): 2212–2264. 2236. 
 
93 Senate Committee on Immigration, Deportation of Criminals Preservation of Family Units, Permit 
Noncriminal Aliens to Legalize their Status, 74th Cong., 2d sess., 1936, S. Hrg. 2969, 1. 
 
	   228 
yesterday.”94 “Praise of the Roosevelt administration by United States Senator William Gibbs 
McAdoo and a pro-fascist address by a dapper young Italian vice-consul marked the climax of 
the celebration which opened Saturday.” In his speech, Vice-Consul Millo recalled the bitterness 
of Italian immigration that came after Columbus’s first arrival. “Although they bettered 
themselves economically,” Millo explained, “Italo-Americans had little reason to be proud of 
their origin until the advent of Mussolini” and the conquest of Ethiopia. When his turn came, 
McAdoo avoided talk of Ethiopia and Mussolini, instead using his position as principal speaker 
to make a case for Roosevelt and the Social Security Act.95 
Roosevelt had a similar experience with another Italian historical figure, Francesco Vigo. 
An Italian migrant in the American colonies, Vigo amassed a fortune as a trader which he put to 
use in 1779 financing General Rogers Clark’s battle against the British at Vincennes, Indiana. In 
the 1930s, Indianapolis Consular Agent Vincent LaPenta worked with Vassar Professor Dr. 
Bruno Roselli to resurrect Francis Vigo as a Revolutionary War hero in an attempt to raise 
Italianità in his city. In 1934, LaPenta brought Roselli to a celebration at the Francesco Vigo 
Memorial Association, where Roselli spoke about the “neglected hero” who was responsible for 
“giving an empire to the United States.”96 By financing the battle that allowed America to secure 
the Northwest Territory from England, Vigo became a symbol of American immigrant patriotism 
and American expansionism. Indiana’s Democratic Governor Paul V. McNutt, in attendance at 
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the event, described Vigo as “the greatest of good men and the best of great men.”97  
As the Ethiopian War developed, Vigo became especially useful for pro-Fascist 
propaganda. Most obviously, as a Revolutionary War hero, Vigo could remind Americans that 
they did not always agree with England on colonial matters. Vigo’s tale also highlighted 
America’s own history with territorial expansion, allowing for easy comparisons with Italy’s 
expansion in the 1930s. More subtly, Chicago’s Consul General Giuseppe Castruccio hoped 
Vigo’s story could chip away at France’s prestige in the United States by replacing the French 
General Lafayette as the most important European in the Revolutionary War. Castruccio 
believed American’s contemporary deference towards France stemmed from their historic 
celebration of French political intelligence, culture, and society, and was convinced that Vigo 
could similarly help raise Italy’s status in the United States. Finally, Vigo was a model for Italian 
Americans as a war hero who never saw battle. Vigo became a hero by essentially writing a large 
check for General Clark, allowing the General to purchase war supplies. For pro-Fascists asking 
Italian Americans to fight economic sanctions through their checkbooks, no better model of 
Italianità existed.  
On June 14, 1936 President Roosevelt came to Vincennes to dedicate a memorial to 
General Rogers Clark. Situated on the site of Fort Sackville, the memorial shared space with a 
statue of Francis Vigo, erected in 1934. Roosevelt used the dedication to make a case for 
preserving the natural resources secured for America by Clark and Vigo, “a patriot of Italian 
birth, [to whom], next to Clark himself, the United States is indebted for the saving of the 
Northwest Territory.”98 Italy’s Ambassador Augusto Rosso then dedicated the Francis Vigo 
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statue on the same plot of land. 
Rosso was under pressure from Italy to get the United States to recognize Italy’s month-
old victory in Ethiopia, and The New York Herald Tribune noted the ambassador did not waste 
the opportunity. The ambassador, wrote the paper, “impliedly compared Vigo’s pioneering for 
America, with Italy’s present movement into Ethiopia.” The paper quoted Rosso stating, “at this 
historical moment which marks the life of my country, every Italian feels particularly gratified in 
seeing the homage that America is extending to a man who has been above all a great pioneer: a 
man who has helped to open new roads to human enterprise and endeavor: one who has truly 
worked for civil and social progress.”99 Roosevelt did not stick around for Rosso’s speech, but 
his campaign certainly benefitted from the Italian government coordinating the transportation of 
thousands of Italian Americans from Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis to the event. For those 
thousands in attendance, Rosso and Roosevelt’s laudations of Vigo supported their growing 
notion that one could be both proudly Italian and American as a transnationalistic citizen.  
Organizers and Organizations 
 Columbus Days and Vigo dedications attracted American politicians because of the 
persistent work of pro-Fascists in mobilizing their communities in a show of unity and force. 
From the early 1930s through the start of the World War, American politicians in both parties 
relied on the same pro-Fascists to help mobilize voters. Anti-Fascist Italian American Max 
Ascoli assailed ethnic and American politicians for pandering to pro-Fascists in exchange for 
votes. In New York City, he derided the staunchly pro-Fascist Monsignor Arcese for exerting too 
much control over politics north of 119th Street in Manhattan. “Without the blessing of 
Monsignor Arcese a political candidate is condemned to lose,” he wrote, and so congressional 
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candidates from Arcese’s district never missed an opportunity to march with the Monsignor in 
the parish’s processions. Even Mayor LaGuardia, who so often lambasted Nazism and Hitler, 
rarely mentioned Mussolini. “The priests are all fascists,” Ascoli explained, “and LaGuardia 
needs the vote of the priests.”100 
Ascoli also criticized American politicians who he claimed “were never too fastidious, 
particularly in the great metropolitan centers, about getting the support of fascist elements 
working under the inspiration of the fascist consulates ⁠.”101 Though most clubs destroyed records 
that connected their pro-Fascist pasts to American politics, a few names and organizations stand 
out. In 1940, silk merchant Paolino Gerli, who had once presented Premier Mussolini personally 
with a check for $4,500, chaired the Committee of Americans of Italian Origin for Willkie.102 
Paolo del Bagno, Republican Party captain for New York’s 20th Assembly District, 
founded and led the Fascist group Circolo Mario Margantini, named after the first Italian soldier 
to fall in Ethiopia. The anti-Fascist newspaper Il Martello described Silvio D. Battini, head of 
New York’s 18th Assembly District for the American Labor Party as “Fascist of body and spirit.” 
Finally, Mario Zumbo, secretary of the Piedmonte Etneo Independent Club, was the first to 
propose financial contributions to the Italian Red Cross and was nominated “Corporation 
Inspector” by Mayor LaGuardia. These pro-Fascist men headed the political organizations of the 
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth assembly districts, which formed the heavily Italian East 
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Harlem neighborhood in New York City. 103 
Downtown, pro-Fascists joined politics with equal force. In 1940, the New York anti-
Fascist newspaper La Parola accused Willkie’s campaign of transforming all the Italian Fascist 
schools, “and all the so-called educational institutions operating under the direction of 
Rome…into headquarters for the reelection of Wendell Willkie.”104 Alongside the Italian consul 
in Rockefeller Center and the Casa Italiana at Columbia University, the headquarters for Fascism 
in New York was located at 225 Lafayette Street in New York, a building best described as “a 
beehive of Fascist organizations.”105 225 Lafayette housed at least a dozen pro-Fascist 
organizations including Agostino de Biasi’s Il Carroccio, a Dante Alighieri Society school, the 
New York State Lodge of OSIA, Jack Ingegnieros’s Federation of Italian American Democratic 
Organizations, and the Italian Chamber of Commerce. It also housed the Lictor Association, an 
unofficial successor to the FLNA, and a strong supporter of Wendell Willkie. The Lictor 
Association’s leader, Domenica Trombetta, also printed a newspaper from 225 Lafayette, Il 
Grido della Stirpe, which he used to offset Pope’s endorsement of Roosevelt. Trombetta 
repeatedly attacked the president with headlines such as “Franklin D. Roosevelt must go from 
the White House. All Italians in America who are not renegades and who do not depend on the 
trade unions racket, will know in November how to make the weight of their votes felt on the 
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electoral scale.”106  
Willkie received support from others connected to that building. In September of 1940 Il 
Progresso Italo-Americano reprinted a telegram addressed to Miss Eleanor C. De Stefano at 225 
Lafayette Street from Willkie thanking her for conducting a series of informal meetings intended 
to attract women to the Willkie campaign. The candidate wrote, “This new campaign for the 
betterment of the Government excites my particular interest and has my personal approval. 
Certainly your movement will contribute to the victory of the Republican ticket.”107 
In 1936, the DNC forwarded a letter from Jack Ingegnieros, president of the Federation 
of Italian-American Democratic Organizations, about the president’s policy towards Ethiopia. 
While Ingegnieros worked for Roosevelt’s reelection he also worked for Generoso Pope at Il 
Progresso Italo-Americano. Just as the DNC did not seem to care that Pope lead the pro-Fascist 
movement in America when it named him head of the Italian Division, it also overlooked the fact 
that Ingegnieros had taken part in Mussolini’s March on Rome in 1922. The Office of Naval 
Intelligence later described him as a “violent Fascist” and listed his Federation of Italian-
American Democratic Associations as one of the twenty most influential Fascist organizations in 
the United States. In forwarding the letter, the DNC wrote, “Mr. I. is highly regarded by the New 
York State Democratic Organization according to their statement and is entitled to the full 
confidence of the President.”108 
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Italy and America, 1936 Election 
Jack Ingegnieros’ letter contained an urgent plea for the president to recognize Ethiopia 
as an Italian colony. “My contact with the Italian citizens and my discussions with all the leaders 
of our member clubs, in this state, has caused me to believe that if the recognition of the 
annexation does not take place, we are certainly going to lose approximately 80% of the Italian 
vote,” wrote Ingegnieros.109 Though Roosevelt had eventually caved on his desired neutrality 
policy, the Ethiopian War weakened Italians’ attachment to the president. When Congress 
renewed the old Neutrality Act, Roosevelt asked exporters to follow a voluntary, “moral 
embargo” akin to what the League had imposed. Italian Americans took it upon themselves to let 
Roosevelt know their displeasure. In April, the president of Bronx’s Sequoia Democratic Club 
wrote to Roosevelt, “I am sorry to report that sentiment has turned against you, in some cases 
moderately and in other cases bitterly. They seem to feel in the present controversy between Italy 
and Ethiopia, that your sentiments are with the latter country.”110 New York Democratic 
Congressman Fred Sisson felt alarmed enough about his prospects in November that he 
considered spreading a fake letter from Mussolini thanking the president for not applying oil 
sanctions during the Ethiopian campaign “to offset certain propaganda against the President.”111  
Although Italians’ attachment to the New Deal secured Roosevelt an overwhelming 
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majority of the Italian-American vote that fall, the Democrats’ nervousness, especially in 
districts with large Italian populations, was not entirely unfounded. Italian votes for Roosevelt 
dropped between 1932 and 1936; Democrat Fred Sisson lost his seat to a Republican; and the 
Republican Party did use the president’s policies towards Ethiopia against him. When New York 
Republican gubernatorial candidate William F. Bleakley closed his statewide campaign against 
Governor Lehman at a rally in the center of Italian Harlem, he asked the crowd “who was it that 
invoked the sanctions against Italy in the war with Ethiopia and what business was it of this 
country? I hope you will keep that in mind when you vote tomorrow.”112 Whereas other 
candidates were more discrete in allowing collaboration between their campaigns and pro-
Fascists’ organizations and agendas, when Bleakley explicitly asked Italian Americans to vote 
for Ethiopia he was telling them to vote as transnationalistic citizens. 
 In a less overt move to accommodate the pro-Fascist political agenda, Roosevelt 
ultimately recognized Italy’s victory on June 20, the night before the Democratic National 
Convention in Philadelphia. The morning the convention opened, Il Progresso Italo-Americano 
ran a headline with more political value than any of Bruce Barton’s racial choruses: “Roosevelt 
Revokes the Embargo: The American Government Formally Recognizes the War is Over.”113 
Generoso Pope, who would be named president of the Italian Division of the Democratic Party’s 
Foreign Language Citizen’s Committee a few weeks later, printed an editorial on the events the 
next day: “It is unnecessary to add that the Italians of Italy, and even more so the Italians of 
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America, who were grateful to President Roosevelt and Congress for the Neutrality Law that 
determined the failure of the League’s sanctions, are just as satisfied and grateful today for the 
removal of the embargo.”114  
 Roosevelt’s delay in recognizing Italy’s victory may have helped him win Italian 
Americans’ favor at a crucial moment, but it cost Ambassador Rosso his job.115 In his place, 
Mussolini would send a new ambassador, Fulvio Suvich, in October. Anticipation over the new 
ambassador’s arrival kept the Ethiopian War alive as Americans and Italians speculated about 
whether Roosevelt would accept Suvich as representative of the Emperor of Ethiopia.116 When 
Suvich arrived in Washington on Columbus Day, the State Department carefully stipulated that 
accepting Suvich did not constitute recognition of an Ethiopian colony. The non-confrontational 
strategy helped the government avoid conflict with both Italy and Italian Americans. 
Despite his eventual recognition of Italy’s victory, Roosevelt’s slights during the war 
would not be forgotten quickly. Four years after the war’s finish, a pro-Willkie Italian 
advertisement in Il Progresso Italo-Americano enumerated twenty actions Roosevelt had made 
against Italy while president, beginning with eight offenses concerning Ethiopia. “Willkie did not 
deliberately take sides against Italy in the Ethiopian events, Roosevelt did,” the list began, 
followed by Roosevelt’s embargo against arms to Italy, prohibition of American citizens 
traveling on Italian ships, and the moral embargo he requested after his neutrality act failed. 
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Republican Candidate Wendell Willkie, not having ever held elected office, had no such anti-
Italian record.117 
Italy and America, 1940 Election 
According to the advertisement, Roosevelt committed seven more sins against Italy and 
American neutrality before his most egregious transgression: “Willkie did not insult Italy with 
the perfidious phrase of the stab in the back on June 10 1940. Roosevelt did.”118 The ad 
referenced a speech Roosevelt made on the day Italy entered World War II by invading France. 
That day, President Roosevelt gave the commencement address to his son’s graduating class at 
the University of Virginia and adapted his speech to explain recent events in Europe. The 
president’s speech laid out all of the steps he had taken to appease Mussolini in an effort to keep 
Italy out of the war. Making a strong indictment against Italy’s actions in France, he declared, 
“On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has stuck it into the back of its 
neighbor.”119 Republicans made quick use of the phrase, especially aided by a cartoon from the 
Daily Mirror that showed the Statue of Liberty falling with a dagger in her spine. The dagger’s 
handle bore the words “3rd Term” and the caption read “Knife in the Back.”120 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Political Advertisement, “Il Popolo Ha in Pugno I Destini Del Mondo (The American People Have the 
Destiny of the World in Their Hands),” Il Progresso Italo-Americano (New York, N.Y., November 4, 
1940). 
 
118 “The American People Have the Destiny of the World in Their Hands,” Il Progresso Italo-Americano 
(New York, N.Y., November 4, 1940). 
 
119 “The Text of President Roosevelt’s Address at Charlottesville,” New York Times (New York, N.Y., 
June 11, 1940). 
 
120 “I Rinnegati Sono Per Roosevelt (The Renegades Are for Roosevelt),” Il Popolo Italiano (Philadelphia, 
PA, November 2, 1940). Balch Institute, HSP. 
 
	   238 
In a fifteen-minute speech on WOV soon after the image appeared, Columbian 
Republican League’s Anthony Maisano described the image, noting “this is the most impressive 
graphic representation of the sinister period by which we are confronted to-day.”121 
Philadelphia’s Il Popolo Italiano reprinted the image days before the election above an article 
titled “The Renegades are for Roosevelt.” The article paraphrased Anthony di Silvestro, 
Pennsylvania state senator and son of the Supreme Grand Venerable who entered OSIA into 
agreement with Mussolini. “Whoever believes Italy stabbed France in the back, vote for 
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Roosevelt,” the article began. “However, whoever believes Roosevelt’s words is a fraud, a 
renegade, and a traitor,” the Popolo Italiano stated succinctly. Worse than simply misconstruing 
Italy’s actions in France, the paper explained how Roosevelt’s word choice of a dagger revealed 
the president’s prejudice against Italians by recalling old stereotypes of Italians as violent 
vendetta-seeking gangsters and anarchists who were quick with a dagger, or stiletto: 
“It is a revelation into the intimate thoughts of Roosevelt. It is his confession of the vile 
opinion he has for Italians. Even though he needs millions of votes from American 
citizens of Italian origin, by skillfully choosing that phrase Roosevelt has not 
hesitated…to exacerbate all the stupid and murderous resentments, all the old and new 
prejudices against Italy and the Italians in the world.”122 
 
Il Popolo Italiano made sure Italian Americans took Roosevelt’s insult personally and voted 
accordingly as transnationalistic citizens to defend themselves and their homeland. Lest they 
forget on Election Day, the paper printed a headline instructing voters to “Remember F. D. 
Roosevelt’s Insult!”123 
A month before the 1940 election, the Foreign Language Division of the National 
Committee of Independent Voters for Roosevelt and Wallace took a survey of Italian voters in 
New York City. Though Roosevelt won 78.7 percent of the city’s Italian vote in 1936, the 1940 
survey found 50 percent of Italians intended to vote for Willkie, 22 percent for Roosevelt, and 17 
percent remained undecided. Italians who supported Willkie did so because they disapproved of 
the president’s foreign policy and believed his challenger was more likely to keep America out 
of the war. Though 50 percent of respondents approved of Roosevelt’s domestic 
accomplishments, only 11 percent felt favorably towards his foreign policy. The Foreign 
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Language Division explained the large group of undecided voters felt torn between their 
appreciation for the New Deal and fear of entering the war. When asked to list policies they 
associated with the president, Italians cited actions Roosevelt had taken to aid England (against 
Italy), but also “WPA, Housing, N.R.A.” One Willkie supporter summed up the ambivalence 
Italians felt in the summer of 1940 towards Roosevelt. “He should not have sent fifty ships to 
England,” he firmly stated, but then added “God bless WPA.”124  
The Foreign Language Division reported the Charlottesville speech was the most widely 
heard address made by the president that year, and 14 percent of Italians surveyed mentioned 
hearing it. The survey did not count those who had heard about the speech or had seen The Daily 
Mirror’s cartoon. To win the Italian vote, the Foreign Language Division suggested the 
Roosevelt campaign emphasize the New Deal, point out the similarities in both parties’ foreign 
policy platforms, and come up with an antidote to the “stab in the back” speech; possibly by 
stressing the contribution of minority groups to American Democracy or by making a specific 
statement against joining the war. The advice given Roosevelt in 1940 closely resembled that 
given to Landon in 1936: speak directly to their biggest issues—and if that did not work—offer 
recognition of Italians’ achievements. 
Though Roosevelt delayed entering his own campaign until polls started favoring Willkie 
in October, he managed to meet both suggestions from the Foreign Language Division in his first 
weekend on the campaign trail. On October 13 in Dayton, Ohio, the president delivered a 
Columbus Day address over the radio to the entire Western Hemisphere. He opened by 
celebrating the contribution of Italians as “an essential element in the civilization and makeup of 
all of the twenty-one republics” of the Americas, adding, “Italian names have been high on the 
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list of statesmen” and “have helped to create the scientific, commercial, professional and artistic 
life of the New World.” Addressing the second tactic suggested by the Foreign Language 
Division, he continued, “for many years every ounce of energy I have had has been devoted to 
keeping this nation and the other republics at peace with the rest of the world. That is what 
continues uppermost in my mind today.”125 
 The Democratic Party and the National Committee of Independent Voters for Roosevelt 
and Wallace worked hard to build on the president’s single attempt to recognize Italian 
Americans in the country and calm their anxieties. The Foreign Language Division established 
state organizations throughout the country for twenty-three different foreign language groups 
that made radio addresses, wrote newspaper articles, distributed pamphlets, stood on street 
corners, held rallies, and met with ethnic associations to get out the immigrant vote for Roosevelt. 
Of the 23 foreign-language groups organized by the Foreign Language Division, only the Italians 
had branches in all 48 states. Greeks comprised the second most ubiquitous foreign-language 
division, with offices in 26 states. The combined efforts of the Foreign Language Divisions 
helped secure the Italian urban vote overall, but their efforts were not enough to offset the “stab 
in the back speech” in New York where the president received just 42 percent of Italians’ 
votes.126 Even in the cities where he won Italians Roosevelt fared worse than his previous two 
elections. Across six major Italian American communities, the president lost an average of 21 
percentage points from his 1936 election, and in New York City he dropped 36 points ⁠.127 
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 In a post-election summary of the votes, The Washington Post explained Willkie was able 
to pick up a significant portion of the Italian American vote “by the simple expedient of saying 
nothing derogatory about Mussolini to offset Roosevelt’s ‘stab in the back.’”128 But the 
Republican Party and its local affiliates did not remain silent about foreign policy when 
campaigning to Italian Americans. The main talking points of the Republican Party to Italian 
Americans included the continuation of relief under Willkie, condemnation of the presidential 
third term, and most importantly, the likelihood of America entering the war under Roosevelt. 
The Columbian Republican League combined the last two points in its attacks on Roosevelt. It 
explained in campaign literature that both “war” and “third terms” were “monstrous creatures 
born of ambition sick with power, and from the need to bury the failings of eight years of 
government.”129 The League claimed Roosevelt only considered seeking a third term after 
Germany’s invasion of Poland, arguing “therefore, the European war, by Roosevelt’s admission, 
created the Third Term, and the Third Term—God forbid—will create war in America.”130  
What had begun as a campaign against the third term turned increasingly to scare tactics 
emphasizing America’s trajectory towards war. The day before the election, the “Non-Partisan 
Committee for Republican Victory,” a group closely connected to the Columbian Republican 
League, ran a full-page Italian-language ad in Il Progresso Italo-Americano, positioning the 
election as one between war and peace. After so many injustices, it explained, two million Italian 
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American voters should choose Willkie the next day because “the reelection of Roosevelt means 
the certainty of war.”131 Philadelphia’s Il Popolo Italiano ran an Election Day ad that simply 
asked, “Italian mothers that love their sons, do you want peace or war? Roosevelt is dragging us 
towards inevitable war.”132 
Democrats from Italian districts recognized the effectiveness of the Republican strategy 
and looked either to the DNC or the Committee of Independent Voters for Roosevelt and 
Wallace for assistance. Fiorello LaGuardia chaired the Committee of Independent Voters, and its 
Foreign Language Division handled desperate requests for the Mayor’s appearances from 
politicians in tight races across the country. In September, the Connecticut Federation of Italian 
American Democratic Clubs wrote “There has been considerable resentment against the 
president…because of his ‘knife in the back’ remarks and the 6,000 voters of italian extraction 
hold the balance of voting power.”133 In October, New York Congressman Alfred F. Beiter wrote 
to Democratic National Committee Chairman Ed Flynn asking for aid in Buffalo to combat 
Italian-Americans’ resentment against Roosevelt. “As you know” he wrote, “the Italian-
Americans are ‘off the reservation’ this year because of a feeling against the President.” He 
argued that the Italian vote in that city was crucial to the Democratic national strategy since the 
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party needed “to carry Buffalo by a large vote in order to carry the State.”134 Flynn passed the 
congressman’s letter on to the president along with a similar letter from Newark, New Jersey 
Mayor John Marinaro.   
The New Jersey Trade Union Committee for the Election of Roosevelt, Wallace and 
Edison wrote LaGuardia the next day asking him to make an appearance in Newark. “I think I 
need not urge upon you the importance of New Jersey as a pivotal state in the present 
Presidential campaign,” wrote the head of the committee, adding “with the tremendous 
percentage of Italian voters in Northern New Jersey conceded by all to be the key factor in 
swinging New Jersey’s electoral votes, I’m sure you can appreciate how invaluable an 
appearance here…would be.”135 
Later that week, Wendell Willkie gave speeches in Newark and Jersey City. He spoke 
about his and the audience’s shared origins as descendants of “Americans by choice” and then 
assailed New Jersey’s Democratic machine run by Frank Hague. He compared the New Deal to 
Nazi Germany at length, describing Hague as a “puny Hitler,” but carefully avoided mentioning 
Mussolini or Italy. About the president, Willkie said “not only has he pushed America close to 
the wars of Europe and Asia. He now seeks to drag the wars of Europe and Asia into American 
politics.”136 Mayor LaGuardia did accept the New Jersey Trade Union’s request for a speech, 
following Willkie a week later with his own campaign appearance in Newark. Addressing two 
thousand union workers, he criticized “the utility expert of the Republican Party” for meddling in 
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local New Jersey affairs, and underlined Roosevelt’s commitment to keeping the country out of 
war. From there, the Mayor continued on an aggressive speaking tour giving similar speeches in 
eleven other cities including Pittsburgh, Boston, Detroit, Chicago, and St. Louis.137 By the time 
he got to St. Louis LaGuardia had moved to the offensive, implying Willkie “planned to 
establish a Nazi-like government” and compared publicity director Bruce Barton to Herr 
Goebbels.138   
LaGuardia and Willkie’s strategy to evoke anxiety over Nazism—but not Italian 
Fascism—spoke to the country’s fear of being provoked into another world war by the stronger 
of the two European dictators. It also signaled the politicians’ disregard for anything 
approximating a pro-German vote. The politicians’ word choice may seem insignificant, but it 
represented a much greater disparity between the treatment of Italian and German Americans 
leading to World War II, with serious repercussions for America’s Axis immigrants after Pearl 
Harbor. The origins of this disparity can be traced to the idea one New York City congressman 
had in 1934 to begin an investigation into un-American activities. 
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Chapter Five: 
Good Americans, Good Italians, 1940-1948 
 
Two months after his third inauguration as president of the United States, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt invited newspaper editor Generoso Pope to a meeting at the White House. Roosevelt 
had honored Pope with other invitations during his previous terms to discuss Italian American 
issues like immigration reform and American neutrality, but the April 1941 meeting had no clear 
policy agenda. Was the meeting, as The Baltimore Sun offered, simply “acknowledgement of aid 
given by the Italian-born publisher in the last presidential campaign?”1 Pope surely deserved 
recognition for his efforts offsetting the “stab in the back speech” to win the president a small 
majority of Italian votes despite his 23 point decline among Italian voters overall, but that was 
not why Roosevelt called the meeting. He had summoned Pope in response to the leak of 
damning testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee. The testimony painted 
Pope as the mastermind behind a sinister plot to turn America’s Italians into Fascists, and in the 
wake of public outcry, Roosevelt decided he needed to meet with Pope in person. Would the 
president finally acknowledge the pro-Fascism of his strongest ethnic supporter and head of his 
party’s Italian Division? He would not. The Sun interpreted the meeting as a “gesture of 
confidence in the loyalty and Americanism of a man who had been accused before a 
congressional investigating panel of being a ‘Fascist leader’ in this country.”2 Pope described the 
conversation as a “very happy chat” with a longstanding friend. He presciently reassured his 
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readers, “Italo-Americans need have no worry, regardless of the events of the future.”3 
Despite Roosevelt’s “gesture of confidence” in Pope’s loyalty and Americanism, the 
catalyst behind the president’s summons caused Pope and the Italian American community great 
concern. For years, pro-Fascists had watched comfortably as the House un-American Activities 
Committees of 1934-1935 and 1938-1940 called hundreds of Nazis and Communists to answer 
for their activities in America while ignoring Italians. The second committee had asked only 
eight other Italians to testify on Fascist propaganda in its twenty-eight months of hearings, 
making them less than 2 percent of the committee’s 450 witnesses. Only one of the eight 
witnesses, anti-Fascist newspaper editor Girolamo Valenti, had given his testimony in an open 
session, and the committee simultaneously investigated him for communist activities, 
undermining his credibility. In contrast, the newly leaked testimony came from a highly credible 
source: the former publicity director of the Italian government in America.   
In testifying before Congress, former Fascist propagandist Goffredo Pantaleoni set out to 
do what no other anti-Fascist had yet accomplished: to convince America of the massive scale, 
efficacy, and danger of Italian American Fascism. Opening his testimony on December 22, 1940, 
Pantaleoni promised to “prove how a system is working in this country by which all the activities 
of Italian residents or Americans of Italian descent are bound to [Fascism] and have to forward 
and obey it.”4 To start, he mentioned all the ways “a man in his daily life” encountered Fascism: 
“Economy and trade, finance, transportation, propaganda, press, publicity, cultural activities, or 
he belongs to associations or clubs, and finally he may have military activities,” to which the 
acting chairman responded, “I take it the point you are making is they cover the entire gamut of 
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human experience?” “Perfectly,” responded Pantaleoni.5 
Over the next three hours, Pantaleoni mapped out the methods through which the Italian 
consuls encouraged or coerced prominenti to spread Fascist propaganda. Italian consuls, he 
explained, worked diligently and secretly at spreading their propaganda through organization 
heads, business owners, and radio broadcasters, tied together by the Italian-language newspapers, 
on which the whole system rested. He specifically named Generoso Pope’s papers, Il Progresso 
Italo-Americano and Il Corriere d’America, as “responsible for the changing of the Italian 
mentality…in becoming so much pro-Mussolini, pro-Fascist, pro-Germany, and pro-
totalitarian.”6 In addition to Pope’s Italian-language papers, the largest in the nation, Pantaleoni 
claimed Pope spread direct Fascist propaganda through twenty-seven Italian-language schools. 
He further accused Pope of raising a million dollars in support of the Ethiopian War; giving the 
Fascist salute at public events; writing editorials glorifying Mussolini and vilifying Churchill; 
and receiving a personal invitation to visit Italy from Benito Mussolini. During that trip, King 
Vittorio Emmanuelle III honored Pope with a medal “for his services.” “What services,” 
Pantaleoni asked Congress, “if not Fascist services?”7 
Italian Americans predicted the New York Post’s leak of Pantaleoni’s closed executive 
session would be as damaging to Fascism as Marcus Duffield’s 1929 exposé of the Fascist 
League of North America. Just the threat of a congressional investigation after Duffield’s article 
in Harper’s led Mussolini to disband the FLNA quickly and drastically change his program in 
the United States. Panicked, America’s Fascists reverted to their old tactics of violent 
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intimidation. Pantaleoni received death threats and went under police protection. The next month 
in Chicago, the former owner and editor of the strongly pro-Fascist newspaper L’Italia, John F. 
Arena, was gunned down hours after speaking to congressional investigators. Meanwhile, anti-
Fascists excitedly called upon their political contacts to take advantage of the Fascists’ 
vulnerability. Italian exile Count Carlo Sforza wrote to Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, 
adding his own accusations against Generoso Pope and urging Ickes to install anti-Fascists as 
editors of Pope’s two papers. Ickes forwarded Sforza’s recommendation to Roosevelt, instigating 
the president’s summons of Pope.8  
Pope had a more mixed response to Pantaleoni’s testimony. In the weeks following the 
leak, Pope published several editorials in his papers denying any connection with Italian 
language schools and averring “I profess only one ‘ism’ and that is Americanism.”9 His 
professions of Americanism did not lead to any change in policy for Il Progresso, however. On 
the pages between the Italian and English versions of his editorial denying any connection to 
Fascism, his paper included a list of Mussolini’s fallen soldiers under the headline “The Roster 
of Glory,” as well as the fifteenth list of donations to Italy through the Federation of Italian War 
Veterans.10 He printed another fifteen lists in the following weeks, collecting more than a quarter 
million dollars for Mussolini before the federal government abruptly shut down the collection in 
May.11 The State Department found the collection in violation of neutrality laws after it 
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investigated the Federation of Italian War Veterans more carefully, concluding they were “so 
closely identified with the Italian Government that they must be regarded as organizations acting 
for or on behalf of that government.”12 
Pope believed the political support he gave the Democratic Party protected him and the 
entire Italian American community by extension, and his meeting with Roosevelt in April 
confirmed his belief. If Pope was guilty of raising a million dollars for the Ethiopian War then so 
were the tens of thousands of individuals who contributed the funds. If Pope was un-American 
for sponsoring Italian Fascist schools throughout his city then so were immigrant parents for 
enrolling their American-born children. More importantly, if Roosevelt needed the votes of 
millions of Italian American voters, then he also needed Generoso Pope’s pro-Fascist 
propaganda network. Because pro-Fascists had so effectively tied Mussolini’s agenda to their 
community’s political participation, American politicians could not target the former without 
threatening their access to the latter. The House un-American Activities Committees initiated in 
1934 and 1938 made that situation clear to politicians in Congress and The White House. As a 
result, despite more than a decade of conspicuous support for Mussolini’s agenda in Italy and 
Africa, Italian Americans’ political capital—acquired in conjunction with their pro-Fascist 
political campaigns—saved them from the fate of their German and Japanese counterparts in the 
1940s and allowed them to keep advocating for their pro-Fascist agenda long after the U.S. 
entered World War II. Beginning with Samuel Dickstein’s Un-American Activities Committee 
of 1934 and extending through the end of Axis internment, American politicians saw Italian 
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Americans as too big to jail.  
Un-American Activities: The McCormack-Dickstein Committee of 1934 
In the spring of 1934 John W. McCormack of Massachusetts and Samuel Dickstein, a 
Jewish immigrant from Eastern Europe representing New York’s Lower East Side, initiated a 
congressional investigation into “the extent, character, and objects of Nazi propaganda activities 
in the United States.”13 Though Dickstein brought the investigation to life, he asked McCormack 
to serve as chair to circumvent his colleagues’ criticism that his Judaism biased his investigation. 
The committee collected thousands of pages of testimony on the Nazi movement in the United 
States, stating “all kinds of efforts and influence, short of violence and force, were used to obtain 
its desired objective, which was to consolidate persons of German birth or descent, if possible, 
into one group, subject to dictation from abroad.”14 Dickstein concluded the German government 
pursued its goals through three avenues. First, it distributed Nazi propaganda through ethnic 
clubs, radio programs, and newspapers. Second, its consuls exerted economic, political, and 
physical coercion on German immigrants to force their support of the Nazi regime. Finally, it 
directed a cultural project among ethnic Germans to forestall their complete assimilation, 
including Nazi youth summer camps in America.  
Despite Dickstein’s recusal from the chairman’s position, German American Nazis still 
referred to the investigation as the “Jewish inquisition” because of his zealous resolve to root out 
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all Nazi influence in America.15 Though not quite an inquisition, Dicktein’s determination to 
uncover a Nazi threat in America blinded him to the errors in his conclusions. In early 1934 the 
fate of the German American Bund was so bleak Bundist Karl Neumann wrote, “sometimes I 
think during the night that if our Führer, Adolf Hitler, ever saw the mess in New York, he would 
cry.”16 The following October McCormack and Dickstein publicized testimony they heard about 
a new group, the Association of the Friends of New Germany, prompting one ethnic leader to 
travel to Berlin and explain to the Führer in person the mess in New York. He warned Hitler that 
the Friends of New Germany would only harm the homeland and that the new association was 
chiefly responsible for causing disharmony among the German Americans.17  
Germany’s ambassador to the United States, Hans Luther, had a similarly pessimistic 
view of the Friends of New Germany, and urged the Foreign Ministry to seriously restrict the 
group’s membership and program in response to the Dickstein investigation. “In this connection 
I should like to call to mind the Italian experience,” Luther wrote, explaining how Mussolini had 
shut down the FLNA in 1929, “under the pressure of the anti-Fascist attitude here at the time, 
which never attained the strength or the proportions of the hostility which exists towards us.”18 
Dickstein and McCormack were exclusively interested in organizations managed and financed 
from abroad, typically with loyalty oaths to the homeland. Such a narrow description fit the 
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Friends of New Germany in 1934, and would have fit the FLNA had Mussolini not disbanded 
the organization in 1929. As Ambassador Luther explained, the Italians had adapted their 
mission and methods to suit the American political environment, and were much better than the 
Germans at managing their emigrants abroad. In contrast, he feared the Nazis were only better at 
repeating their mistakes and engendering hostility. Soon after, the German Foreign Ministry 
attempted to follow Italy’s lead by definitively forbidding German citizens from belonging to the 
Friends of New Germany and denying any connection between the association and the German 
government. 
Crisis management was not the only area in which Germany copied the Italian 
government. Harvard professor Gaetano Salvemini wrote of Germany’s entire operation in 
America “the German authorities were but aping what had been the practice of the Italian 
Fascists for many years.”19 Even the infamous Nazi summer camps were not original—Italians 
were first to establish pro-Fascist summer camps in America and even send students on free 
summer trips to Italy to learn from the Ballila, or Fascist youth. Unfortunately for the Anti-
Fascists, they lost control of that message quickly. The only anti-Fascist to testify before the 
McCormack-Dickstein Committee, Girolamo Valenti, was entirely unprepared for his 1934 
appearance. During his quick and disorganized testimony, Valenti named some prominent 
Fascists and anti-Fascists, gave the impression Generoso Pope was a victim of Italian 
government espionage, and characterized the entire Fascist problem as an internal squabble 
between Italian Americans over leadership of their ethnic associations. In sum, Valenti botched 
his first appearance. Dickstein later recalled Valenti’s performance as “barren of all facts, purely 
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hearsay, and of no value.”20 When the McCormack-Dickstein Committee published its findings 
in February of 1935 it dismissed entirely the idea of an Italian Fascist movement in the United 
States. While the committee acknowledged receiving some evidence that certain immigrants 
attempted to establish a fascist organization, it stated confidently, “no evidence was presented 
and this committee had none to show a connection between this effort and any fascist activity of 
any European country.”21 
Even if Valenti had been better prepared to face Congress, neither he nor his allies could 
effectively challenge the pro-Fascists’ political power in Congress and the McCormack-
Dickstein Committee specificallly. When finally confronted with evidence of Italian American 
Fascism, Samuel Dickstein went directly to Generoso Pope for answers. “In my presence he 
condemned their action and absolved the Italian people in this country of any participation in this 
movement,” Dickstein recalled years later in defense of Pope and his Committee. Salvemini 
wrote of Dickstein’s decision to ask “one of the key-men of the movement” about Fascist 
activities in America: “The lamb asked the wolf whether there were wolves in the vicinity.”22  
Dickstein’s decision to approach Pope directly made sense; the two were well acquainted 
through Tammany Hall politics, and Pope’s hold on the ethnic vote in New York made him a 
powerful political ally for the congressman. In January of 1935 Dickstein spoke at a banquet 
honoring Generoso Pope’s campaign to reform immigration laws. In February he published his 
report denying any Fascist activity in America, and in March he sat at the table of honor at 
Pope’s graduates’ banquet along with four congressmen, Mayor LaGuardia, Commissioner 
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General of Immigration MacCormack, Postmaster General Farley, and Italian Ambassador 
Augusto Rosso. Dickstein was clearly not the only American politician dependent on Pope’s 
political support, but he was the only one making a name for himself as an expert on un-
American activities. When he defended Generoso Pope in Congress his words carried weight. 
Days after Pantaleoni’s testimony leaked, in March of 1941, Dickstein defended Pope on 
the House floor as “an outstanding American citizen” who has “always condemned fascism and 
the Mussolini movement.”23 A month later Pope met with Roosevelt in the White House and 
Dickstein again spoke in Congress defending the newspaper editor. He also took the opportunity 
to malign Goffredo Pantaleoni, Giralomo Valenti, and the murdered Chicago witness John F. 
Arena as conspiratorial Fascists, Socialists, and criminals in league with mafia kingpin Al 
Capone. Dickstein’s exaggerated claims lead anti-Fascists to fear their window for shutting down 
Fascist propagandists was closing quickly.  
In an aggressive response, Girolamo Valenti sent copies of a special English-language 
edition of his newspaper La Parola to every congressman and senator the next month. The 
paper’s headline read: “GENEROSO POPE’S FASCIST RECORD: CONGRESSMAN 
DICKSTEIN CONNIVING WITH THE FIFTH COLUMNISTS.” 24 Valenti filled four pages 
with articles including, “Investigator Dickstein—Who Failed to Investigate;” “Why United 
States Should Interne Generoso Pope;” “The Story of a Disloyal Naturalized American” and 
“Generoso Pope’s Newspapers Have Been Engaged in Anti-Semitic Propaganda: Does 
Congressman Dickstein’s Conscience Bother Him?” Valenti prominently featured a reproduction 
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of one of Pope’s seven checks of $100,000 given to Ambassador Rosso during the Ethiopian 
War and a photograph of Pope giving the Fascist salute in Rome. 
Dickstein mentioned Valenti’s stunt when he made a third speech in Congress defending 
Generoso Pope as “one of the leading citizens of the city of New York and this country.”25 He 
refuted Valenti’s key evidence by pointing out that Mayor LaGuardia, Congressman Sirovich, 
and Justices Cotillo and Pecora all endorsed Pope’s fundraising for Ethiopia by attending a rally 
at Madison Square Garden in 1935. The pro-Fascists’ attempt to affix their support of Fascism to 
American politics paid off. Valenti’s shocking evidence of Pope’s $100,000 check to Mussolini 
became worthless when Dickstein read the statement of support LaGuardia gave at the same 
MSG rally. Dickstein further called for a government shutdown of Valenti’s paper and accused 
the major anti-Fascist players in New York—Girolamo Valenti, Carlo Tresca, and Max Ascoli—
of being a “communist provocator [sic],” an anarchist, and a Fascist, respectively.26 His remarks 
about Pope, Valenti, Tresca, and Ascoli were an almost verbatim copy of the editorial Pope 
published in defense of himself a few weeks earlier. 
Dickstein’s slurs did not restrain Carlo Tresca, a proud anarchist and anti-Fascist. In an 
article in his newspaper Il Martello titled “Mr. Dickstein, You Are a Jackass,” Tresca wrote of 
the most recent speech: “I do not know what kind of reward you received from Mr. Pope for 
services rendered to him in using your parliamentarian privileges, as a congressman, to make vile 
attacks against all his critics and political opponents.”27 “Perhaps you did not get a penny from 
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the sand king, the fascist millionaire, the tool of Mussolini in the United States,” Tresca 
continued, “You may care for the friendship of such a man: it may help you in getting some 
votes from Italian fascists in your constituency.” Considering Il Progresso had a readership of 
82,000 Pope’s friendship came with more than a few Italian votes for the congressman.28 
Un-American Activities: The Dies Committee of 1938 
When Martin Dies renewed the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1938, anti-
Fascists hoped the Texan, far removed from Pope’s influence, would give Italian Fascism due 
attention. Dies himself promised not to focus on any single ethnic group, and particularly not 
German Americans.29 In Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco, New York, Philadelphia, and 
Washington, D.C., anti-Fascists approached congressional investigators with extensive evidence 
of the Fascist political and propaganda networks operating in the country. To their dismay, Dies 
primarily focused on Communism, and instead of investigating Italian Fascism anew, he 
applauded the “splendid work done by the McCormack Committee” and “started where that 
group left off” by emphasizing the Nazi movement and ignoring evidence of Italian American 
Fascism.30 
Dies’ continuation of the McCormack investigation began with the return of Girolamo 
Valenti to the witness stand in October of 1938. This time, Valenti came prepared both to face 
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accusations that he was a Communist and to prove “the influence of the powerful organs of 
propaganda emanating from well-knit and centralized fascistic forces which are mind-
conditioning American citizens and swerving their allegiance to Italian dictatorship under the 
thumping fist of Mussolini.”31 Valenti introduced twenty-four pieces of evidence including 
letters of intimidation from Italian consuls to immigrant anti-Fascists; application forms for the 
Association of Italian Fascists Abroad in New York City; pro-Fascist Italian textbooks used at 
the Abraham Lincoln High School in Brooklyn; photographs of American children in Detroit and 
Pittsburgh returning from free trips to Italy dressed in Fascist uniforms; phonographs of pro-
Fascist radio programs; the copper postcards sent to Mussolini during the Ethiopian War; and the 
published vows of Fascist allegiance made by numerous Italian American businessmen.  
Valenti offered what he believed were impressive statistics of Italian American 
Fascists—10,000 in the Black Shirt legions; 100,000 members of some 200 pro-Fascist 
organizations, and another 100,000 immigrants within the influence of Fascist propaganda. The 
numbers were actually a remarkably low estimate, particularly for those involved in pro-Fascist 
organizations or under the influence of pro-Fascist propaganda.32 Throughout his testimony, 
Valenti made comparisons between Italian and German activities, showing his recognition of 
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Congress’s overblown obsession with the Nazi threat and his willingness to adapt his testimony 
to appeal to the American politicians. That strategy had the adverse effect of giving the 
misleading impression that Italian American Fascists copied and were subordinate to the German 
American Bund. Furthermore, Valenti’s claims of 10,000 Black Shirts would hardly impress an 
American public or Congress that had heard Samuel Dickstein’s hyperbolic claims of 450,000 
members in the German American Bund.33 
Almost a year passed before Dies called his next witnesses on Italian Fascism: an anti-
Fascist Italian in San Francisco and then six Italians in Chicago. In San Francisco, businessman 
and Republican Party leader Antonio Cogliandro submitted a report on Italian Fascist activities 
he had written for California’s Attorney General Earl Warren at Warren’s personal request. The 
report resembled Valenti’s for its thoroughness in listing all the ways Italian consuls helped pro-
Fascist organizations and punished anti-Fascists in the state, with special emphasis on how the 
consuls reached children through youth groups and sports teams. However, despite his 
description of a ubiquitous propaganda system that reached 50,000 children in schools and 
infiltrated bocce clubs and women’s auxiliaries, Cogliandro estimated 75 percent of Italian 
Americans in California were still anti-Fascist, 10 percent Fascist, and 15 percent uninformed 
and apathetic. “It is really a miracle if the great majority of our fellow citizens of Italian origin 
remain faithful to democracy notwithstanding the barrage of Fascist propaganda from paid 
fascist agencies, the totalitarian kept press, the radio, etc.”34 More than a miracle, it was creative 
math calculated by someone who wanted to protect the image of Italian Americans. 
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In Chicago, four of the six witnesses either had no direct connection with Fascism or 
denied having any. The fifth, newspaper editor Egidio Clemente, undermined his testimony by 
giving a rosier picture of the Fascist situation than his experience suggested. Clemente stated 
Fascism hardly existed in his city, citing at most 2,000 Fascists in a city of 300,000 Italians.35 
Clemente did not mention that newspaper stands refused to sell his anti-Fascist paper because 
they either disagreed with his stance against Mussolini or because they feared reprisals from 
zealous pro-Fascists. Fascists in Chicago were particularly quick to violence, perhaps because of 
the mafia’s influence there, and Clemente believed the threats against his friends and himself 
were serious enough to warrant the relocation of his paper to New York City. Clemente remained 
in Chicago, though he confessed to a friend that his wife often wept in fear for their safety.36  
Clemente’s most interesting claim was that Italian parochial schools indoctrinated 
students with Fascism by using the textbooks sent from Italy, which Dies found hard to believe. 
Dies questioned Clemente extensively on how he came up with the idea that the church would 
teach Fascism, stating, “I don’t understand that, because the Catholic Church is not in sympathy 
with Mussolini and never has been in sympathy. I cannot understand how priests and nuns would 
teach Fascist literature in the schools.”37 Clemente responded matter-of-factly that in Chicago, 
Italians understood it perfectly well. Besides Italian Americans’ general sympathy for Mussolini, 
there were practical reasons for the nuns and priests to teach Fascism. Italy gave out the 
textbooks for free and the consuls sponsored fundraising events for parochial schools. Dies’ 
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disbelief underscored how his search for official agents of foreign governments prevented him 
from seeing the effectiveness of Italy’s unofficial propaganda system. Thinking of the Catholic 
Church’s policy towards Mussolini and seeing priests and nuns as obedient agents of the Vatican, 
Dies could not understand the system Clemente described in which local consuls helped 
everyone from nuns to political bosses do their jobs better with the use of pro-Fascist propaganda.  
Dies had an easier time stomaching the testimony of the last Chicago witness, Dr. Renzo 
Sereno, professor of political science at the University of Chicago. In a November 1939 closed 
executive session, Sereno gave the committee the type of testimony it liked, replete with hard 
evidence about official organizations with money trails and loyalty oaths connecting members to 
Italy. Sereno spoke about the activities of the Italian Ministry of Popular Culture and accused Il 
Progresso Italo-Americano, Il Grido dello Stirpe, and Chicago’s L’Italia of copying the Fascist 
propaganda message “from A to Z.”38 Sereno also presented and analyzed a sample of 35 
membership applications for the Benito Mussolini Club in New York. Fully Fascist associations 
like the Benito Mussolini Club were small and rare in Italian American communities, but since 
they most resembled the German American Bund they received more attention than pro-Fascist 
associations like the 250,000 person Order of the Sons of Italy. 
 Sereno’s study revealed that most members were semiskilled naturalized Americans who 
had lived in the country for an average of 18 years. The Emergency Quota Act of 1921 that had 
encouraged Italian settlement and naturalization passed 18 years prior, so the description actually 
matched a large portion of the Italian community. As representations of Italian Americans 
nationwide, Sereno argued the behavior of the 35 Benito Mussolini members signaled a much 
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greater phenomenon occurring in American politics, as he explained:  
Most of these people are American voters and thus Fascist propaganda can have a direct 
influence on American elections. Italian diplomatic and consular agents in the United 
States make no mystery of the fact that a political union of Italo-American voters would 
put the Fascist government in a most advantageous position for bargaining with the 
leaders of the major parties…the aims of this club are contrary to the American tradition, 
the American idea of citizenship, and in some instances the American laws.39 
 
In organizing Italian American voters on behalf of Italy, Sereno claimed, “there is no doubt that 
the clubs serve exclusively the purposes of the Fascist government.” The Ethiopian War 
definitively proved the political actions of pro-Fascist networks served the Fascist government, 
but the ongoing Italian language campaigns showed they served the Italian American community 
just as much, something Sereno did not acknowledge. Sereno attributed the problem to the 
Fascist clubs, disregarding the culpability of American politicians who had employed pro-
Fascists, their organizations, and their propagandist rhetoric to win Italian American votes. 
Ignoring the interchange between Italian Americans, the Italian state, and American politicians 
over Italianità and transnationalistic citizenship, Sereno reopened the old debate over loyalty 
oaths and nationalistic citizenship, arguing the Benito Mussolini club showed “a total lack of 
feeling of American citizenship.” Since several members were both naturalized Americans and 
members of the Fascist Party, he claimed they had taken oaths “to fight and die for Il Duce and 
fascism and thus have denied their oath as citizens.”40 What he did not recognize was that 
American politicians had already made axiomatic the transnationalistic idea that one could not be 
a good American by forgetting Italy. 
Sereno’s testimony came closest to giving the Dies Committee a reason to care about 
Italian American Fascism as it actually existed, and not as it resembled the German American 
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Bund. Despite his testimony, when the Dies Committee published a report on its findings in 
January of 1941 it wrote four lines about Italian American Fascism: “Mussolini too has made an 
effort to spread among people of Italian ancestry in America the idea that their first loyalty is to 
Fascist Italy. The faithful Fascist, whether or not he be an American citizen, is required to take 
the following oath which speaks for itself.” The report quoted the defunct FLNA’s membership 
oath, and then quickly switched to the strategies Stalin and Hitler employed using “Trojan horses 
or ‘fifth columns’” in the United States.41 The Committee did not take up the question of Italian 
American Fascism again. 
The Committee’s Effect 
Congressman McCormack once defended the legacy of his Un-American Activities 
Committee by insisting that its significance rested on its ability to influence public opinion above 
all else. Discrediting the idea that his committee’s effectiveness could be best measured by the 
legislation it inspired, he explained, “the great value that a special committee of this kind will 
have to the people and to our country is the arousing of public opinion against subversive 
activities.”42 While Congress attempted to keep America out of war by passing legislation for 
both neutrality and preparedness, the appearance of the “fifth column” in the Spanish Civil War 
forced Americans to look inward at domestic threats to their nation’s isolationism. The fear of 
internal threats increased the importance of public opinion. Domestic enemies and subversives 
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could be more effectively routed out by their neighbors than by Congress or the Army, so a well-
defended America meant a well-informed citizenry. Though McCormack’s investigation resulted 
in only one new law on investigatory procedure, the Committee would successfully arouse 
American newspapers, Hollywood filmmakers, President Roosevelt, and FBI Director J. Edgar 
Hoover to Samuel Dickstein’s imagined fifth column threat of German spies and saboteurs.  
As an explanation for why the United States government cared so little about Italian 
American Fascism, historians often cite a March, 1940 poll that asked Americans to name the 
nation exerting the worst influence in Europe. 55 percent named Germany, 34 percent Russia, 
1.8 percent England, and only 1.2 percent cited Italy.43 Since Americans did not see Italy as a 
major threat before it invaded France, scholars argue they could not have seen Italian Americans 
as a threat either. But there is no reason to assume Americans automatically tied their perception 
of a nation to that of its emigrants. In the early 1900s, when the nascent Italian state was too 
weak to feed its people, the American public was consumed with Italophobia. After an Italian 
immigrant living in Paterson, New Jersey traveled back to Italy to assassinate King Umberto I in 
1900, newspapers printed scores of stories on the “anarchist den” in Paterson and on the larger 
threat of Italian anarchists, bolshevists, and mafia gangsters.44 Americans’ early twentieth 
century fear of Italians transferred to the federal government, which passed corresponding 
restrictive immigration laws.  
In the case of Fascism, the direction was reversed. Fear of German Americans and 
disregard of Italian Americans originated with Samuel Dickstein’s committee in 1934 and spread 
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to the general American public. In 1939, a Gallup poll asked Americans about their opinions of 
the Dies Committee on un-American activities. Three out of five Americans had heard of it, and 
of those, three out of four were convinced its findings were legitimate and important enough to 
support the committee’s continuation. That year, Dies promised to study three major subjects, 
and respondents were asked which they believed most important. 42 percent said pro-war 
propaganda, 32 percent said Nazi activities, and 26 percent said Communist activities.45 Italian 
Fascism was not an option. When Dickstein opened his investigation in 1934 his colleagues in 
the House criticized him for taking a personal, religious vendetta against Nazism in Germany 
and bringing it into American politics. By 1939 the Un-American Activities Committees had 
trained almost a third of Americans to see German American Nazism as the greatest threat to the 
country and consider Italian Fascists as so insignificant they did not merit study at all.  
The full effect of the McCormack-Dickstein Committee on the nation would not become 
apparent until Martin Dies picked up where the two left off in 1938. In the White House the 
effect was quicker. In August of 1936 President Roosevelt called FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover 
to the White House to discuss the problems presented by the committee. Hoover walked away 
from the meeting with a verbal directive from the president to aggressively investigate 
Communist and Nazi activities, and began culminating a secret list of suspect individuals. Over 
the next three years Congressman Dies attempted to centralize investigatory power in the House 
of Representatives, forcing Roosevelt to stake his claim to jurisdiction over the matter by making 
Hoover’s secret work official. In September of 1939 Roosevelt announced that the FBI would 
take the lead in all investigations into espionage, sabotage, subversion, and violation of neutrality 
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laws.46 
Roosevelt’s announcement tied the FBI’s investigation, the Dies Committee, and public 
opinion together in the country’s pursuit of fifth columnists. Dies believed his committee should 
sit at the center of the government’s pursuit of subversive activities and openly criticized 
Roosevelt and Hoover for not doing enough to combat the Communist and Nazi threat. Dies 
publicly accused the Roosevelt administration of harboring 2,850 known Communists in key 
government positions, and regularly rebuked the FBI for its slow movement dismantling the 
network of America’s imagined 400,000 Bundists. Rather than downplay the threat, Hoover 
responded by writing articles affirming the menace of spies and saboteurs and stating a Nazi fifth 
column was “capable of more damage to our national defense than a huge invading force.”47 He 
assured his readers that his bureau worked tirelessly with highly skilled officers in Naval and 
Military Intelligence—but not Congress—to take down the German fifth column. For both Dies 
and Hoover, danger lurked everywhere and the only answer was to expand the budgets and 
jurisdictions of their respective investigatory bodies.   
Americans reacted to the public turf war between Dies and Hoover by engaging in 
amateur investigating of their own. In 1935 the FBI received just 35 complaints from Americans 
suspecting espionage from their neighbors, but in 1938 the number jumped to 240. That year the 
FBI uncovered a German spy ring in New York City, leading to indictments for 18 individuals, 
four of whom were in American custody. The first spy caught, Guenther Gustav Rumrich, had 
offered his services to the German government in 1936, providing his homeland with mostly 
declassified and publicly available documents. Rumrich was caught in 1938 in an audacious 
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attempt to pass himself off as Secretary of State Cordell Hull in hopes of obtaining U.S. passport 
blanks. His arrest exposed himself and everyone he had worked with for the previous two years, 
leading to the arrest of three other individuals. Despite the spy ring’s largely unsuccessful 
operation, the trial regularly made front-page headlines. The story continued to stay in the news 
after the lead FBI agent on the case published a book about his story titled The Nazi Spy 
Conspiracy in America. Warner Brothers turned the book into a movie, Confessions of a Nazi 
Spy, in April of 1939. The film portrayed the German American Bund as the source of Hitler’s 
power in America and dramatically played up the extent of German espionage in the United 
States, drawing the public’s attention to the Bund as a potential fifth column. Fritz Kuhn, leader 
of the German American Bund, brought an unsuccessful five million dollar libel suit against 
Warner Brothers, which he dropped in 1940.48 The libel suit did not deter Hollywood, which 
produced 94 films between 1939 and 1942 on spies, sabotage, and subversion in America.  
The German American Bund attracted even more attention that spring when leader Fritz 
Kuhn hosted a celebration in Madison Square Garden for George Washington’s birthday. 
Germany’s consul general in New York Hans Borchers thought the event, which drew a sold-out 
crowd of 22,000, finally reflected a discipline and awareness of American public opinion Kuhn 
had previously been lacking. Borchers noted every effort was made to give the event “a purely 
American stamp,” by singing the Star Spangled Banner, delivering speeches in English, and 
printing a declaration in the program booklet stating “The Bund is opposed to all isms in 
American public life, including Nazism and Fascism.” In many ways the event resembled 
Italians’ pro-Fascist events, including Generoso Pope’s earlier celebrations of Washington’s 
birthday and his sold-out pro-Ethiopian War rally of 1935, also held at Madison Square Garden. 
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But while Pope’s MSG event had attracted 1,000 protestors, the negative publicity did not 
diminish its overall success in uniting the Italian American community and establishing the pro-
Fascist agenda in Italian American politics. In contrast, Kuhn’s event required the largest police 
protection detail of any event in New York’s history: 1,700 policemen held back a 100,000-
person crowd. The event further convinced Borchers that growing a decisive political bloc of 
Germans in America was “practically hopeless.”49 
The events differed in two other important respects. First, Kuhn’s speakers called for a 
“Jew-free America,” reflecting the German American Bund’s strong and open anti-Semitism, 
which made them immediate targets of well-organized Jewish political organizations.50 Nazism’s 
anti-Semitism was what initially drew Samuel Dickstein’s attention to German American 
propaganda in the United States in the early 1930s, opening the inquest into un-American 
activities. In contrast, Italian Americans had little room for anti-Semitism in their political and 
working lives, and Generoso Pope worked closely with Jewish politicians, making anti-Semitic 
remarks a rarity in pro-Fascist propaganda.  
The second major difference concerned the choice of speakers at the two events. While 
all of Kuhn’s speakers were leaders and members of the German American Bund, Pope’s 
speakers were all politicians. With the backing of a congressman, two state supreme court judges, 
and New York’s mayor, Pope’s event could raise $55,000 for Mussolini and sing the Fascist 
hymn with little problem. Conversely, Kuhn’s George Washington celebration was such a public 
relations disaster it convinced Consul General Borchers that Germany needed to dissociate itself 
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completely from the German American Bund. All the efforts of Americanization could not turn 
back the influence Dickstein, Dies, and the Rumrich spy ring had on public opinion. Nor could it 
solve their fundamental problem, according to Borchers: “that Germany can scarcely anticipate 
great advantages from politically organizing a so-called German-American element.”51 
The Madison Square Garden event and the film Confessions of a Nazi Spy, combined 
with Martin Dies’ claims in the press, contributed to a rise in espionage complaints to 1,651 from 
the summer of 1938 to 1939. Over the next twelve months, Germany invaded Poland, beginning 
World War II; Roosevelt placed the FBI in charge of investigating subversive activities; and Dies 
continued to lambast the bureau for ignoring and hampering his committee’s findings. “Fifth 
columnists” also became a household word and a political tool. The day after Holland 
surrendered to Hitler, in May of 1940, Roosevelt spoke to Congress, mentioning the fifth column 
threat as he asked for the production of fifty thousand military planes a year. The next day Dies 
gave an hour-long speech blaming the fall of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Finland on the 
activities of fifth columnists in each nation. Dies pointed to the situation of the United States, 
where he claimed the Communist Party in America and the German American Bund each had a 
membership of 100,000, stating “in dealing with the most difficult problem that the Government 
can deal with we have been handicapped in every conceivable manner. I say to this House and to 
our Government that we need your help.”52 Two days later Dies introduced a bill in the House to 
furnish his committee with another $100,000.53  
Attorney General Robert H. Jackson responded that week by warning the country “to take 
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sensational fifth column stories with a grain of salt.”54 He announced the FBI was working 
“effectively and zealously to combat fifth column activities in this country” but nonetheless 
urged Americans to help by reporting any evidence of suspicious activity. That month 
complaints to the FBI peaked with 2,871 in a single day. By the end of the fiscal year in June, the 
FBI had heard 16,885 complaints.55 In September, a Gallup poll revealed 48 percent of 
Americans believed fifth columnists lived in their communities.56 
Not to be overshadowed, the Senate revived an all but dead bill for alien registration, 
which the House passed 382-4.  Roosevelt signed the Alien Registration Act (Smith Act) in June, 
to the approval of 95 percent of Americans.57 The registration and fingerprinting of America’s 
five million aliens proceeded with surprisingly little difficulty between August and December of 
1940, though the full report on registration was not released until October of 1941.  
The registration of aliens in the fall of 1940 drew Italian Americans’ attention to their 
large alien population. When the Department of Justice released a preliminary report of 
registration in February of 1941 it did not account for the nationalities of aliens registered, but 
did note that the total of 5 million aliens had surpassed earlier estimates by 1.4 million, and 
pointed to New York where a quarter of the nation’s aliens resided. In New York City, where 
one in five immigrants came from Italy, citizenship had long been a project and frustration for 
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Generoso Pope. It was clear to him that Italians would comprise a large portion of the registered 
aliens in the country when the final results were published, and they did. The final tally revealed 
Italians were the largest group of aliens in the nation and the majority of Axis aliens by a large 
margin. 694,971 Italian citizens resided in the country, dwarfing Germany’s 315,004 and Japan’s 
91,853.58 
The Immigration and Naturalization Services estimated a 100 percent increase in 
citizenship applications that fiscal year in response to the registration drive, though Pope was 
less optimistic. Alien registration had shed light on the high number of undocumented Italians 
who risked revealing their status to the government if they registered, and risked arrest if they 
did not. Because of Italy’s low quota numbers for immigration, hopeful immigrants commonly 
overstayed tourist visas or joined a ship’s crew only to desert in port, earning the derogatory 
label “WOP” for Italian Americans, meaning “without papers.” Pope was sympathetic to their 
cause, having campaigned for years to legalize their statuses with little success. Some 
immigrants with family ties in the country could apply to have their deportation orders cancelled, 
but the backlog for applications caused yearlong waiting periods. Others could cross the border 
to Mexico or Canada and reapply for entry within the limited Italian quota, though they risked 
getting stuck in a foreign country. For the rest, Pope suggested they register anyway, betting the 
government would not deport them since it was currently low on available ships.59 
Even among legal residents, naturalizations traditionally lagged for Italians plagued by 
low literacy and English language skills. To help them, Pope opened an office at his newspaper 
staffed with an immigration lawyer for walk-in assistance. In announcing the office Pope wrote 
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that he hoped his readers would take advantage of the material, political, and moral benefits 
citizenship offered. He repeated some of his old reasons for naturalization: the right to vote, to 
peddle goods, to receive Social Security, and rely on public relief, and added a new one: “Now 
that the United States creates a great army through the draft, will you find yourself in the strange 
moral condition of a non-citizen father—a non American—that has his son serving the army, 
perhaps in war, of a Country in which he is a foreigner?”60 Thousands of fathers would 
experience that strange moral condition just eight months later. 
Pope latched his community-based support of naturalization onto citywide and national 
efforts at increasing the number of applications for citizenship. President Roosevelt designated 
May 18, 1941 “I am an American Day,” asking officials to host events “calculated to impress 
upon all our citizens, both native born and naturalized the special significance of citizenship in 
this nation.”61 Though Pope was still printing lists of contributions from its readers for the Italian 
government, and though Mayor LaGuardia had asked the FBI to investigate Pope for un-
American activities, LaGuardia still felt obligated to ask Pope to serve on the organizing 
committee for the city’s events that day. 3,500 cities nationwide hosted events on May 18, 
though none could rival the 750,000 people who turned out for the massive celebration in Central 
Park—a gathering larger than the entire population of San Francisco. The civic pride celebrated 
through public naturalization festivities was reinforced by the penalties for not registering. On “I 
am an American Day” the Immigration and Naturalization Services announced the arrest of 123 
men from the greater New York area. Mostly Italian and German undocumented immigrants who 
had overstayed tourist visas or walked off ships, they had not registered under the Alien 
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Registration Act of 1940 and as such were being held in Ellis Island. Whether from civic pride or 
fear, by the time Italy declared war on the United States the number of Italian aliens in the 
country had dropped to 600,000.62 Nearly 100,000 Italian aliens had naturalized that year. 
America at War 
Even with the increase in Italian naturalization, on December 7, 1941 twice as many 
Italian aliens as Germans lived in the United States, though Germans outnumbered Italians on 
Hoover’s secret lists eleven to one.63 The night of Pearl Harbor the FBI began rounding up 
several hundred individuals from its lists, and on the 10th Hoover announced the majority of 
arrests had been carried out. The FBI had arrested 1,291 Japanese, 857 German, and 147 Italian 
suspects with no distinction made for citizenship status. Hoover was prevented from announcing 
his progress on the previous day, he remembered, because Attorney General Francis Biddle was 
unsatisfied with the results. Hoover recalled, “the Attorney General decided not to issue a press 
statement [on December 9] because we had only taken into custody a little over 400 Germans, 
that if this figure were given out public opinion would be very unfavorable.”64 The lists were not 
just susceptible to public opinion; they were actually created by the public’s tips to the FBI over 
the previous two years. The Justice Department’s surprising disclosure in the fall of 1941 that 
Italians made up two thirds of Axis aliens could hardly undo six years of definitive claims by 
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Dickstein, Dies, Hoover, and even Roosevelt that German American Nazis posed a far greater 
threat than Italians. Americans believed them, as reflected in the disproportionately large number 
of accusations they made to the FBI about their German neighbors. Polling conducted by the 
Office of Strategic Services in the month after Pearl Harbor further demonstrates the Dies 
Committee’s success at convincing Americans of the existence of a German fifth column. 38 
percent of respondents in January of 1942 believed there were aliens in their communities 
disloyal to the United States. When asked which nationality the alleged aliens were, 82 percent 
said German, 29 percent said Italian and just 24 percent said Japanese.65 The results were skewed 
regionally, with New England and Middle Atlantic areas targeting more Germans, and Pacific 
states suspecting more Japanese. 
Hoover and Biddle were both closely handled by President Roosevelt, and all three 
responded to the American media and public opinion when assessing the German and Italian 
threats. Biddle recalled the exchange he had with President Roosevelt after Germany and Italy 
declared war against the United States. The president had already signed proclamation 2525, 
declaring all Japanese citizens in the country enemy aliens, and now Biddle had proclamations 
2526 and 2527 for the classification of German and Italian enemy aliens, respectively. The 
president asked how many German aliens lived in the country, to which Biddle incorrectly 
answered 600,000—the number of Italian aliens and almost twice the number of Germans. “And 
you’re going to intern all of them,” the president stated, which Biddle considered an “impulsive 
and absurdly impractical suggestion.” “I don’t care so much about the Italians,” the president 
continued. “They are a lot of opera singers, but the Germans are different, they may be 
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dangerous.”66 Roosevelt’s feelings on Italian opera singers should not be taken as a glib remark, 
but as the product of a longstanding political relationship he had with prominent Italian 
American Fascists, and the exaggerated claims Dies, Dickstein, and Hoover made about German 
American Bundists for their own political advancement.  
Rather than focus on the potential threat of German Americans, over the following few 
weeks, politicians, civic associations, and the Hearst newspaper chain played on a long history of 
racism against Japanese immigrants to win support for the ethnic group’s mass internment. 
Though the Attorney General strongly opposed the mass evacuation of 112,000 Japanese on the 
West Coast, by February Biddle saw public opinion was decidedly against him, as was the Army, 
the California congressional delegation, Governor Culbert Olson, California Attorney General 
Earl Warren, and Mayor Fletcher Bowron of Los Angeles, where most Japanese residents lived. 
Martin Dies soon joined the bandwagon to claim the FBI failed to investigate and arrest 15,000 
Japanese spies in America.67 In reality, a State Department investigation conducted in October 
and November of 1941 had concluded definitively that the Japanese in America were 
exceedingly loyal to the United States and not a threat. The Munson Report was read by Biddle 
and Roosevelt and circulated to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, though all but 
Biddle supported evacuation.68 In his memoir, Biddle reflected on the reasons for Japanese 
internment, asking “did the military really think that mass evacuation was necessary? Certainly 
not for six weeks and not in Hawaii” he responded.69 The lack of evidence that Japanese 
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constituted any real threat, as well as the lag between Pearl Harbor and calls for internment 
convinced Biddle that the politicians pushing mass internment on him and Lt. General John L. 
DeWitt, commander of the Western Defense Command and the 4th Army, were not truly worried 
about security.  
DeWitt did not decide on Japanese internment in a vacuum, but with the support of local 
and national politicians that were equally influenced by a growing number of anti-Japanese 
voices including “the American Legion, the California Joint Immigration Committee, the Native 
Sons and Daughters of the Golden West, the Western Growers Protective Association, the 
California Farm Bureau Federation, the Chamber of Commerce of Los Angeles, and the 
newspapers.”70 The racist rhetoric the pro-internment coalition employed to further its cause did 
not make allowances for citizenship, supporting the removal of not just Japanese aliens, but all 
persons of Japanese descent. One Los Angeles Times editorial exemplified the type of racist 
thinking that allowed Californians to consider the internment of American citizens of Japanese 
descent both acceptable and necessary: “A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is 
hatched,” W.H. Anderson wrote in early February: 
“So a Japanese-American, born of Japanese parents, nurtured upon Japanese 
traditions…notwithstanding his nominal brand of accidental citizenship, almost 
inevitably and with the rarest of exceptions grows up to be a Japanese, not an 
American…and himself is a potential and menacing, if not an actual, danger to our 
country unless properly supervised, controlled, and as it were, hamstrung.”71 
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Anderson’s “accidental citizenship” for Japanese immigrants fit Mussolini’s vision of Italian 
citizens remaining Italian to the seventh generation abroad, yet no one suspected American-born 
Italians of subversion. Later, supporters of Italian aliens would rely on the term “accidental alien” 
to garner sympathy for the plight of immigrants who had lived in the United States for 30 or 40 
years without ever obtaining citizenship. The saga of an Italian immigrant too busy, illiterate, or 
poor to take a citizenship test induced more sympathy than the plight of an American-born child 
with Japanese parents. 
On February 19, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, providing for the 
exclusion of certain persons, regardless of citizenship, from military zones. Soon after, the House 
of Representatives Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, also known as 
the Tolan Committee, held hearings on the mass evacuation of enemy aliens from military zones. 
Hearing testimony from politicians, scholars, businessmen, police, and concerned citizens, the 
committee considered the feasibility, legality, and desirability of interning Japanese, German, 
and Italian enemy aliens. 
When the Tolan Committee asked witnesses to compare the three ethnic groups, many 
evoked racial language to insist Japanese hid their thoughts and feelings better than Germans and 
Italians. The Chiefs of Police in Alameda and Berkeley both found it “practically impossible to 
obtain information, to obtain true impressions of the Japanese” because there existed “no 
particularly common meeting ground for the oriental and occidental mind.”72 Others, like Mayor 
John Gordon of Madera, California, indicated that Italians’ eagerness to report each other to the 
FBI for suspicious activities made them a more honest group as a whole, whereas he claimed the 
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Japanese would never inform on their own.73 A few betrayed the economic motivations behind 
their support of Japanese internment, like Asahel Curtis Jr., executive secretary of the Seattle 
Retail Florists’ Association. After describing the “Japanese infiltration” of the floral industry and 
“its many ramifications” for white businesses, Mr. Curtis tried hiding his economic motives 
behind Americanism by targeting the Japanese American Civic League.74 Curtis felt ethnic 
associations were proof of immoral and un-American activities, and described the JACL as “the 
same old Japanese trait.” “It was formed for only one purpose—to protect the Japanese, the same 
as every other Japanese society,” he explained, asking, “Is there a German or Italian Civic 
League? No! If there was we would run them out of the country.”75 
Of course the Italians had numerous civic leagues, bolstered by years of cooperation with 
the Fascist government that set to work immediately defending and protecting their communities. 
In San Francisco, a new committee of “Italians Loyal to the United States” quickly scheduled 
meetings with California’s Attorney General Earl Warren and a member of DeWitt’s staff to 
discuss the idea of Italian internment. General DeWitt openly shared his vision for removing all 
enemy aliens of Italian, German, and Japanese birth from the Western Command. He believed 
the internment of Japanese residents was just a first step to securing the region, with German and 
Italian internment to follow soon after. Although the Tolan Committee recommended against 
German and Italian internment, Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 gave General DeWitt the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Ibid., 10995. 
 
74 Economics can not be discounted as a major motivation for Japanese internment. Michi Nishiura 
Weglyn notes Japanese in California controlled nearly one half of the commercial truck crops in 
California and held a monopoly on the retail distribution of fruits and vegetables in Southern California. 
Weglyn, Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America’s Concentration Camps, 37. 
 
75 U.S. Congress, National Defense Migration, “Hearings Before the Select Committee Investigating 
National Defense Migration, H. Res. 113” (77th Cong. 2nd Sess. Part 30, March 26, 1942), 11611. 
 
	   279 
authority to evacuate anyone he believed dangerous, regardless of race or citizenship status.  
In the Italians’ meeting with the Army, Justice John Molinari impressed upon DeWitt’s 
men the logistical problem of removing more than 50,000 Italian aliens from the military zones 
of California. Besides their size, Molinari’s committee explained how removal would prove a 
major infrastructure and economic problem for the state. Italians heavily dominated in fishing, 
truck farming, and perhaps most importantly, garbage collection. Finally, Molinari told Warren 
and the Army that Italians would not go quietly—they would litigate and advise affected Italians 
not to go; a substantially different response than that of the Japanese American Citizens’ 
League.76 Similar conversations happened in D.C. and in the hearings of the Tolan Committee, 
leading the committee to conclude in its report that any proposal of Italian internment “is out of 
the question if we intend to win this war.”77 For the same reasons, the Army and Navy stopped 
all plans to intern Japanese in Hawaii, describing the islands’100,000 Issei and Nisei as a “vital 
labor supply” that were too numerous to house and feed.78 By May, the War Department advised 
General DeWitt against evacuating Italian and German aliens on the West Coast, opting for the 
individual exclusion of certain dangerous aliens instead. Out of 600,000 Italian enemy aliens, the 
Justice Department interned only 232 and paroled another 265 by the time Italy surrendered.79 
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The Year of Anxiety: December 8, 1941 to October 12, 1942 
Italian aliens did not make it through the war entirely unscathed. On December 8, 1941 
President Roosevelt signed proclamations 2526 and 2527 naming Germans and Italians living in 
the United States “enemy aliens.” From New York to California immigrants and their families 
faced a range of new experiences as a result of the enemy alien status that ran from mildly 
inconvenient to deeply traumatic and even tragic, with a handful of Italians committing suicide 
as a result of their degraded status.80 An array of restrictions attached to the enemy alien label 
expanded over the first few months of the war until October 12, 1942 when Attorney General 
Francis Biddle announced the title no longer applied to Italians. Scholars refer to the ten months 
between Pearl Harbor and Columbus Day as the “year of anxiety” for Italian Americans who 
worried each new restriction would lead them closer to internment. The sense of unease was 
augmented by the government’s varied use of restriction and enforcement across locality and 
ethnic group. In California, where General DeWitt hoped to intern all Axis aliens, 58,000 Italians 
faced far steeper restrictions than their paesani on the East Coast. 
Prohibitions during the war for enemy aliens generally fell into four categories: 
contraband, travel restrictions, curfews, and military zones. Among other items, enemy aliens 
could not own firearms, radios, cameras, or even flashlights, which were considered signaling 
devices, and the FBI had the authority to search enemy aliens’ homes if there was reason to 
suspect contraband. In restricted zones designated by Biddle on the west coast, enemy aliens 
were prohibited from traveling five miles outside of their place of residence unless commuting to 
and from work. For good measure the government prohibited them from riding in airplanes as 
well. If they moved, they needed to inform the Department of Justice of their new residence. 
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Beginning in February, enemy aliens nationwide needed to re-register with the government and 
carry an identity card at all times. Where Biddle set curfews, enemy aliens could not leave their 
homes between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. Many immigrants who worked at night and early morning had 
to quit their jobs, except in San Francisco where Italian aliens predominated as janitors, bakers, 
chefs, and scavengers. There, aliens were allowed to apply for individual permits to work past 
curfew. The accommodation made for Italians in San Francisco demonstrates how Italian 
Americans’ political power and ubiquity in vital industries made imprisoning them impractical. 
Their strength could not protect them from everything, however. In addition to the restricted 
zones, the Attorney General and Secretary of War also had authority to bar enemy aliens from 
particular areas surrounding forts, arsenals, airports, power plants, navy yards, piers, docks, or 
any factory for the manufacture of munitions. Beginning in late January, Biddle specified 
military zones in California, Oregon, Arizona, and Washington where enemy aliens were totally 
prohibited as of February 24, affecting some 10,000 Italians.81 
 Military zones cut Italian aliens off from their jobs, their families, and their homes on the 
west coast. Despite the Italian immigrant Mayor Angelo Rossi’s defense of Italians in San 
Francisco, 1,400 fishermen could not set foot on his city’s waterfront after February 24. Among 
those excluded was Giuseppe DiMaggio, whose son had just set a fifty-six consecutive game 
hitting record in baseball. Mr. DiMaggio’s case was heavily publicized because of Joe, but most 
enemy aliens looked like DiMaggio and his wife. 56 percent of Italian aliens were over 44 years 
of age and 10 percent were over 64.82 Though none could claim the DiMaggio’s impressive 
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record of placing three sons in major league baseball, many of them did have American sons in 
the military who were shocked to learn their mothers and fathers were losing their homes and 
jobs while they served. When the Tolan Committee heard testimony on Italian evacuation in the 
spring of 1942 witnesses regularly described Italian enemy aliens as elderly, illiterate, and 
parents to American GIs. Professor Ottorino Ronchi testified to the condition of Italians in 
Monterey, where aliens were similarly barred from fishing. He told the story of a sixty-year-old 
widow facing exclusion who had one son killed in Pearl Harbor and the other son enlisted. She 
told him, “I wish I had a couple of more children. I will send them to fight. My interest is in 
America.”83 Though the Army did not track soldiers’ ethnicities, Italian Americans regularly 
cited their disproportionately large representation in the American military as a symbol of the 
parents’ allegiance, claiming one million Italian American sons fighting for Uncle Sam.84 
Like restriction, exclusion affected Italians differently throughout the west coast, with 
some cities, like Pittsburg, California, excluding Italians wholesale while in others an imaginary 
line divided prohibited parts of town from safe zones. Some Italians found the line absurdly 
tragic, if not comical, as it forced aliens to quit their jobs, leave their families, or sell their homes 
and move, even if just one block away. Some families decided not to move, and came up with 
creative solutions to the problem instead. One Californian family kept their home in the 
restricted zone since their enemy alien matriarch was still permitted there during the day. At 
5p.m. she had to leave, so every evening she checked into a motel just down the street. In Eureka, 
an unfortunate alien discovered he would have to transfer management of his business to his 
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American-born son because the pool hall he owned sat on the wrong side of the line. Not willing 
to give up his livelihood entirely, his friends teased him as he stood at the gas station across the 
street for months shouting orders at his son.85  
Just as many remembered the restrictions as more of a derailment than a disruption in 
their lives. In Arcata, the line drawn along Highway 101 divided an Italian-born teen from his 
high school the semester before he graduated, forcing him to drop out of school and miss 
graduation. Decades later Joe Nieri still remembered with bitterness the pain of suddenly getting 
cut off from his future, his teammates, and the friends he had known since kindergarten, and the 
indignation he felt when he learned he still had to register for the draft. He wondered if he would 
have gone onto college, like most of his friends, had it not been for his enemy alien status. “You 
kind of forgive, but you can’t forget…it’s embedded too deep. It really hurt us, ‘cause we did 
lose a year of school. We had to move, we had to be in the house by 7:00 o’clock. We couldn’t 
go anywhere. And then they made us go into the army.”86 Nieri joined the military in May of 
1944, and two months later all the aliens in his class—mostly Mexicans and Italians—received 
certificates of naturalization.  
While the enemy alien status affected all aliens, even those too young to naturalize, 
internment was reserved for the most vocal Fascists, regardless of citizenship. Domenico 
Trombetta, naturalized American and self-described “Number One Fascist in North America” 
fared worse than most.87 Trombetta owned and published the outright Fascist newspaper Il Grido 
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dello Stirpe and founded the Lictor Federation, an unofficial heir to the disbanded Fascist League 
of North America. Trombetta had also hosted a Fascist radio show on WHOM until the station 
deemed his anti-Semitic rhetoric too inflammatory. In 1940 Goffredo Pantaleoni named 
Trombetta with Pope for sharing the responsibility in converting Italian Americans to pro-
Fascism. The early 1940s were not kind to Trombetta, who saw Italian Americans turn their 
backs on more overt displays of Fascism and eventually Mussolini altogether. His paper’s 
circulation dropped from 30,000 to 5,000 before Trombetta closed shop the week after Pearl 
Harbor. The FBI finally arrested him in September of 1942. A week later Trombetta lost his 
citizenship for taking the oath of American citizenship under false pretenses and with mental 
reservations. He stayed at Ellis Island until May 9, 1945, when he was finally paroled.88  
Others interned at Ellis Island included Giacomo Bonavita, a member of the Federation 
of Italian Veterans who volunteered in Ethiopia; Eugenio Casagrande, Philadelphia radio 
announcer and secretary of the Italian Union of America; Remo Fioroni, secretary of the New 
York Dante Alighieri Society; Pietro Garofolo, director of Cine Roma; Italo Verrando, president 
of the Italian Chamber of Commerce of New York; and Ubaldo Guidi Buttrini, the Fascist radio 
announcer of Boston accused by Girolamo Valenti of belonging to the Italian secret police. 
Those arrested often represented the prominenti of their cities, with deep roots in businesses, 
media outlets, and community associations, like the Order of the Sons of Italy. OSIA took up the 
cases of a number of its members arrested and interned, including Guidi who was also the 
order’s National Supreme Orator. OSIA petitioned Attorney General Biddle for Guidi’s release, 
winning him a rehearing in 1943, which he lost. When OSIA Supreme Venerable Judge Felix 
Forte met with President Roosevelt that spring, he brought up Guidi’s case again, prompting 
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Roosevelt to inquire with the Department of Justice about Guidi’s status. Biddle responded he 
was unwilling to release the ten Italians remaining at Ellis Island, all thoroughly Fascist. Though 
OSIA could not win his release, their willingness to flex their political muscles on behalf of a 
clear Fascist reflected their refusal to retreat from any of the political gains the group had made 
in the previous two decades.89  
More than 400 other pro-Fascists spent some or all of the war in camps in Montana, 
Oklahoma, Wisconsin, Maryland, Tennessee, California, and Texas. Noticeably absent from any 
camp was Generoso Pope, who managed instead to secure a position for himself on New York’s 
draft board and then lead the foreign-language drive for war bonds for the Treasury Department. 
Pope’s position in the Treasury Department was not an oversight; neither his pro-Fascism nor his 
control of ethnic politics and the press were secrets to the politicians and agencies of the U.S. 
government. His incredible success at fundraising among Italian Americans was no secret either. 
Even after Italy’s declared war, Americans believed the benefit of his support outweighed the 
public relations liability of employing a former Fascist. As one anti-Fascist wrote to Gaetano 
Salvemini, “Pope’s strength comes…from the political machines of New York and 
Washington…As long as he controls the only newspaper that serves as a bridge between 
American politicians and the Italian electorate, he will continue to be master of the situation.”90 
Pope used his connections to American politicians to bolster the defense of himself and 
his readers. In the spring of 1941 Pope solicited and printed letters from leading American 
politicians responding to his two campaigns for the purchase of defense bonds and the 
elimination of discrimination against Axis immigrants. The long list of Americans who heartily 
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endorsed Pope and the Italian Americans as loyal citizens could only be rivaled by the 
attendance of American politicians at a dinner in Pope’s honor in Washington that July. Shortly 
after learning about an FBI investigation into his pro-Fascism, Pope traveled to Washington as 
president of the Marconi Memorial Foundation. While there, he hosted a dinner in his own honor 
with eleven justices, three senators, and twenty-one congressmen in attendance. Judges Freschi 
and Pecora, Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, New York Senator James Mead, Congressional 
Minority Leader Joe Martin, Pennsylvania Senator and former Secretary of Labor James Davis, 
as well as old friends Edward Corsi and Samuel Dickstein gave toasts and speeches in honor of 
Pope. Speakers defended Pope’s loyalty to America, lauded his ability to unite the Italian 
Americans, and noted his skill in fundraising. Days later, Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the 
Treasury wrote a letter to Il Progresso affirming Italian Americans’ loyalty to the United States 
and asking them to regularly purchase savings bonds and stamps for the defense of America.91  
Though Pope professed his loyalty to America in the spring and summer of 1941, his 
editorial policy towards Fascism did not change substantially. As he made clear in his editorials 
on naturalization, loyalty to Italy did not mean disloyalty to America in his eyes. In defense of 
his Americanism, he wrote in May:  
“There are still some half-baked snoopers intent on rummaging through old newspapers 
and old photographs to try to prove my anti-Americanism because of my affection for 
Italy, my respect for the Government which the Italians have chosen and my friendship 
for the diplomatic and consular representatives of Italy of the United States. But have 
they found in their breathless search and their malicious gleanings, a single act or word of 
mine against America?”92  
 
As one of the framers of transnationalistic citizenship for Italian Americans, Pope did not see any 
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problem in having foreign allegiances as long as he avoided making outright loyalty oaths 
against America.  
Pope did make some concessions to the changing situation of wartime. Before traveling 
to Washington to surround himself with friendly American politicians, Pope headed to the 
offices of Max Ascoli, a longtime foe as president of the Mazzini Society in New York. There, 
Pope met with Justice Ferdinand Pecora, Dean Alfange, and Walter Millis of the Council for 
Democracy and New York Herald Tribune to discuss the revelation that Fiorello LaGuardia had 
initiated an FBI investigation into his pro-Fascism. Pope agreed to discontinue his paper’s pro-
Fascism and give space in the paper for representatives of the Mazzini Society, including Max 
Ascoli, Gaetano Salvemini, and Carlo Sforza. Biddle later remarked how “overnight,” Pope, 
“high in favor of Tammany Hall, turned over his newspaper, so recently dripping warmly with 
eulogies of Il Duce, to those who were now engaged in bringing about his defeat.”93 The process 
was considerably slower than that. Anti-Fascists considered the meeting a failure as Pope 
continued his pro-Fascism and they continued attacking him in their own papers. Only after 
meeting with Roosevelt twice in September of 1941 did Pope finally accept that Americanism 
meant more than avoiding foreign loyalty oaths, and finally wrote an editorial denouncing 
Mussolini and Fascism.  
Italy’s Victory is America’s Victory, 1942-1943 
The agreement between the Mazzini Society and Pope did not do much to help the 
suffering anti-Fascist society. Founded nationally in 1938 as a bridge between Italian exiles such 
as Gaetano Salvemini and Carlo Sforza and longtime residents including Girolamo Valenti, the 
Mazzini Society’s politics divided along those same lines. Unable to unite themselves, they were 
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similarly incapable of forming political alliances with outsiders. Their most likely ally, Luigi 
Antonini, was the target of as much vitriol as Pope was among the Mazzinis. Rather than court 
the vice-president of the ILGWU and leader of 33,000 Italians in Local 89, Salvemini bluntly 
described Antonini as “the scourge of God.”94 Their particular gripe against the labor leader was 
the truce he formed with Generoso Pope during the Ethiopian War, when both agreed to stop 
attacking the other personally. The Mazzinis’ similar decision to work with, rather than against, 
Pope in 1941 only further undermined the unity of the group. 
Another reason Salvemini, Sforza, and the Mazzini Society spurned Antonini was his 
political ambition in the United States, which they did not share. His quest to replace Pope as the 
deliverer of the Italian American vote often meant placing the unity of Italian American power 
second to his reputation. Like the Mazzini Society, he hoped Pearl Harbor would lead to Pope’s 
downfall, and quickly prepared to assume the role of representative of Italian America. Antonini 
started with the creation of the Italian-American Labor Council, organized around a nine-part 
agenda that included the unity of Italian American workers and associations, the purchase of 
defense bonds, the protection of Italian aliens “against unjust discriminations,” and the spreading 
of a slogan: “America’s Victory is Italy’s Freedom.”95 Though Antonini had never liked Pope or 
supported the pro-Fascist agenda, he hoped to replace both, and his slogan carried the pro-
Fascists’ mantel of transnationalistic citizenship. 
For years, pro-Fascists had shown that by removing loyalty oaths to Mussolini, they 
could be both good Italians and good Americans. As transnationalisitc citizens with specific 
obligations and rights in their two nations, Italian Americans were neither permitted nor required 
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to forget Italy during its time of need. Antonini’s slogan was a seamless transition from the pre-
war axiom “you cannot be a good American if you are not a good Italian, and you cannot be a 
good Italian if you are not a good American.” Similarly, “America’s Victory is Italy’s Freedom” 
was not unidirectional: Allied victory would ensure Italy’s liberty from its subordinate position 
to Germany, but Italy’s liberation would also help secure an American victory. The IALC sought 
to convince Italian Americans that their political action could guarantee both. 
On the night of January 31, Antonini unveiled the IALC to the immigrant and American 
political community at a gala concert in Madison Square Garden, modeled closely after Pope’s 
many events at the same venue. Highlights of the night included Antonini’s presentation of a 
$20,000 check to Mayor LaGuardia for the American Red Cross and a telegram to President 
Roosevelt, affirming Italians’ straightforward loyalty to America. The speakers did not ignore 
the immigrants’ more complicated connection to Italy, however. Rather than throw out precedent, 
anti-Fascists built on the transnationalistic citizenship claims of the pro-Fascists. Reinforcing 
Italian Americans’ rights to organize on behalf of Italy and America as a special class of migrant 
citizens, Antonini declared, “we are Italian Americans, loyal and devoted to America and to the 
true Italy, and therefore we call upon our people over here to help America win the war!”96  
The loyalty and support of Italian Americans could not be assured, however. The enemy 
alien status had seriously harmed the community’s collective psyche, as an American attendee at 
the gala noted. The general theme of the night was not the American Red Cross or America’s 
victory, but the status of enemy aliens, he wrote in his report to the Office of Strategic Services. 
The informant drew three conclusions from the rally: the IALC represented 200,000 men and 
women in New York’s labor unions, the Italian American labor movement drove the Free Italy 
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movement, and “Italian-Americans are extremely sensitive” about the enemy-alien status.97  
To change the classification of Italian aliens, Antonini personally wrote to New York’s 
Governor Lehman, sent a resolution to President Roosevelt through the IALC, and convinced the 
ILGWU to pass a resolution addressed directly to Francis Biddle in June. That same month 
Edward Corsi, chairman of the enemy alien hearing board, spoke at the New York Conference 
for Mobilization of Foreign Born for Victory, telling representatives of 150 entities, including 
the Department of Justice, that loyal enemy aliens should be designated “friendly aliens” 
instead.98 Soon after, Biddle began cultivating support for Italians’ reclassification from the FBI, 
Department of State, and Army. In August he presented the idea to Roosevelt, who was sorry he 
had not thought of the reclassification sooner, noting, “it was a masterly stroke of international 
statesmanship and good politics.”99 The two decided to wait until Columbus Day to make the 
announcement, a date just two weeks before midterm elections.  
The political importance of Columbus Day was not lost on Italian Americans, who 
ramped up their efforts to change the enemy alien status in the weeks leading up to the October 
holiday, not knowing the decision had already been made. On October 9, the Order of the Sons 
of Italy, who had pledged ten million dollars in war bonds, sent a delegation of enemy alien Gold 
Star mothers to Washington to meet with Vice President Henry A. Wallace and deliver a petition 
of 40,000 signatures. As Gold Star mothers the women had each lost children in the war, and 
Representative Thomas Eliot (D-MA) who accompanied the women believed their sacrifice 
earned them more than the removal of the enemy alien classification. Eliot also spoke about a 
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bill he had introduced that spring allowing parents with sons or daughters in the military to 
become citizens without waiting to make declarations of intent.100 
While the delegation met in Washington, Biddle worked on his speech announcing the 
reclassification of Italian aliens. For help drafting his important address, Biddle turned to his 
executive secretary, Ugo Carusi, an Italian immigrant well versed in the rhetoric of Italianità. 
When Carusi spoke at a war bond drive in D.C. six months earlier he told his audience, “I know 
it is customary for speakers addressing an audience like this to talk about the glories of Italy’s 
past. Or to talk about the great Italian names which have become immortal in American history, 
like Columbus, Caboto, Vespucci, Vigo, Mazzei.” He asked for their permission to focus instead 
on the present, as he thought of  “our sons, many of them dressed in the uniforms of the 
American Armed Forces, fighting for the freedom and security for the same universal values that 
our fathers fought for under Garibaldi and Mazzini.” Before he launched into his full appeal for 
the purchase of war bonds by obliging Italian Americans to demonstrate their loyalty through 
actions and not words, he practically quoted from the pro-Fascist speeches of Pope’s Ethiopian 
Rally: “I see no real inconsistency between the sentiment we feel for the land of our birth and the 
love we have for the country of our adoption” he stated, “what human being does not bear a 
natural love for his native land?”101 San Francisco’s L’Italia, which reprinted Carusi’s entire 
speech in Italian and English, printed those lines in bold. And like so many propagandists versed 
in pro-Fascist tactics, the headlines L’Italia chose for the English and Italian versions differed in 
revealing ways. In Italian, the front-page headline translates to “BE TRULY PROUD OF YOUR 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 “‘Loyal Alien’ Status Asked for Italians,” The Baltimore Sun (Baltimore, MD, October 9, 1942). 
 
101 “Let No One Make You Believe That We of Italian Origin Are a Group Separated from Other 
Americans,” L’Italia (San Francisco, CA, April 4, 1942). Italian American Collection, San Francisco 
Public Library. 
 
	   292 
ITALIAN ORIGINS BUT BE DEVOTED AND FAITHFUL TO THE GREAT AMERIAN 
NATION OF YOUR ADOPTION.”102 In English on the next page L’Italia printed an actual 
quote from Carusi’s speech as its headline: “Let no one make you believe that we of Italian 
origin are a group separated from other Americans.”103 L’Italia did not need to be so 
surreptitious; by 1941 American politicians had fully accepted and even encouraged Italian 
Americans to think of Italy when they acted politically in America, dismissing the idea that such 
a transnationalistic act could be un-American.  
With the help of Carusi, Biddle followed Italian American rhetorical tradition on 
Columbus Day. In the typical style of Italianità, Biddle opened his speech apologizing for 
Columbus not being able to do in 1492 what “General Jimmy Doolittle and his squadron of 
bombers” did in Japan in 1942. He then named twenty-one great Italians who had excelled in 
exploration, science, art, and politics, quoting from Garibaldi, Cavour, Alfieri, Leopardi, and 
Mazzini. He connected the rebelliousness of Dante, Galileo, da Vinci, and Michelangelo to the 
alien enemies’ revolt against Italian Fascism. Turning to the current century, Biddle lauded 
Italian American soldiers like Lieutenant Willibald C. Bianchi who won the Medal of Honor for 
his service in Japan, and affirmed each division of the army averaged five hundred soldiers with 
parents born in Italy. Finally, he announced that within one week 600,000 Italian nationals living 
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in the United States who had faced relocation, restrictions, and interrogations from the 
government since Pearl Harbor would no longer be considered “enemy aliens.”104  
Biddle’s announcement of Italians’ new status won immediate praise from both Italians 
and Americans, but it was not the only announcement he made that day. Before his big reveal, he 
mentioned Italian mothers and fathers in the United States who sent their sons to fight in the war 
even though they could not become citizens, noting, “had it not been for the barrier of the 
literacy test, almost without exception they would have become so long ago.”105 “It is for this 
reason,” he explained, that he recommended the passage of a bill to make aliens who migrated 
prior to 1924 eligible for citizenship without taking a literacy test, an act that would affect 
200,000 Italians, or a quarter of the Italian alien population.  
Other bills concerning alien parents, like the one Thomas Eliot introduced in the spring of 
1942 and spoke about with the Italian gold star mothers, were far less ambitious than what 
Biddle proposed on Columbus Day. Eliot’s bill would have only expedited the citizenship 
process for people already eligible to naturalize, so Biddle put his weight behind a farther-
reaching bill introduced by Congressman Dickstein in 1940 with Generoso Pope’s support. 
Biddle’s backing of Dickstein’s bill reveals an overlooked aspect of the Italian American 
wartime experience: the political mobilization of the community did not end with Pearl Harbor. 
Though the declaration of war and the enemy alien status had disrupted the leadership and 
organizations of the prominenti, it did not destroy them. Italian Americans had not succeeded in 
changing naturalization or immigration laws to date, and even with Biddle’s support neither 
Dickstein’s bill nor Eliot’s ever became law. But Italian Americans had been trained by the pro-
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Fascists to mobilize best on behalf of their homeland, and after Mussolini’s arrest and Italy’s 
surrender in the summer of 1943 the community reinvigorated its efforts to support Italy. 
 After earning so much goodwill among Italian American voters in October, the Allied 
aerial bombings of Italy in the summer of 1943 undermined all the good will Roosevelt had 
earned among Italian Americans since Biddle’s announcement. Anti-Fascists had always 
doubted their fellow immigrants ever really renounced their love of Mussolini, but open 
condemnation of the bombings in Little Italies showed the American government too that “a 
surface appearance of patriotism” only covered their “strong feeling of antagonism” towards any 
anti-Italian policy, according to one OSS agent. Walking through Italian sections of San 
Francisco, the agent believed all but ten or fifteen Italians in the entire community deeply 
resented the bombing. Some, he was surprised to find, believed the Allies bombed Italy out of 
spite, “spite that our cities did not have the architectural treasures and the artistic riches which 
take centuries to accumulate.”106 Anti-Fascist Giuseppe Lupis similarly believed 95 percent of 
Italian Americans were still Fascist, and that Antonini, Corsi, and Pope covered this truth up to 
the American government for their own political ambitions. Italian Americans listening to short-
wave radio broadcasts from Italy heard former Il Progresso reporter Angelo Flavio Guidi blame 
Roosevelt for bombing Italian churches and hospitals, leading one anti-Fascist to assert, 
“Roosevelt will lose the whole Italian vote next election.”107 Lupis told the OSS that anti-
Roosevelt propaganda was so strong that a common belief among Italian Americans was that the 
president had been forced to remove the enemy alien classification by Italian American boys in 
the army who threatened to revolt if their parents were not reclassified.  
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Even immigrants without short-wave radios fell under Fascist influence through the 
Italian-language press. The OSS found anti-Fascist papers tried apologizing for the necessity of 
the bombings while pro-Fascist newspapers simply repeated anti-American propaganda from 
Radio Roma. In Cleveland, the pro-Fascist L’Araldo said of the bombings, “if the aim of the war 
is to destroy Rome, it is better to lower the masks and to confess that the glory of Italy is too 
offensive to the eyes of the envious.”108 In Seattle, La Gazzetta Italiana, which had appealed to 
the Fascist government years earlier for financial assistance, survived into the 1940s by relying 
on material from Radio Roma. In 1943 it continued that tradition, following the Fascist line as it 
insisted that despite the bombings, “a great nation cannot, ought not, to surrender. That would be 
everlasting ignominy. Therefore [Italy] fights.”109  
 From New York to Cleveland to Seattle informants agreed Italian American morale 
plummeted in response to the aerial bombings of Italy and the short-wave radio propaganda 
received from Radio Roma. For all the flag waving and promises of “100% Americanism” after 
Pearl Harbor, among themselves anti-Fascists worried Italian Americans did not want to see 
Mussolini lose. Max Ascoli, president of the Mazzini Society, wrote to a friend in the summer of 
1944, “I am sure that very few Italians in Italy still harbor nostalgia for Mussolini. Here on the 
contrary, any time you take the trouble to listen to a poor wop, you have a fair chance of hearing 
bitter recriminations against Roosevelt, Churchill, and the king who have ruined Mussolini.” 
Ascoli found a silver lining, writing, “of course, these poor wops, in spite of all their bitterness, 
are too confused in their minds and too disorganized to represent an actual danger.” The masses, 
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he explained, “have to be politically reoriented,” though by whom posed the central problem. 110 
Ascoli’s liberal use of the derogatory term “wop” sheds some light on why his organization had 
such a difficult time maintaining alliances with long-time Italian American residents and citizens. 
To counter the anti-Roosevelt sentiments of the Italian American masses, community 
leaders rallied their communities on behalf of a just peace for Italy, with factions divided along 
old political lines. The longstanding political feuds between pro-Fascists and the many factions 
of anti-Fascists resurfaced in the new associations for Italy, with the divide between exiles and 
immigrants wider than ever. Antonini’s Italian-American Labor Council (IALC) competed with 
the Free Italian American Labor Council (FIALC) of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of 
America. Generoso Pope and Justice Pecora’s Anti-Communist American Committee for Italian 
Democracy (ACID) directly attacked Vito Marcantonio’a left-leaning United Americans of 
Italian Origin for United Nations Victory. At the same time, the Order of the Sons of Italy, which 
had lost two thirds of its members during the war, saw a resurgence with the fall of Mussolini 
and subsequent reunification with its anti-Fascist factions, while the Mazzini Society lost a sense 
of purpose. Both groups tried adding their own voices to the chorus of Italian Americans pushing 
for a just peace for Italy. When that failed they each attempted to at least silence and undermine 
the others. Summarizing his work among Italian Americans in the summer of 1944 Max Ascoli 
wrote, “my more recent contribution to the war effort is that of counter-attacking or at least 
neutralizing fellow Italian-Americans in America.”111 An OSS analyst succinctly described the 
problem of trying to understand the Italian Americans’ intricate web of political and personal 
feuds when he mapped it out for a colleague, noting, “this looks like a triple-plot Restoration 
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comedy’s dramatis personae but it as simplified as it can be.”112 
 Anti-Fascists’ longstanding inability to coalesce in the 1920s and 1930s had enabled the 
pro-Fascists to take control of their communities’ political agendas, but the onset of war brought 
support from the Office of War Information for anti-Fascists to take over their communities’ 
propaganda channels. Their efforts during the year of anxiety helped to break up Pope’s 
monopoly on Italian American political organizing in New York City, even if it did not destroy 
his power entirely. Rather than reluctantly work with Pope, anti-Fascists hoped they could 
organize without him entirely.  
Pope’s vulnerability especially encouraged Congressman Vito Marcantonio, who 
inaugurated his United Americans organization at a Madison Square Garden rally in September 
of 1943. Marcantonio saw untapped potential in the fractured Italian American community, 
noting “we haven’t yet marshaled our potential strength. We have an army equipped but not yet 
placed into action.” In a radio address advertising the rally, Marcantonio assured his listeners the 
meeting would be “historical.” “Our elder statesmen don’t know what should be done in Italy,” 
he insisted, explaining their confusion provided an opportunity for Italian Americans to decide 
the future course of foreign affairs, but only, he promised, if they “indicate our strength in 
numbers, to give force to our program and influence.”113 
Italian Americans understood the significance of the moment and their community’s 
potential power to dictate Italy’s future, but that did not change their problems in unification. 
That fall, separate events hosted by Marcantonio, Sforza, and Antonini tried getting Roosevelt’s 
attention on the matter of Italy’s peace. Without Generoso Pope’s experience and help drawing 
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massive crowds to well-orchestrated events, Marcantonio’s rally could fill only half of Madison 
Square Garden and the others collected just a few thousand attendees between them. At a Cooper 
Union meeting of the Free Italian American Labor Council, chairman Joseph Catalonotti did not 
see the contradiction in his speech when he first condemned Generoso Pope and Luigi Antonini 
and then called for unity among Italian Americans. At the same meeting, Professor G. Levi della 
Vida from the University of Pennsylvania deplored the mutual recriminations of Italian 
American groups, citing the duty Italian Americans had to unite by repeating a familiar line of 
rhetoric: “You cannot be good Americans unless you are good Italians, and you cannot be good 
Italians unless you are good Americans.”114 In their attempts to replace Pope, the anti-Fascists 
were willing to swallow their pride in copying his style, actions, speech, and theory of 
citizenship. But effective transnationalistic citizenship also required the unity of the ethnic 
political bloc—beginning with its leaders—something the anti-Fascists still could not stomach.  
“A Vote for Dewey is a Vote for Italy” 1943-1944 
Had each of the competing Italian American groups united they would have found 
common ground in more than their choice of rhetoric. Each group separately pushed for the same 
four issues: first the total elimination of Fascism, then the furnishing of immediate relief to Italy, 
and later the change of Italy’s co-belligerent status to full ally. A fourth issue quickly grew out of 
Italy’s allied status: the security of Italy’s pre-war colonial possessions, which Italian Americans 
began discussing even before Mussolini’s arrest. Despite major political divisions between 
Italian American communists, former Fascists, immigrants, and exiles, Italians in America 
mostly agreed that Italy should at least maintain its pre-Fascist holdings. Even Carlo Sforza, who 
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considered the conquest of Ethiopia “criminal,” said of Lybia, Eritrea, and Somaliland “to take 
away one of her old colonies from Italy might wound Italian feelings.”115 
To these four demands the Order of the Sons of Italy added some domestic issues in line 
with the Fascist agenda of elevating Italy and Italian Americans simultaneously. At its national 
convention in the fall of 1943, OSIA passed resolutions in favor of a free Italy, in support of 
Dickstein’s bill for access to citizenship, and in favor of the parole of Italian POWs held in the 
United States to their relatives and friends in America.116 Despite its dip in membership that 
threatened the financial ruin of the society, OSIA continued its political work through the war, 
becoming stronger in the process.117 In 1949 its Supreme Venerable could boast, “There is not a 
piece of legislation affecting the reconstruction of countries devastated by the war…that its 
passage was not considerably aided by [the Sons of Italy’s] efforts in the name of our Order.”118  
Between the fall of Fascism in the summer of 1943 and OSIA’s national convention in 
1949 legislation on naturalization took a back seat to the two main issues for Italian Americans: 
relief for Italy and the status of her colonies. For Italian Americans who listened to Radio 
Roma’s reports on the Allied aerial bombing of their homeland, Italy’s surrender in September 
gave migrants a much-needed opportuntity to help. Immediately, their organizations called for 
the renewal of mail service and the permission to send material goods to their friends and 
families in Italy. As months passed and shipments of supplies were held up, they turned to their 
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representatives for help fulfilling their obligations as transnationalistic citizens to support Italy. 
Several congressmen wrote directly to Roosevelt on behalf of their Italian American constituents 
asking the United States to open mail and package exchange with Italy.  
Roosevelt did not open mail service with Italy until the onset of the presidential campaign 
in the summer of 1944. When he did allow mail service in mid-August, the organization 
American Relief for Italy (ARI) sent its first shipment of privately collected goods to Italy. ARI 
brought together Generoso Pope, Luigi Antonini, and Eugene Alessandroni of OSIA, who 
quickly and easily mobilized their constituents on behalf of an impoverished Italy. In cooperation 
with ARI, the National Catholic Welfare Conference held a two-week intensive clothing drive in 
the spring of 1944 that yielded six million pounds of goods with the help of 84,000 volunteers in 
32 dioceses. In the last four months of 1944 American Relief for Italy sent four million pounds 
of clothing, ten million vitamin tablets, 138,000 pairs of shoes, 204,000 pairs of shoes, as well as 
enormous quantities of food bars, powdered milk, cloth, and first-aid kits. Antonini’s Italian 
American Labor Council sent 172,000 women’s dresses from its dressmakers, and since the 
Germans had destroyed Italy’s rail system, the Pennsylvania OSIA lodge, Local 48 of the 
ILGWU and a few other groups donated several trucks. Arturo and Walter Toscanini gave three 
trucks, and the Dante Alighieri Society of Jersey City gave four.119  
The fervor with which Italian Americans donated was enormous, but, as the ARI 
president regularly pointed out, private donations alone could not save Italy. In September the 
Roosevelt administration took a significant step forward in granting aid to Italy by pushing for 
50 million dollars from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). 
The comparatively small amount of relief drew outrage at the UNRRA conference from nations 
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that thought Italy deserved nothing, but Italian Americans were still unsatisfied.  
Months earlier, the slow pace and paucity of aid became a presidential election issue after 
Vito Marcantonio introduced a joint resolution in May asking the president to give full allied 
status to Italy, entitling the nation to lend-lease aid and give her an enormous position of power 
for negotiating the peace treaties. By July, Ascoli predicted to a friend in Italy that his country 
would soon see lend-lease aid. “We must remember that this is an election year and that the 
Italian vote is far from being in Roosevelt’s bag,” the Mazzini Society president wrote. Though 
lend-lease would be a victory for Italy, it would not necessarily help the anti-Fascists, however. 
“So possibly the people who will get the credit for Lease Lend to Italy will be the old, former, 
pro-fascists who may promise to deliver the Italian vote,” he mused, warning “It will be like the 
Biddle declaration all over again on a far larger scale.”120 
In the summer of 1944 Roosevelt did not think he needed another Biddle declaration—he 
believed he had secured the Italian vote with the first one. Though the president did not do much 
campaigning directly to Italian Americans, he did promise aid to Italy in a radio broadcast to 
Antonini’s IALC at their Columbus Day celebration that fall. He also reminded his audience of 
Biddle’s announcement, the opening of mail to Italy, and the new option Italian Americans had 
to send small remittances to family at home. The changes he mentioned were all improvements 
over the previous two years, but Italian Americans’ frustration made their foreign policy 
concerns an easy target for Roosevelt’s Republican opponent.  
On October 11, New York Governor Thomas Dewey attempted to sew up the Italian 
American vote by giving his own Columbus Day address in which he threw his full support 
behind Italian allied status, explaining, “we Americans cannot and will not stand by and watch 
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Italy suffer. What we have thus far done is little indeed, compared to what we must do.”121 “No 
other course could better honor the name of Columbus or express our gratitude to him for what 
he did for all of us,” Dewey noted, picking up a common theme of Italianità that the United 
States owed a debt of gratitude to Italy for its discovery. Hours later in an obvious scramble to 
cut Dewey’s influence among Italian Americans, Roosevelt made a major public statement about 
Italy’s reconstruction. Surprising his European allies, Roosevelt announced the United States 
would reimburse in dollars what the Italian government paid in lire to the United States troops.122  
Compared to full allied status, fifty million dollars seemed like petty change, as the 
Republican Party incessantly explained to Italian voters. Carmelo Cacioppo, speaker for the 
Republican Party in Pennsylvania laid out the two candidates’ offers to Italy in a radio address in 
Italian on Scranton’s WARM. “To fool the Italian vote,” he explained, President Roosevelt had 
allocated fifty million dollars in aid to Italy. “But I tell you my dear countrymen: what does 50 
million dollars mean when used for the rebirth, for the reconstruction of Italy? Do you really 
believe that 50 million dollars will give clothing, bread, milk, shoes, and medicine to the Italian 
people, a population of 45 million?”123 “The voice of Italy speaks to you!” he declared, The 
Martyred Italy! The Starving Italy! The Italy without a roof! The Italy without clothing! That 
Italy that is asking for your help!” Cacioppo’s words closely resembled language from 1935 
when announcers successfully called upon Italian Americans’s transnationalistic citizenship 
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obligations to donate to the Italian Red Cross and prevent starvation imposed by the League of 
Nations’ economic sanctions.  
Added to Italy’s physical destruction was the ignominy of Winston Churchill’s 
pronunciation that the Italian empire was dead. “There are fanatics who are crying out ‘No more 
colonies for Italy! No Tyrol! No more Fiume! Everyone wants to skin my Italy…Your Italy” 
Cacioppo called out to his listeners. In the next breath he promised them “Only Dewey, and 
Dewey alone can save Italy if he is victorious on Election Day.” For good measure he informed 
them, “If the Italians of Italy were permitted to vote on November 7th they would all vote for Mr. 
Dewey.”124 
 Cacioppo was not a renegade; his speech matched radio addresses given in New York 
through the Republican National Committee’s All American Division. Over the next two weeks 
Italians working with the RNC delivered speeches in Italian and English that seemed to compete 
with one another for how desperate and pathetic they could make Italy sound. Anthony Maisono 
of the Columbian Republican League might have won that competition when he announced over 
WHOM “only now that we are in the thick of the electoral campaign were the 50 million dollars 
announced for the purchase of medicine and milk for Italian babies. In the single city of Rome 
the infant mortality is 438 of every 1,000.” Maisano concluded with an extension of the new 
Republican slogan, “A vote for Dewey is a Vote for Italy”: “A vote for Dewey means helping 
Italy return to its rightful position; a vote for Dewey means recognizing Italy as our friend and 
ally…a vote for Dewey means assuring all the nations of the world, large and small, a fair and 
lasting peace.”125 
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Dewey could not rest on his Columbus Day promises alone, as one OSIA leader in 
Massachusetts warned Edward Corsi. Nazzarene Toscano worried Republican leaders in Boston 
and elsewhere were working under the false assumption that Italian Americans’ “widespread, 
latent dissatisfaction” about Roosevelt guaranteed the Italian American vote for Dewey without 
much cost or effort. He worried that “unless such dissatisfaction is cultivated and worked up to a 
pitch of enthusiasm for Dewey it…may remain in a large part inarticulate and not express itself 
in votes.” “Voters of our descent, to weigh effectively in the next election, should be organized 
community by community,” he argued, especially in swing states where Italian Americans made 
up large proportions of the electorate. Toscano related a recent conversation he had with James 
Donnaruma, the owner of La Gazzetta del Massachusetts who had once blackmailed the Italian 
consulate in Boston for his pro-Fascist support. That brief defection notwithstanding, 
Donnaruma and his paper retained sympathy for the Fascist cause and supported either the 
Democratic or Republican parties, depending on who purchased the most advertisement space.126 
Despite the obvious problems of relying on Donnaruma’s support, Toscano wrote “I think I 
should emphasize once again that he has considerable influence among the people of our descent 
in Massachusetts, that he has a following in almost every community throughout the state, that 
once he has sponsored the cause of a candidate for political office he goes to work for him with 
all his heart and soul, and his political action is enthusiastic, tireless, and aggressive.”127 
Both parties were eager to put enthusiastic, tireless, and aggressive pro-Fascists to work 
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campaigning for them in 1944. President Roosevelt once again employed Generoso Pope as the 
chairman of his Italian division, inviting Pope to the White House soon after Dewey’s Columbus 
Day address for a private meeting. Dewey relied on the old Fascist leaders and networks that 
Willkie had four years earlier, like Joseph Carlino, a member of Corsi’s Columbian Republican 
League who campaigned for Dewey on the pro-Fascist station WOV in the fall of 1944. Carlino, 
a “notorious” Fascist according to Antonini, served on the advisory council for New York’s 
Dante Alighieri Society and provided legal counsel to the Bank of Sicily and Italian consulate. 
Somehow Carlino managed to avoid the fate of Renzo Fioroni who had almost the exact same 
resume as secretary of the Dante Alighieri Society and attorney for the Bank of Sicily. Fioroni 
was arrested in J. Edgar Hoover’s initial roundup and subsequently interned at Ellis Island, Fort 
George Meade and Fort MacAlester, while Carlino worked for the Treasury Department selling 
war bonds, like Generoso Pope.128 In 1944 Carlino started selling Dewey to WOV’s radio 
audience. Repeating Dewey’s Columbus Day speech and noting America’s debt to Italy for 
producing Columbus, Carlino told his listeners, “for the good of our beloved America and for the 
good of our land of origin as well, no American of Italian extraction must deny his vote to 
Dewey. Our votes, my friends, carry great weight, and might well determine victory for 
Dewey.”129 
 The Democrats could not combat Dewey’s promises on foreign policy, and focused 
instead on domestic issues, as they had in the last two elections when Italians protested 
Roosevelt’s moral embargo in 1936 and the “stab in the back” speech of 1940. By 1944, the 
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Republicans were able to build on earlier defections from the Democratic Party and win a good 
portion of the Italian vote. In New York City, where Roosevelt won 80 percent of the Italian 
American vote in his first two elections, he won only 42 percent in 1940 and dropped to 33 
percent in 1944. In comparison, Jewish voters in New York City gave Roosevelt 72 percent of 
their votes in 1932, 88 percent in 1936, and 89 percent in 1940. Nationwide, urban Jews gave 
Roosevelt 93 percent of their votes in 1944.130 In Philadelphia only 41 percent of Italians voted 
for Roosevelt in 1944, down from 54 percent in 1940 and 65 percent in 1936.131 Even in San 
Francisco, where 90 percent of Italians voted for Roosevelt over Hoover and Landon, 42 percent 
voted for Willkie and 44 percent went for Dewey. Both Dewey and Willkie won a larger 
percentage of the votes from the Italians of San Francisco than they did from the Irish and the 
city as a whole.132 
 Dewey fared better than any other Republican against Roosevelt, though the president 
won with a landslide of Electoral College votes, as he had in his previous three elections. 
Dewey’s loss did not deter Italian Americans from their mission of helping Italy, however. 
Dewey’s campaign gave them cause to be optimistic since their support for the Republican 
candidate had at least forced Roosevelt to abandon his previous policy of non-involvement with 
Italy and formally commit the United States to Italy’s rehabilitation. Italian Americans were 
hopeful they could push Roosevelt’s commitments further, to accepting Italy as a full ally.  
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The matter of Italy’s allied or co-belligerent status became more urgent in anticipation of 
the United Nations meeting in San Francisco in the spring of 1945. The United Nations would 
take up the question of Italian colonies at its meeting, and Italy desperately wanted to participate 
in that conversation. In February of 1945 Vito Marcantonio re-introduced his earlier joint 
resolution calling for the president to recognize Italy as an ally and extend lend-lease aid. When 
the Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on the resolution, Italian Americans sent 350 
representatives of 3,000 associations to Congress, including local and national politicians, labor 
leaders, and heads of civic, mutual aid, and recreational associations. Established groups like the 
Order of the Sons of Italy, Il Progresso Italo-Americano, and the Mazzini Society were each 
represented, as were newer organizations like the “East Harlem Committee for Recognition of 
Italy as an Ally.” Mayor LaGuardia, Edward Corsi, and Samuel Dickstein joined a host of 
politicians with Italian constituents. The nearly united front was only disrupted by the absence of 
Luigi Antonini and his Local 89. Exposing the cracks in the Italian American voting bloc, 
Antonini announced he and his members would not support anything introduced by the 
communist Vito Marcantonio.133 
 Just as Roosevelt’s fourth inauguration did not deter Italian Americans from pursuing 
allied status for Italy, neither did his sudden death the day after their hearing. From one setback 
to the next they continued to press the American government to support Italy. The start of the 
San Francisco conference without Italy in the spring of 1945 and the publication of the Italian 
peace treaty in 1947 only heightened Italian Americans’ unity and motivation. Despite all other 
disagreements, Italian Americans found common ground in their insistence that Italy would have 
to keep its pre-war colonial possessions to feed its population and retain its dignity. They were 
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devastated to discover the 1947 peace treaty reduced Italy’s possessions well below what it held 
before World War I. Italy suspended telephones, buses, and work for ten minutes of mourning on 
February 10, 1947 as Italy signed away 900,000 square miles of land including Italian 
Somaliland, Eritrea, Trieste, Fiume, and Lybia. In conveying the magnitude of Italy’s loss The 
Harford Courant noted Lybia alone was more than twice the size of Texas.  
Immediately after Italy signed away its colonies, Italian Americans turned to their United 
States senators to do what Italy could not—reject the peace treaty. Within a few weeks, Charles 
Poletti, Edward Corsi, Fiorello LaGuardia, and Rhode Island Governor John Pastore formed the 
Committee for a Just Peace with Italy to urge the United States Senate not to ratify. The Order of 
the Sons of Italy and Columbian Republican League also mobilized their members to approach 
senators in states with heavy Italian populations. When the Committee on Foreign Relations 
heard testimony regarding the ratification, all three groups headed to Washington, this time with 
Antonini dutifully in attendance representing the IALC and ILGWU. The testimonies of fifteen 
witnesses on April 30, 1947 reflected conversations happening nationwide. Representatives cited 
Italy’s worthiness of its colonies for overthrowing Mussolini, the humiliation Italy faced if it lost 
the colonies it won in World War I, and the threat of a Communist takeover in the country if the 
devastated nation had to pay onerous reparations and its overflowing population had no place to 
go for work. The Senate could only ratify or reject the treaty, not amend it, so the Committee on 
Foreign Relations approved ratification 13 to 0. Italy ratified the treaty in July, and in a gesture 
of good will the United States subsequently forgave one million dollars of Italian debt.  
Letters to Italy 
The spring of 1948 brought another chance for Italian Americans to assert their political 
capital as transnationalistic citizens to help their homeland. Nearly a year after Italian Americans 
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predicted a Communist takeover in Italy, their warnings seemed likely to come true. On January 
1, 1948 the new constitution of the Italian Republic came into effect, with the first parliamentary 
elections scheduled for April 18. To America’s horror, from the announcement of elections 
through mid-March, it appeared the Communist Popular Front was leading, with estimates that it 
held 40 percent of the vote in a twelve-way poll.134  
Fear of losing Italy to Communism led the American government to play good cop/bad 
cop with the Italian public in the spring of 1948. First, Truman and Congress allocated an 
additional 55 million dollars in aid to Italy and pushed through the European Recovery Program 
in a special ceremony designed for maximum press coverage. Next, the British, French, and 
United States governments called for the return of Trieste to Italy—a promising sign to Italians 
who wanted even more of their pre-war land returned. Meanwhile, the State Department 
threatened to cut off aid to Italy if the Communist Party won, and the Department of Justice 
promised to block entry and prosecute deportations of Italian immigrant members of the 
Communist Party.  
Italian Americans heard a call to action as transnationalistic citizens with the 1948 Italian 
election. They also saw a perfect opportunity to pursue their two main political goals of elevating 
the status of Italy in the world and their own status in the United States. Moreover, they felt the 
elections could help absolve them for supporting Mussolini. Relying on old tactics, in January of 
1948 Generoso Pope initiated a letter-writing campaign among his readers, asking them to write 
a letter to family and friends in Italy against the Popular Front. Just as his letter-writing and 
fundraising campaigns of 1935 relied on his readers reaching out to their friends, families, 
customers, and organizations, Pope asked his readers to secure pledges from ten friends to write 
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to their acquaintances in Italy.135 And just like the Ethiopian War mobilization, the 1948 “Letters 
to Italy” campaign extended far beyond Il Progresso. Outside of New York, newspapers 
similarly enjoined their readers to write, going so far as to offer talking points, pre-written form 
letters, or even free postage. The editor of La Tribuna Italiana in Milwaukee, for example, paid 
to send the letters to Italy written by his staff and readers. Their letters followed the model of the 
U.S. government in simultaneously making promises and threats. While the letters mentioned the 
possibility of returning Trieste to Italy they also included a clear personal threat to the recipient: 
“if the forces of true democracy should lose in the Italian election the American Government will 
not send any more money to Italy and we won’t send any more money to you, our relatives.”136  
Italian American associations also picked up the tab of paying for postage, as one Asbury 
Park, New Jersey resident noted “it was possible to walk into the local lodge of the Order of the 
Sons of Italy any hour of the day or night, sign a letter, and walk out without even worrying 
about postage.”137 Other organizations placed pre-printed letters in stores, barbershops, churches, 
and other public places, as they had once put out cans for Ethiopian War collections. After the 
campaign ended, 87 percent of Italian Americans surveyed in Elmira, New York, had heard of 
the appeal to write letters and 42 percent had actually followed through. Though 85 percent of 
respondents cited the church as their main source of information on the campaign, they also 
heard about it from their friends, radio stations, and Il Progresso.138 In addition to asking 
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immigrants to write letters, both WOV and WHOM opened their stations for immigrants to 
record messages, airmailing the recordings to Italy free of charge. WOV sent 400 recordings of 
recent Italian war brides in one day, while WHOM opened its recordings to anyone, drawing a 
week-long crowd that was four people wide and a block long. By April, the New York Post 
Office noted it was handling more than a million extra letters per week to Italy.139 On April 18 
the campaign ended with the Christian Democrats winning a staggering 48.5 percent of the vote 
and a majority in Parliament.140 
In an article in Common Ground describing the letters to Italy campaign, writers Sylvan 
Gotshal and Halsey Munson made two notable but inaccurate claims about the campaign. First, 
while social clubs, newspapers, radio stations, and churches were clearly involved in 
orchestrating the successful campaign, they argued, “there was no guiding hand, no central 
agency of propaganda, no outside financial support. Americans of Italian background took the 
most direct, the simplest, most effective step possible: a mass appeal, made simultaneously but 
independently—something quite unique in history.”141 But, the letter-writing campaign was 
hardly a new political tactic for the Italian American community nor was it entirely spontaneous. 
It was orchestrated through the informal political networks of mostly former pro-Fascists who 
had learned to mobilize “spontaneously” on Mussolini’s command to avoid detection from the 
American government. In its execution, letters to Italy was an almost exact copy of the 
successful letter writing and fundraising campaign for the Ethiopian War that netted hundreds of 
thousands of dollars for Mussolini’s army and influenced Congress to take a clear stance on 
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American neutrality over President Roosevelt’s objections. If only the priests had also offered 
steel wedding bands to the war brides making recordings on WOV they could have scored a few 
more points for the Christian Democrats.   
The second claim Gotshal and Munson made was that “Italian Americans had nothing to 
gain, no selfish motive in advancing the cause of democracy. In a material way, it mattered little 
to them which way the elections went.”142 If Gotshal and Munson had any real knowledge of 
Italian American history and politics they would have seen Italians were not simply motivated by 
“a sentimental attachment for the Italy of their fathers and mothers” or “a deep love for America” 
as the writers claimed. As transnationalistic citizens they were prompted to action by their sense 
of obligation to Italy and America and the possible gains they could make as a community 
through the campaign’s successful execution. Because Italian Americans were uniquely 
positioned to save their homeland from the dangers of Communism, Letters to Italy spoke 
perfectly to the single cause that had been motivating the Italian American community politically 
since Fascism’s birth: the ability to use their unique status as transnationalistic citizens to make 
themselves more important to both the United State and Italy.  
Having fulfilled their obligation to the United States, Italian Americans almost 
immediately turned their attention back to Washington, D.C. to ensure fulfillment of the 
promises made that winter. First on their list of priorities was the status of Italy’s colonies of 
Libya, Eritrea, and Somaliland, then under British military occupation. Though Italy ceded those 
lands in its 1947 peace treaty, in the summer of 1948 unanimous agreement on a final colonial 
settlement still eluded the Big Four of the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, and France. 
Emboldened by their success that spring, Italian Americans reignited the campaign for Italy’s 
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trusteeship over her colonies. The Order of the Sons of Italy in America initiated a new letter-
writing campaign in August, this time directed towards Washington.143 When other ethnic 
organizations, politicians, and newspapers joined OSIA’s cause, they helped make Italy’s 
colonial question the first political issue of the 1948 presidential campaign.144  
While OSIA organized lodge members locally, on the national level Edward Corsi, 
Industrial Commissioner for the State of New York, held the ear of Republican presidential 
nominee Thomas Dewey and his chief foreign policy advisor, John Foster Dulles. Initially Dulles 
advised Dewey against committing himself to Italy’s cause in light of America’s stance on 
colonies. “But under the pressures of the campaign that position was a difficult one politically,” 
Corsi later explained, “because it would disappoint thousands of Italian-Americans voters who 
felt that was stealing from the Italian people what had nothing to do with Mussolini and 
Fascism.”145 Corsi remembered Dulles’ brother Allen urging upon John “the need of not being 
too academic about this question,” because above all was “involved the election of a president, 
of a Republican president.” Counting twelve states on the East Coast with “a preponderance of 
Italian-American votes,” Corsi explained how Dulles and Dewey both “came around eventually 
to that point of view.” Their conversion did not take long. On the evening of August 17, 1948 
Dewey met with a delegation of Italian Americans headed by Corsi and Eugene Alessandroni, 
OSIA’s grand venerable in Pennsylvania, to discuss Italy’s future. At the end of the meeting, 
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Dewey surprised all by declaring his support for Italy’s administration of its African colonies 
through a United Nations trusteeship.146  
Democrats condemned Dewey’s announcement as “an outright bid for the Italian-
American vote” which the New York Times described as “decisive” in key states, affirming, 
“importance of the appeal to Americans of Italian descent could not be minimized.”147 The 
president took several days to respond, which the Times interpreted as evidence that Dewey had 
out-maneuvered Truman on the issue. Since Dewey’s proposals actually resembled what the 
State Department had already put forward in closed negotiations, his announcement was chiefly 
surprising to the Democrats for its politicization of bipartisan treaty negotiations. Additionally, 
since the talks were due to conclude before the inauguration, Dewey had set himself up to win 
regardless of the outcome. Truman and the Democratic Party ultimately attacked Dewey on those 
lines, but the Governor’s remarks opened ground for Republicans to win back Italian voters.148  
Dewey not only seemed to beat Truman among Italian voters, he also trumped the 
president in every national Gallup poll from April through November.149 By mid-September, 
politicians and analysts were so convinced of Dewey’s inevitable victory over Truman that the 
New York Herald Tribune reported “President Truman will lose New York, Connecticut and 
New Jersey by such proportions that Democratic party candidates down to the county level fear 
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they will be swept away by the landslide.”150 A quarter of the first and second-generation 
Americans in each of the three states were of Italian origin, and local politicians considered them 
a crucial swing vote.151 Exacerbating the Democrats’ anxiety over the Italian vote in those states 
was Dewey’s obvious courtship of Generoso Pope through the issue of Italy’s trusteeship.  
Within a month of Dewey’s announcement Pope earned an invitation to the White House 
in the company of Rhode Island Senator Howard McGrath, chairman of the Democratic National 
Committee. Truman hoped the visit would reinforce Pope’s support of the Democratic party, 
thereby securing the Italian American vote, but Pope used the opportunity to push Truman for an 
answer on the Italian colonies. The president disappointed Pope by refusing to make any 
declaration that could threaten the ongoing State Department negotiations, stating bluntly, “I’m 
not going to give you any of that Dewey bull.”152 In his account of the meeting, Pope left out 
Truman’s glib response, choosing to portray the president as sincerely interested in Pope’s 
arguments and in agreement with the editor over Italy’s dire problem of overpopulation.  
Despite—or because of—the meeting, Il Progresso continued to cover Dewey in a 
positive light, especially in regards to Italy, and offered tepid support for Truman. Whereas for 
Roosevelt he had made clear to his readers for whom they should vote, in the 1948 election he 
asked them to cast a ballot regardless of party. Moreover, when he called his community to 
register he asked them to think of themselves primarily as Italian Americans. “The last Italian 
elections have given an illuminating demonstration of the power of voting,” his paper wrote the 
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week after Pope’s meeting with Truman. “If the twenty-seven million Italian voters—men and 
women—were not united at the polls to block the offensive communism, today Italy would be a 
satellite of Russia…You must follow the example of our faraway brothers. Do your duty. 
Register yourselves, your wives, and your children that are entitled to vote.”153  
In full-page political ads printed on the Sunday before Election Day, the Republican and 
Democratic Parties further developed Pope’s message of voting for Italy. In its advertisement, 
the DNC’s Italian American Division wrote of Truman’s aid to Italy “This Record of 
Magnanimous Assistance Clearly Shows that the DEMOCRATIC PARTY and its most 
illustrious representatives are THE TRUE friends of the Italian People.” 154 On the following 
page the Columbian Republican State Committee wrote “The Voters of Italian sentiment vote for 
the Republican Party out of desire for the honor and power of the American Nation, friendship 
with Italy and the justice and and well-being of its people.” 155 Neither ad mentioned any other 
issues, domestic or foreign, making the election for both parties a referendum on Italy’s future. 
Truman won the presidency two days later, and as the Democrats predicted, Dewey’s 
promises to Italy did not help treaty negotiations that autumn. The Big Four failed to come to a 
unanimous decision and the matter of Italian colonies stalled until the following fall, when the 
General Assembly ultimately voted for Libyan freedom by 1952, Italian trusteeship over 
Somaliland until 1960, and the postponement on the Eritrean question pending further study by a 
United Nations commission.  
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When Agostino de Biasi formed his first Fascio Italiano di Combattimento in the United 
States in May of 1921 he stated, “we assert the right of all emigrants to participate in the national 
recovery and reconstruction and to voice their desire to participate in [Italian] elections.”156 
Twenty-seven years and one world war later Italian Americans gave meaning to their 
transnationalism by advovating on behalf of Italy’s recovery, reconstruction, and new 
government through participation in two national elections.  
Italian Americans fulfilled de Biasi’s dream not only by influencing the Italian election 
and persuading an American presidential candidate to change his foreign policy regarding Italy, 
but also by winning Congressional regonition of their transnationalistic citizenship years later. In 
August of 1951, Congress officially declared Italian citizens a special class of people with 
specific obligations to the United States and Italy when it passed “An Act To provide for the 
expeditious naturalization of former citizens of the United States who have lost United States 
citizenship through voting in a political election or in a plebiscite held in Italy.”157 Despite clear 
laws to the contrary, Congress recognized that Italian Americans who had voted against 
Communism in April of 1948 were acting as a special class of transnationalistic citizens and 
deserved legal accommodation for their unique position. While other Americans lost their 
citizenship for voting in foreign elections, Italian Americans could have their citizenships 
reinstated by simply swearing the naturalization oath once again. 
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Conclusion 
 
Italian Americans fulfilled their platform of Italianità with the settlement of the colonial 
question and Congressional recognition of transnationalistic citizenship, thereby securing Italy’s 
place in Europe and their own status in the United States. But their achievements came at a price, 
for the community struggled to find a new cause around which to unite. Their problems were 
exacerbated by Italy’s political disengagement with the Italian American community. With its 
political needs met in America, the Italian state stopped calling for the direct service of its people 
abroad, causing its emigrants to stop considering themselves as transnationalistic citizens.  
In their struggle to maintain a cohesive platform after 1948, Italian Americans’ first 
instinct was to revisit old political issues, first by reforming the discriminatory immigration 
quotas that had humiliated their community since 1921. However, while immigration reform was 
of great importance to the Italian community, it was also their most difficult political battle. In 
addition to Congress’s longstanding stalemate on immigration, Italian Americans needed to 
overcome their community’s deep shame over quotas and the stigma surrounding undocumented 
immigrants before they could make real progress. For nearly thirty years, efforts to mobilize 
Italian Americans on behalf of immigration reform had produced only anemic responses, 
frustrating Benito Mussolini, Generoso Pope, and dozens of other politicians in their campaigns 
to prevent, overturn, and humanize quota laws.  
Finally, in 1952 a major immigration reform bill passed over President Truman’s veto. 
Despite their lobbying efforts, Italian Americans were devastated to see quotas retained in the 
McCarran-Walter Act, with the Italian numbers stubbornly remaining below those of other 
European nations. Prominenti promised to make their community’s anger felt in the general 
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elections that fall. In Pennsylvania, the Republican newspaper Il Popolo Italiano published a 
bilingual front-page editorial against the incumbent senator, Republican Edward Martin, because 
of his vote overriding Truman’s veto. The newspaper addressed 700,000 Italian Americans of 
Pennsylvania who it believed had put Martin in the Senate, asking them to now remove him, 
stating, “a vote for Senator Martin means an endorsement of an immigration policy that 
conspicuously discriminates against the Italians. It becomes, therefore, a moral obligation for 
every voter of Italian extraction to make sure that Senator Martin is not returned to another term 
in the U.S. Senate.”1  
On the eve of the election, the Democratic Campaign Committee of Philadelphia printed 
an advertisement for presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson that opened with a line from the 
Republican Party platform of 1932: “the restriction of immigration is the republican policy, our 
party passed the laws that established the quota system.”2 The Democratic Party asked Italian 
Americans to vote as transnationalistic citizens on behalf of themselves, their homeland, and 
their adopted country, when the advertisement concluded: “If you love Italy and have its future 
in your hearts, but above all if you love our nation and want to preserve America as the land of 
opportunity and refuge for our friends and families in Italy and in the entire world, vote for Adlai 
Stevenson as President.”3 Despite their efforts, attempts to organize Italian Americans against the 
immigration quotas were no more successful in 1952 than they had been in 1932, and both 
Martin and Eisenhower won in Pennsylvania. 
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Italian Americans then turned to another defunct Fascist objective: the elimination of 
negative portrayals of Italian Americans in the media. Mussolini’s government had taken up the 
cause in the 1930s again st films such as Scarface, Farewell to Arms, and Is My Face Red? with 
mild success in at least altering scenes that portrayed Italians poorly. Without the backing of the 
Italian state, the Italian American community of the 1960s modeled their efforts after their 
Jewish neighbors instead, founding the American Italian Anti-Defamation League in 1966.4 Over 
time, Italian Americans continued to replace the support they had once received from 
Mussolini’s government with fellowship among other immigrants, particularly urban Catholics, 
and increasingly acted on their developing racial consciousness as white ethnics.5  
Italian Americans’ white consciousness took root during the Second World War, but the 
Civil Rights movement caused it to flourish as the group felt increasingly threatened by the 
encroachment of African Americans into immigrant neighborhoods.6 In their fight to preserve 
their post-war gains, Italians found the Republican Party especially receptive to their cause, so 
that by the late 1960s only 37 percent of Italians still affiliated with the Democratic Party.7 At 
that time, the G.O.P. increased efforts to win over ethnic voters, and in 1972 Richard Nixon 
claimed victory with 60 percent of the ethnic and blue-collar vote.8 Interestingly, Republicans 
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attempted a reverse Letters to Italy approach that year to secure the Italian vote for Nixon. In the 
autumn of 1972, between 40,000 to 60,000 retired Italian Americans living in Italy received 
letters asking them to write their relatives in the United States about voting for Richard Nixon if 
they cared about their Social Security and feared American disengagement from Europe.9 While 
creative, the letter-writing campaign hardly resurrected the Italian American platform.  
Although some scholars believed Italian Americans still constituted a significant vote 
through the 1970s, they measured the group’s political power by the number of Italian names on 
party tickets rather than on specific policy gains benefitting the community.10 By 1970, 
sociologists Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan signaled the end of the Italian vote 
when they wrote of white ethnic voters, “whether we say ‘Italian’ or ‘Irish’ is not important…the 
people are the same, and the issues are the same.”11 Without the Italian state reinforcing the 
community’s unique political platform of Italianità, the Italian American vote of the 1960s and 
1970s lost its distinctiveness and power by merging with other white ethnics. 
The Italian American community lost its political power when it gave up its 
transnationalistic cause, but its legacy of transnationalistic citizenship lives on in Italy and 
elsewhere. Just as Mussolini’s government continuously wrestled with the problem of emigrant 
political participation, the new Italian state started debating and drafting bills concerning 
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emigrant rights soon after its establishment. Though it took the country 48 years and 143 failed 
bills before a 2003 presidential decree gave overseas Italians the franchise, today Italians abroad 
enjoy representation in their homeland through eighteen designated parliamentary seats.12 United 
States law has changed too. In a 1967 case regarding the denaturalization of a dual citizen who 
voted in an Israeli election, the Supreme Court ruled neither naturalized nor native-born 
Americans could lose their citizenship for voting in foreign elections.13 Without a citizen’s 
explicit declaration of denaturalization, the United States government now has little ground to 
revoke a person’s citizenship, even for serving in a foreign army.  
 Italy and the United States are not alone in extending political citizenship to migrants. 
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, more nations have started reinterpreting their migrants’ 
transnationalism as an advantage rather than a deficit, and are now formally acknowledging their 
migrants’ political stakes abroad. In 2001, 83 countries allowed international absentee voting, 
and another 28 nations implemented it by 2010.14 Though these political gains are recent, it is 
important to note that ethnic Americans have been acting as transnationalistic citizens long 
before globalization became a trendy topic of scholarship. Even without legal recognition of their 
political standing migrants acted politically at home by sending remittances, supporting 
homeland candidates, and building civic institutions. Besides Italy, scholars have found long 
histories of emigrant political engagement in nations such as the Dominican Republic, Poland, 
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and Mexico, among others.15 It is for future scholars to determine how the recent extension of 
direct political rights will merge with migrants’ traditional methods of indirect political influence. 
The transnationalistic citizenship Italian Americans developed from the 1920s through 
the 1940s has also left a pronounced imprint on American politics. The lure of transnationalistic 
voters that attracted Willkie, Dewey, Roosevelt and Mussolini to the Italian American cause 
during the Great Depression continues to tempt politicians inside America and abroad, though 
rarely with the same level of success. The leaders of Israel and Mexico, for example, have 
recently come under fire for allowing American politicians to bring them into partisan politics 
for the benefit of ethnic voters.  
During the 2012 presidential campaign, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
received criticism for his overly warm welcome of Republican candidate Mitt Romney in 
Jerusalem. Three years later, Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner returned the 
invitation by asking Netanyahu to speak in Congress against President Obama’s nuclear deal 
with Iran. Netanyahu’s speech clearly played into a Republican strategy of using Israel to drive a 
wedge between Jewish American voters and the Democratic Party, just as the G.O.P had once 
done with Italians and Ethiopia. However, unlike the Italian voters of the Great Depression, 
today’s Jewish voters share values with the Democratic Party that they rank significantly higher 
in importance than the status of Israel.16 As columnist and lobbyist Douglas Bloomfield wrote of 
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the invitation, “If Boehner and the Republicans thought Netanyahu, the self-anointed leader of 
the world’s Jews, was the Moses who would lead a Jewish exodus from slavish devotion to the 
Democrats to the promised land of the GOP and Tea Parties, they’re in for disappointment of 
biblical proportions.”17  
Conversely, though Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto was no friend to the 
Republican presidential candidate in the summer of 2016, he baffled his own constituents and 
emigrants when he invited Donald Trump to Mexico that August. In opening his presidential 
campaign in June of 2015, Trump had promised “to build a great, great wall” on the border at 
Mexico’s expense, saying of Mexican migrants: “They’re sending people that have lots of 
problems. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.”18 For his part, Peña 
Nieto had likened Trump to Mussolini and Hitler on Twitter. Univision anchor Jorge Ramos 
described the pair as “two of the most despised and hated politicians by Mexicans on both sides 
of the border” and echoed Mexican Americans’ bafflement over the reason behind Peña Nieto’s 
invitation. By giving a strong anti-immigrant speech on the following day, Trump quickly lost 
further support among conservative Hispanics who accused the candidate of using their 
community as props.19 Though Peña Nieto may have invited Trump to position himself as a 
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strong defender of his people, the meeting did not win him many supporters anywhere.20 In 
Fountain Hill, Pennsylvania, a Republican dual citizen spoke with despair over the politics of 
both of his countries, reflecting “For the first time in my life, I think if Trump gets elected…I 
will have no place to go…I will not go back to Mexico while this president is still there and I 
would hate to stay here with whatever is coming to us if Trump gets elected.”21 Others have 
taken a more active approach as evidence suggests Hispanic voter registration surged in the 
summer leading up to the election.22  
 What connects these examples is more than political opportunism by American and 
foreign politicians. It is recognition by all that the transnationalistic citizens residing in the 
United States are members of two political communities. It is also a hope that ethnic voters could 
serve as political agents on behalf of their homeland if organized correctly. Most importantly, 
these stories demonstrate the agency of the migrants themselves, who feel empowered to reject 
or accept the calls of their national politicians and affect the international conversation on 
immigration and citizenship.  
In February of 1924, Secretary of Labor James Davis wrote a lengthy article for The New 
York Times on American immigration and the “evil mental, moral and physical influence” of the 
country’s “feeble-minded…criminal…inebriate” and dependent migrants. Secretary Davis 
promised if he had the power he would “bar every individual…whose political or economic 
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views constituted a menace” to the United States. He endorsed an immigration system that 
excluded Asian immigrants, registered all aliens annually, deported any unlawful resident 
without regard to family status or length of time in America, and allowed for the speedy 
“elimination” of immigrants who could not be “Americanized or naturalized for any reason.” 
Davis was convinced his measures were necessary to prevent America becoming “a 
conglomeration of racial groups, each advocating a different set of ideas and ideals according to 
their bringing up” rather than “a homogeneous race striving for the fulfillment of the ideals upon 
which this Government was founded.”23 His proposals went even further than the 1924 
immigration act that had placed Italians among the least desirable of America’s immigrants.  
The parallels between Davis’s words in 1924 and Donald Trump’s hateful rhetoric about 
Mexicans and Muslims in 2016 are plentiful. Though Trump’s meeting with Peña Nieto and his 
own party’s Hispanic Coalition have not yet caused the candidate to soften his tone on migration, 
it is still too early to know whether a coalition of Hispanic or Muslim Americans can effectively 
pressure the Republican Party and its leader to change. We can only know what happened to 
Secretary James Davis and the Italian Americans, and wonder whether history will repeat itself.  
The secretary, who had likened the new immigrants of Eastern and Southern Europe to 
“breeding rats” in his 1922 autobiography, became suddenly aware of the growing political 
power of Italian Americans in 1926.24 That year he delivered the opening address at the annual 
convention of the country’s largest Italian American organization, in which he told the room to 
be proud of their heritage and to love Italy. As shown in this dissertation, Italian Americans 
interpreted those words as granting full permission for their community to organize on behalf of 
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Italy’s protection and their own elevated status. In 1930, after his election to the Senate from 
Pennsylvania—the state with the country’s second largest population of Italian Americans—
Davis became conspicuously quiet on the issue of immigration. Finally, in 1941, Davis gave a 
toast at a dinner in Generoso Pope’s honor in Washington, D.C., in which he predicted the 
reascension of the Republican Party before applauding Italian Americans for contributing to the 
wealth and richness of the nation. By appealing to the strength of the Italian vote in 1926, Davis 
had inspired his country’s immigrants to demand their rights as transnationalistic citizens. And 
by uniting as a political block over the next two decades, Italian Americans not only quieted 
Davis’s hateful rhetoric in 1941, they also positioned thesmselves as so intrinsic to American life 
that the entire U.S. government was willing to overlook their many years of aggressive pro-
Fascism. Thankfully, America’s migrants today need not wait for a Fascist dictator to make 
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